SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND GLOBALIZATION

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İKSAD
Publishing House

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FOREWORD

This age, which we call the 21st century, is an age in which technology has increased, communication has accelerated, borders have been eliminated and global economic and political developments have emerged with a rapid change. The main factor behind this rapid change is globalization. In the emergence of the process of globalization, the basic dynamics of the human development, along with the historical evolution, are the changes in the information, communication and transportation technologies. These changes are influential in many aspects of our lives as a socio-economic factor, economic, social and cultural etc. around the world. it makes changes in many areas inevitable. In our world, which has entered into a rapid change with the globalization, the political organizations of the states, together with the rapid change process that emerged in the multinational corporations, together with the management philosophies, organizational structures and so on. they have to adapt their functions and functions according to the new process. In this book I have edited, the geopolitical struggles of middle-sized states in the process of globalization, the perspective of globalization and war in a different context, the fragmented world concept created by the phenomenon of globalization, are the international financial problems that have emerged in the process of globalization; Smart power concept of a new political concept emerged in the globalization process from the perspective of Turkey's Middle East and Africa policy again this context, Syria has made civil war of socio-economic and political origins and one of the most important problems of the growing world population together with globalization with food safety issues precious academics in the field regarding The studies are included.

ÖNSÖZ

21.Yüzyıl olarak adlandırdığımız bu çağ teknolojinin arttığı iletişimin hızlandığı sınırların ortadan kalkıp küresel ekonomik ve politik gelişmelerin hızlı bir değişimle ortaya çıktığı bir çağdır. Bu hızlı değişimin arkasında yatan temel etken ise küreselleşmedir. Küreselleşme sürecinin ortaya çıkmasında insanoğlunun yaşadığı tarihsel evrimle beraber asıl temel dinamikleri oluşturan faktörler ise bilgi, iletişim ve ulaşım teknolojilerindeki değişimlerdir. Bu değişimler sosyo ekonomik bir faktör olarak hayatımızın birçok noktasında etkisini göstermekte, dünya genelinde ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel vb. birçok alanda değişimleri kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. Küreselleşmeyle birlikte hızlı bir değişim içine giren dünyamızda devletler politik organizasyonlarını çok uluslu şirketler de ortaya çıkan hızlı değişim süreciyle beraber yönetim felsefelerini, organizasyon yapılarını vb. işlev ve fonksiyonlarını yeni sürece göre uyarlamak zorunda kalmışlardır. Editörlüğünü yaptığım bu kitapta küreselleşme sürecinde orta büyüklükteki devletlerin birbirleriyle olan jeopolitik mücadelelerini, küreselleşme ve savaş olgusuna farklı bir bağlamda bakış açısını, Küreselleşme olgusunun yarattığı parçalanmış dünya konsepti yine küreselleşme sürecinde ortaya çıkan uluslararası maliye sorunlarını; Küreselleşme sürecinde ortaya çıkan yeni bir politik kavram olan akıllı güç kavramı perspektifinden Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu ve Afrika politikalarını yine bu kapsamda Suriye iç savaşının sosyo ekonomik ve politik kökenlerini ve Küreselleşmeyle beraber artan dünya nüfusunun en önemli sorunlarından biri olan gıda güvenliği konusuyla ilgili alanında kıymetli akademisyenlerin yapmış olduğu çalışmalar yer almaktadır.

Dr. Kaan DİYARBAKIRLIOĞLU

CHAPTER 1

GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

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Introduction

Questions of national sovereignty in political science since Jean Boden has always occupied a significant place, but in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries new aspects have appeared in this area, especially in the context of the discussion of the problems of globalization and the new world order. The topic of change, "erosion", "disappearance", etc. of national sovereignty has become increasingly discussed in the political science literature. However, with a considerable number of works devoted to the problem of the transformation of sovereignty, certain and extremely important aspects of this problem have been overlooked. This article is devoted to the analysis of one of these insufficiently studied aspects — the voluntary reduction of sovereign prerogatives.

In this article, it is sought to prove that globalization as a whole contributes to changing and reducing the nomenclature and volume of sovereign powers of states, and the process is two-way: on the one hand, factors that objectively reduce the sovereignty of countries are strengthened, and on the other - most - The state of states voluntarily and consciously goes to its restriction. Of course, one can also talk about a number of important trends, tendencies and processes that

constitute the diverse, complex and in many respects contradictory dynamics of world political processes, as a result of which, in particular, there is not only a limitation of sovereignty, but something and its appreciable strengthening. But it is natural that in one article it is impossible to give a complete picture of all processes, therefore our main task is to investigate the tendency to change and reduce sovereign prerogatives, especially in connection with the voluntary actions of the owners of these sovereign prerogatives.

In our opinion, the processes of changing sovereignty in the modern era are among the most significant. Moreover, it seems that if such processes (of course, with large fluctuations) intensify, this should significantly affect all spheres of life, including changes in ideology and social psychology (a moment that is still underestimated by many analysts).

Sovereignty as a concept

Sovereignty in political science is usually defined as the most important feature of the state in the form of its complete independence within a certain territory, that is, its supremacy in domestic policy, as well as its independence in foreign policy. This concept became widespread in the 19th century. However, at the beginning of the new time, it received a rather clear interpretation in the works of N. Machiavelli, J. Boden, T. Hobbes and others.

In the Westphalian system of international relations, since it arose after the devastating 30 year European War and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the principles of the sovereignty of states gradually gained pan-European and then worldwide recognition[1]. But it is important to note that this "normative trajectory" of international law was fully described only by the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th centuries. As a result of the interpretation of the results of the Great French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the new order established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Today, the UN Charter and some other international agreements contain provisions on the sovereign equality of states and the right of nations to self-determination[2], which, along with In our opinion, the increased external security of most countries significantly contributed to the consolidation of the idea of national sovereignty in international relations in the second half of the 20th century. True, as we will see later, the tendency to recognize sovereign rights was combined with the tendency to voluntarily reduce them by the sovereigns themselves.

However, the concept of sovereignty is very complex and ambiguous[3], and its content has constantly changed and continues to change due to changes in international relations, the characteristics of states

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[1] Jayasuriya, Kanishka. "Globalization, law, and the transformation of sovereignty: the emergence of global regulatory governance." Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 6 (1998): 425.

[2] See. article 2 (1) of the UN. It states that the organisation `is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. Avaliable at https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/, accessed: May 25, 2019.

[3] De Benoist, Alain. "What is sovereignty?." Telos 1999.116 (1999): 99-118.

themselves, and even the difficulty of defining the concept of a state. This content also varied depending on who acted as the highest sovereign: a feudal monarch who has "the right to give or dismember states when dividing the inheritance", an enlightened absolute monarch who has already spoken on behalf of the people, or the nation itself. In addition, absolute sovereignty in theory, both of states and nations, is always strongly or even fatally limited to various factors. Sovereignty can be viewed in different aspects and versions[4]. In a word, the concept of sovereignty is not unambiguous and indisputable, but causes great controversy and therefore requires significant clarification, including in connection with the different approaches to the classification of the states themselves that have sovereignty.

In political science, it is gradually realized that it is necessary to rethink and reassess the concept of "sovereignty" in connection with the emergence of the global political community, clarifying the limits of private sovereignties, the principles of combining them with each other and building their hierarchy, taking into account the actions of various subjects: TNCs, numerous non-governmental organizations, multinational structures and events, as well as the development of various global ideologies, such as global civil society. The last decades of the twentieth century showed that the national state can no longer cope with the growing complexity of problems of a global nature[5].

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[4] De Benoist, ibid.
[5] Hurrelman, Achim et al., "Is there a legitimation crisis of the nation state?", Leibfried, Stephan, and Michael Zürn, eds. Transformations of the State?. Vol. 13. Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 120.

Especially many works on rethinking various aspects of the concept of sovereignty appeared in the 1990s under the influence of events related to direct intervention and military intervention (including that sanctioned by the UN) in relation to individual countries such as Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, Bosnia and others.

Globalization: the balance of pros and cons

There is no universally accepted definition of globalization and, probably, it will not appear in the near future, since the most diverse meaning is embedded in this concept. Without a claim to an unequivocal definition, we would define it as follows. Globalization is the process by which the world becomes more connected and more dependent on all of its actors. There is an increase in the number of common problems for states as well as an increase in the number and types of integrating subjects.

In other words, a peculiar system arises in which the problems of individual countries, nations, regions and other subjects (corporations, various associations, global media holdings, etc.) are combined into a single coil. Individual local phenomena and conflicts affect many countries. At the same time, decisions in the most significant centers of the world are reflected in the fates of all. In general, "the processes of globalization in the widest sense are characterized by a sharp increase and complication of mutual ties in the main areas of economic, political, and social life that are acquiring global dimensions". Globalization is an exceptionally diverse process. Virtually all areas of life experience

these effects. Many positive and negative phenomena are also becoming global - for example, the struggle to protect the environment, the anti-globalization movement itself, terrorism and criminality, the drug mafia, etc.

Any progress always means that a certain part of the changes in something worsens the situation compared to what it was before. In our opinion, a reduction in the volume of sovereign prerogatives simultaneously leads to positive and negative consequences. So, more than before, the openness of borders not only ensures the growth of trade, but also contributes to the spread of terrorism and facilitates drug trafficking. At the same time, the balance of pros and cons looks different for different countries, regions, territories and even for different strata of society. There is an ambiguous perception of globalization. It is not without reason that critics point to unevenness in receiving benefits from it and to the widening gap in the standard of living of different countries[6]. It is also important to note that by creating the contours of a new order, globalization at the same time breaks the old order that works within the framework of state systems, and the speed at which old relationships break down is often far ahead of the pace of new construction. In particular, in a number of countries this is very clearly manifested in the breakdown of traditional ideology based on sacralization of the homeland and nation, and, accordingly, the weakening of such previously highly valued qualities as patriotism, due

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[6] Lindert, Peter H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. Globalization and inequality: A long history. World Bank, 2001, p. 23.

to the growth of alternative national preferences and identifications. But in exchange, globalization has not yet created any ideology that has been shaped and capable of captivating the masses.

Globalization, economy and world politics

Globalization is the result of a very complex blend of political, social, economic, civilizational and many other processes of the modern world. But among these many factors, it is worth highlighting the huge changes in modern productive forces, the media, world trade and specialization. Characteristically, many researchers primarily point to the economic nature of globalization. But it is necessary to keep in mind an important and principled idea that has already been expressed by us: to recognize that economic and technical changes are the engine of globalization, it means to recognize that the process of globalization cannot be stopped or reversed by anyone, since today the development of new technologies is impossible stop, not even slow down. Therefore, in order to control the process of globalization — and such appeals, as well as complaints about its chaotic and unfair character, are very noticeable — it is necessary, first of all, to control the directions and rates of economic and technological development, which today looks utopia.

Technology and trade entangle the world with new network connections and make national borders transparent. Together with other factors, this

greatly complicates the external conditions in relation to the society[7]. As a result, globalization greatly reduces and changes the scope of national sovereignty and undermines the position of the state as the main subject of international relations. Thus, changes in the productive forces in one way or another lead to changes in all other areas of life, including the political sphere[8]. If the inevitable outcome of globalization is a reduction in sovereignty, then at the same time colossal changes in the patterns of knowledge of both states, corporations and groups, and the masses of ordinary people are also inevitable. And if the fate of the state (dies or is it strengthened?) Disputes are not uncommon, and then this result is less often discussed.

In other works, we have already substantiated both the fact itself and the reasons for the fact that before modern technical and economic forces the national borders have become much less serious than before. This is facilitated by many factors, in particular, the powerful development of trade, transport, the role of international capital, TNCs, etc[9]. It should also be borne in mind that "not only states interact in a globalizing world, but more and more territories and regions"[10]. We noted that the fastest growing areas of production are, by their nature,

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[7] Luppicini, Rocci. "Technoethical inquiry: From technological systems to society." Global Media Journal 2.1 (2009): 5.
[8] Luppicini, ibid.
[9] Scherer, Andreas Georg, Guido Palazzo, and Dorothée Baumann. "Global rules and private actors: Toward a new role of the transnational corporation in global governance." Business Ethics Quarterly 16.4 (2006): 505-532.
[10] Diener, Alexander C., and Joshua Hagen. "Theorizing borders in a 'borderless world': Globalization, territory and identity." Geography Compass 3.3 (2009): 1196-1216.

supranational. As examples, it is worth mentioning space technology or the Internet, which is increasingly being used for commercial purposes. Figuratively speaking, a modern person acquires the functions of a mini-station that receives and transmits various information, often at the same time bypassing national borders.

The close connection between national economies leads to a very fast and largely uncontrollable response to local crises in different places on the planet. This was confirmed by financial crises in different countries of recent times. Financial markets are unpredictable and unstable in nature - this is the conclusion of George Soros. One of the main reasons for this instability is rooted in the fact that political institutions lag behind the economy, which has long overgrown the national framework and requires supranational planning, some form of joint control over the sources of fluctuations in financial and other markets. Thus, a new world order is required. However, who will define its basic contours and rules? Globalization, sometimes appears in some works as a process of imposing the will of the United States on the rest of the world, establishing a new world order that would benefit the United States. Indeed, the US influence is obvious and very real[11]. But does this mean that it is precisely Pax Americana (that is, the American world) that should be established, as many in the United States sincerely believe? Of course it is possible. However, is it possible to constantly maintain such an order? It seems that it is rather doubtful. It seems more likely

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[11] Catley, Robert, and David Mosler. Global America: Imposing liberalism on a recalcitrant world. Praeger, 2000. P. 74.

that in the not too distant future the alignment of forces in the world will change. After all, the presence of some trends does not mean that the future is already foreshadowed. On the contrary, the direction, forms and results of processes will constantly depend on the changing balance of forces in the world, on the strategy chosen by certain countries and associations, on various geopolitical factors and combinations. In our opinion, this means that those who seek to play a more important role in an integrating and changing world must predict and predict trends, using them for their own purposes.

Globalization and the reduction of sovereignty

As mentioned above, in practice, the sovereign rights and powers of both states and nations have always been strongly limited by various factors. Nevertheless, at least in the heads of theorists, "Westphalian sovereignty" (that is, unlimited sovereign rights) still existed. In the modern era, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Westphalian system, with its principles of international relations, has changed significantly. It is also important to point out that today the idea of complete freedom of action of states even theoretically looks wrong. The fact is that the volume of internal sovereignty has greatly narrowed legally at the expense of international agreements, including in the area of human rights and even more in fact in connection with the already established patterns and traditions of the behavior of states. That is why

many political scientists believe that it is absolutely necessary to clarify or revise the concept of sovereignty[12].

In works devoted to the transformation of the position and role of the state in the modern world, there is a one-sided debate on whether the state system is strengthened or weakened, while the process seems very complicated and ambiguous, in which then these positions are weakened, but somewhat strengthened. Therefore, under the influence of powerful economic processes, state power is weakening[13], at the same time, the state began to regulate the problems that people themselves had previously solved, in particular, how to build their own house, arrange family relations, so that, there is almost no sphere in which the state bureaucracy would not interfere. We call it a paradox, although these are quite natural overlaps, since typologically similar processes never go single-linearly and only in one direction. A common vector is always a complex balance of multidirectional changes, and the weakening of the system is usually combined with the strengthening of some of its sides, if only by restructuring its components and changing hierarchy levels.

In connection with the foregoing, I would like to draw attention to a certain limitations of approaches in sovereignty studies, since many authors consider the question that powerful global economic supranational and largely anonymous forces influence the transformation of national sovereignty, changing it in general and

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[12] Caporaso, James A. "Changes in the Westphalian order: Territory, public authority, and sovereignty." International studies review 2.2 (2000): 1-28.
[13] Mathews, Jessica T. "Power shift." Foreign Affairs. 76 (1997): 50.

beyond as if against the will of the states themselves. At the same time, there is hardly any notice of another aspect of the problem, which just seems to us to be extremely important: sovereignty to a large (perhaps predominant) degree is reduced voluntarily by the national states themselves. These aspects were designated and investigated by us in a number of works.

Rejection of sovereign prerogatives: paradox or global trend?

In our opinion, there are a number of factors that influence the process of changing national sovereignty, including, of course, technological and economic changes, the desire to avoid wars, global problems that unite countries, regional convergence processes, the rapid increase in contacts all kinds and levels between residents of different countries; the need to jointly resolve many issues and resolve disputes; increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world, etc.[14] But we believe that the factor of voluntariness in reducing the volume of powers for the sake of acquiring additional prestige and benefits among them is one of the most important irreversibility of this movement.

It is enough to take a quick look at those areas in which sovereignty has declined in order to agree with what has been said. The right to establish duties and taxes and determine their size; prohibit and encourage the importation and exportation of goods (capital) and any activities; print money; take loans; establish rules for the maintenance of prisoners and the use of their labor; use the death penalty; proclaim certain political

[14]

freedoms or restrict them; the fundamental rules of elections (and their conduct itself) and of electoral qualifications, as well as many other important phenomena, were no longer determined solely by the wishes of the state itself. Not so long ago, the Europeans abandoned the holy saints - their own, for many centuries suffered national currencies for the sake of one common (euro). In the end, what has always been recognized mainly in sovereignty: the right of war and peace is under international control[15]. Today, such control almost does not impair national pride. World wars and totalitarianism have shown that absolute sovereignty, including the right to initiate wars and repression, is dangerous. From these quite obvious things we made an important conclusion: the internal affairs of the state, in which no one intervenes and which are governed only by national law and customs, are narrowed, and in many ways by sovereigns voluntarily giving up their sovereign rights, and international or a certain community right is expanding.

Without a doubt, many instances of voluntary commitments and treaties can be found in history, which significantly limited the sovereignty of sovereigns and countries. For example, the Holy Alliance and its intervention in revolutionary countries in the first half of the nineteenth century or the Customs Union of the German states of the first half of the XIX century. The processes of internationalization did not begin today, but is already going on for centuries and growing. But, as we

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[15] For more information see Murphy, Sean D. Principles of international law. Thomson West, 2006.

have already noted, the prevalence and power of these processes yesterday and today are not comparable; in other words, at the present time they have acquired a qualitatively different level compared to previous eras. First, they swept the whole world. Secondly, economic alliances were rare before; now they have become the most typical form of associations. And some economic organizations (such as the WTO, the IMF) include most countries of the world. The scale and goals of political alliances have also changed. Thirdly, the density and constancy of contacts between the leaders of countries have increased tremendously. The questions they solve have also changed significantly. Fourth, only a few countries today can pursue isolationist policies and not join any alliances. To set aside what was said, we would like to point out how strange it may seem that today the states have the greatest sovereignty ideologically (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and some other Muslim countries) and economically closed (like North Korea, Cuba), and it is precisely over their "sovereign rights" (in particular, to create nuclear weapons) that sharp conflicts arise. But in general, even in these countries, sovereignty begins to decline. As for sufficiently open and developed states, then, in our opinion, the tendency to delegate their powers to international, regional and global organizations and associations is quite obvious. The only exceptions are the United States, which sometimes allows itself to go contrary to the opinion of many countries, openly putting national interests above world and allied interests. But it seems to us that it is precisely in this confrontation between the United States and other countries expressing a certain collective opinion that the main intrigue of changing the world, as well

as the transformation of the principles of international relations, may be rooted in the future.

Thus, there is no doubt that today, compared with the past, the sovereignty of completely free and independent countries has become much less. And, very importantly, many states give up part of sovereign functions, often truly voluntarily. We believe that such altruism can be seriously explained only by the fact that such a restriction becomes advantageous, because in return, countries hope to get very real advantages. Naturally, such an "exchange" became in principle possible only as a result of the powerful influence of the described (and many not mentioned, but implied) processes. As an important reason for the reduction of sovereignty, in our opinion, it is necessary to indicate a kind of world public opinion: after all, the wider the circle of countries that consciously limit their sovereignty, the more deficient are states that do not make such restrictions.

Subnational, national, supranational: controversial tangle of interests

Many researchers still underestimate the seriousness of the consequences of changing sovereignty and the need to rethink not only this concept in the context of modern processes, but also many others related to it. At the same time, we agree that the state still remains (and will be long enough) the highest unit of historical and political life. In addition, the separation of new and old phenomena is always a very complicated matter, especially since the new order contains very strong elements of the old.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the volume of sovereign rights in the modern world has been strongly redistributed. Therefore, there is no more "united and indivisible" state, national or national sovereignty in the international community. Sovereignty is increasingly divided between supranational, national, subnational, and sometimes regional and municipal units. As a result, as was shown above, new powerful factors have emerged, which, ultimately, lead to the fact that it gradually gives way to a major sovereign to larger entities, including supranational, entities and structures. And, in our opinion, this trend will increase. On the other hand, this is not a one-sided and unambiguous, but a multifaceted process: in some ways sovereignty will be reduced (for example, in matters of economic strategy), but in something fixed and even grow. For example, the ethnically linguistic, cultural and social functions of the state will increase. Therefore, it is dangerous to rush too much into burying a national state. It will be a leading player for a long time (and, in general, one should be quite cautious in forecasts of global political changes). In addition, as some researchers rightly point out, a sharp reduction in the sovereignty and traditional functions of the state can cause chaos.

Although sovereignty is shrinking, it seems that this principle itself (more precisely, appeal to it in certain cases) is likely to be one of the most important in international relations for a long time. Therefore, open disrespect for him will continue to cause condemnation. When old ideas are still alive and new ones are not established, clashes can take the form of a confrontation of principles, which hides their historical

content. Then it is difficult to understand who is right and who is guilty. For example, if with respect to even dictatorial regimes it is rudely and openly to flout the principle of sovereignty, relying on the right of the strong, sympathy may turn out to be on the reactionary, in fact, side. The 2003 Iraq War proves it. Therefore, from the legal and moral point of view, truly flawless arguments that would be based on the decisions of world organizations (first of all, the United Nations) are desirable. That is why it is precisely these kinds of sanctions that are so important to support actions against violating regimes.

So, as was shown above, since post-war time, the tendency for countries to gradually transfer part of their sovereignty to worldwide international organizations has become increasingly clear. An even greater part of sovereignty passes to regional associations. And the integration of states into supranational economic associations is becoming an increasingly important part of globalization. Such supranational formations are already present on all continents, and in some cases there has been a transformation of economic unions into political ones. Of course, the process of creating truly well formed, systemically and deeply integrated supranational entities cannot be fast. Nor will it, in our opinion, be smooth, simply because its members cannot ignore their own interests and not oppose them to each other. And within countries themselves, different political forces interpret national goals in very different ways. In a word, the lapping of supra and intrastate interests is a difficult process, here various collisions are inevitable. In addition, common goals can be interpreted in different ways. The example of the

United States, which has managed to tighten into a tight knot purely national narrow political problems (such as the upcoming elections or the need to raise the president's popularity) with world interests, is in this sense very significant.

Globalization and nationalism

Globalization has a dual effect on nationalism. On the one hand, there is a tendency to a decrease in national sovereignty, on the other hand, a rapid growth of nationalism, the desire of even the smallest nations to find their own sovereignty. At first glance, the explanation of the reasons for separatism in the modern period to which we arrived may seem paradoxical: nationalism is intensifying because states as systems are weakening. However, as we have already pointed out, there is no paradox here, especially given the fact that the security of most states is in fact provided by the world community in the person of the most powerful states. In addition, nations are not eternal beings, but ethno-political communities that most often take shape within the framework of states and under the influence of technological changes. Under certain conditions, their cohesion and uniformity increase, while with others, on the contrary, they weaken. Therefore, the formation of supranational systems in the twentieth century went parallel with the destruction not only of the colonial empires, but also of a number of old and newly emerged states, especially multinational ones, among which even seemed to be very stable (USSR, and earlier, at the beginning of the process, Austria-Hungary). And such a breakdown, we think, plays a somewhat progressive role, facilitating regional and world

integration. But this is a very painful and destructive progress, which confirms the ideas expressed above that progress and regress always go hand in hand. The whole question is in their balance sheet.

Thus, we believe that, on the one hand, the world is still waiting for decades, when national problems will be very acute in different regions and countries, since the causes of nationalist and secessionist conflicts are very diverse. But, on the other hand, there is a growing conviction that the right of nations to self-determination has become "opium for peoples". The narcissism of small differences between ethnic groups flourishes, and the strengthening ethnic ideology, according to other researchers, creates almost the main resource for the revival of violence today. At the same time, however, although inconsistently and with difficulty, a negative attitude to the abuse of this right is being formed in world public opinion. As a result, in our opinion, gradually aggressive nationalism, splitting states and creating a threat to world order, should decline. By no means is it that nations and national differences disappear. It seems to us that development will proceed in a direction when national issues, problems and attitudes are transferred from the sphere of the highest politics and hot fights to a calmer plane, approximately as it happened with the relationship between the different directions of Christianity in most European countries.

What happens in the future?

Reflecting on the integration processes, you inevitably ask yourself: will you succeed in any way, and if so, in what way, to reconcile the diverse interests of hundreds of states that have not only a different culture, but a very large development gap? After all, the acceleration of the pace of development of the world and the limited time for solving global and other problems make it impossible to wait until the lagging countries find their own path of development, since such a search may in some cases last for centuries. The opinion that it is only possible to ensure progress towards overcoming backwardness when creating an effective market and an effective state, of course, has reasons. Well, and if the institution of the state is weak, as in Tropical Africa and some other places and what to do if, on the contrary, the state is so strong that it can prevent objectively necessary changes (as in North Korea or in Cuba)? and what about countries whose population and even elite are not able to understand global problems?

Conclusion

The problem is already moving to the supranational level and is associated with the transformation of sovereignty and with external influence on those countries that do not have the strength for independent changes. But we are convinced that, no matter how mild such influence from outside, it will somehow affect sovereignty. Its restriction, in our opinion, has two levels. On the one hand, the developing countries themselves are ready to unite in regional

communities in order to defend their interests together and solve problems. On the other hand, they are associated with a global confrontation between developed and developing countries (the North-South problem). Here is an example of changes at the first level. Regional organizations in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as in Latin America after Iraq, adopted a new, stricter policy regarding terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. But they want to solve these problems with their own means, on their own territory and with the help of independent peacekeeping structures, which they themselves develop.

At the second level, the dialogue between country associations (for example, the EU and groups of African countries) is increasingly active. But the most important thing is that there are important reasons that, as we think, in the medium term, can force developed countries to more actively speed up the development of the most backward countries in the world. First of all, we are talking about global issues. They affect the entire world community, so the interest of the West in their solution in backward countries will inevitably grow. And the latter, it seems, in turn, one way or another, will have to limit sovereignty in order to adapt to general rules. For example, we would venture to suggest that since the demographic and environmental problems are closely related, it is possible that population regulation will gradually become not only a national, but also a common cause. After all, in order to solve many common problems, it is necessary to realize that development cannot go all the way in breadth, that conscious consumption restriction is

required, as well as mechanisms that can make most countries accept such restrictions.

Globalization, although it began far from today, is a generally new, unexplored, most complex and largely unpredictable process. At the same time, one should not exaggerate the already large role of the economy in the transformation of the state. The economy is a leading factor in this plan only in the long run. For a fundamental change of sovereignty, we believe, very serious changes are still needed in other areas of society, just as there were few changes in the economy to form a bourgeois society, but political revolutions were also required. Therefore, in our opinion, the problem of combining national and supranational, group and world interests will remain the most important for a long period. Only an institutional solution to this gigantic problem will eventually establish a more or less stable new world order. But not the order that is so confidently spoken in the United States and NATO, but, hopefully, a system of more balanced consideration of the interests of different regions and countries. However, the path to such an order is unclear, complex and controversial. Naturally, this requires time, during which a fundamental revolution must take place in the worldview of elites and peoples, as a result of which national problems will first be viewed through the prism of common and then in the context of common (regional and world) tasks and problems.

CHAPTER 2

FRAGMENTED FRACTURED WORLD

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Introduction

The method used in the study is argumentation as well as relevant literature review. The core ideas are going to be schematised and thereby going to be discussed throughout the article. The aim is try to argue the existence of a meta-discourse with all the discursive elements which are going to be analyzed, discussed and concluded. Henceforth, the study is going to be mainly theoretical and it is going to give a descriptive and explanatory account of science and knowledge as well as the world, which is cracked, fragmented and fractured.

The study is going to take the snapshot of social life and international relations in post modern age. One of the presuppositions of this study is that social life is epistemologically associated with social science theories or social science meta-theory if there is any. The second presupposition is that the actual side of international relations is epistemologically associated with international relations theories. Inferring from the presupposed association between actual life and pure social science, the study is going to interrogate whether social life in post modernity allows a unified social science meta-theory in general and a political science theory in particular. This is going to be part of the problematic of the study. As the study will have taken the snapshot of uncertain, cracked and fragmented world, one of the main arguments is whether there could be an integrated international relations theory

just like there had been in the age of modernity such as positivistically oriented international relations theories idealism and realism.

In international relations literature, there is one relevant article in Turkish namely Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Epistemolojik Paradigma Tartışmaları: Post-Pozitivist Kuramlar (Discussions on the Epistemological Paradigm in the Discipline of International Relations: Post-Pozitivist Theories). Though this study seems to be similar in contents to the mentioned article, the focus, scope, viewpoint are different just like the forthcoming argumentation. Henceforth, this study is novel in its different facets. This is strength for the study. However, the two presuppositions mentioned in the beginning tend to be reductionist. Thereby, there will be exceptions which this study may not be able to explain. This is a major weakness for this study.

1. Literature Review

Post-modern age is accepted to be started after 1960's. From historical perspective, postmodernism could be seen as the super-structural expression of American economic and military power or at least the end of Euro-Centrism... In other words, two big changes in modernism allowed the appearance of post modernism: it is the end of control of Europe in the rest of the world and the development of a platform for local or minority cultures. It is also the refusal of one certain science understanding and reaction to excessive rationalization of and thereby loss of sensitivity of personhood. It is also a reaction to distractive repercussions of the control of intermediary mind and its destructiveness (Ateş, 2013, pp.393-394).

Postmodern public administration is categorised under to headings: pessimists and optimistic post-modern thinkers. According to pessimistic viewpoint, scepticism and fragmentation, division, disease, meaninglessness and social chaos have been predicted. Baudrilliard, Heidegger and Nietzsche are such pessimistic thinkers. This category is more widespread in Europe. It forecasts environmental disaster,

unlimited and uncontrollable capitalism and other humanitarian and natural disasters within the scope of postmodern discourse. Pessimists try to solve the cases and developments through the methods such as negating them and language analyses. They keep distance to such dialogues "What should be done?" According to this view, trying to correct rotten concepts, cases, order and developments give negative response and strengthens the cases to be wanted to correct. Henceforth, pessimist postmodern thinkers keep silent in order not to share responsibility in these negative developments. They think that it is enough to understand the situation and they must not take part in the events as an individual (Ateş, 2013, pp.404-405).

One of the most plausibly forecastable forthcoming world orders is the United States' global hegemony projection and the other is a world order projection based on cooperation which prioritises "globalisation" again and just like the one which started to be shaped in the late 1990's (Falk, 2005, p.13). The future of world order is definitely uncertain (Falk, 2005, p.12).

We must adopt non-violent struggle tactics and values. We must follow the part of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King who displayed a kind of belief and activism, it could be said that they claimed their spiritual ancestors were Christ and Buddha righteously. We have this opportunity. From the beginning until the end in our educational practises, we must inspire a pedagogy which is nonviolent from the first years of our lives until the last ours of it. We must desert the violent political culture with in visages security as in our weapons either stocked in homeland or as explained collectively placing mass destruction weapons everywhere in the world...

Albeit controversial due to some serious reasons, humanitarian international interventions conducted at least became the expression of rising responsibility understanding about the prevention of torture behind the walls of hegemonic states in international community as in Bosnia and Chile. Liberating humanitarian solidarity idea has started to

be more influential than immeasurable disproportionateness in sovereignty practises which nationalism invokes and tribal ambitions cause (Falk, 2005, pp.328-329).

Some problems such as hunger, disease and homelessness in our cities which are called Third World problems and those other similar ones did not decrease by the permanent progress of Western civilisation; on the contrary, these problems have been caused by this progress. Perhaps it could be accepted that these developments have not been direct repercussions of scientific progress; but, even if so, these developments have been fostered by the belief that research methods are universally applicable, research results "objectively" correct and thereby both two ought to be used universally and they have been fostered by scientists who think so (Feyerabend, 2017, p.10)

A scientific theory which organises the standards which are viable for all scientific studies and structural elements and which has been justified by citations to mind and rationalism may allure those who are unfamiliar with the subject. However, such a thing is very rough tool for scientists who are familiar with a variety of concrete research problems... What we could only is preparing a historical account of the details also including the social conditions, coincidences and personal traits... The achievement of a particular method could not be the justification of dealing with unresolved problems in a standard way. Such an approach assumes that there are methods which could be departed from particular research conditions and whose existence guarantees achievement. However, there are not such methods. Justifying the quantification of human behaviour could not be based on citing the successfulness of "science." It is, therefore, null and void claim. Quantification is plausible in some instances but implausible in others (Feyerabend, 2017, p.11).

Science is not a whole, the forces which science consists of are unequal (Feyerabend, 2017, p.12).

First World Science is just only one of a plethora of ways of knowledge (Feyerabend, 2017, p.13).

Quantum theory even tells about facets of nature which differ from each other, which does not correspond with each other which could be explained by distinctive and non-corresponding approaches (Feyerabend, 2017, p.14)

Transition to modern political system from old political system where political power stems from flamboyant wealth is plausibly and increasingly unseeingly blurred. The tool of administration exploited by un-nominated persons instead of ruler who personifies political power and transition to covert punishment to overt punishment characterise this process (Foucault, 2017).

Political power which prioritises itself has obstacled formation of individual. In darkness, modern power wants to individualise, take under surveillance and punish everybody, thereby it hegemonizes them (Foucault, 2017).

Henceforth, modern political power has individualised child by school, lunatic by mental hospital, soldier by army, criminal by prison, has registered them, has quantified them, thereby it has become sovereign. As soon as every person has been registered, somewhere everybody will become under control and will be kept under surveillance. Modern political power is a big surveillance (Foucault, 2017).

Sociological study consists of explaining the dialectics between corporeal history and history of things and habitus and area and this leads us to the mystery of social life. Henceforth, mental structures (habitus) and social structures (area) are interconnected, intertwined and they correspond to each other. They are tied with each other genetically and consecutively: society shapes tendencies, ways of existing, feeling, thinking and doing in the category of individuals on

one hand and individuals shape society by doing in accordance with these tendencies on the other hand (Wacquant, 2014, p.447).

Moreover, capital varieties are plural are plural and convertible: In today's societies inequalities are not born by economic capital (heritage, income, etc) only but at the same time by cultural capital (education, diplomas), social capital (beneficial social connections) and by symbolic capital (prestige, recognition). This is the definition of eligible and dynamic sociology which can trace the material and symbolic struggle which produces history (Wacquant, 2014, p.447).

Bourdieu conducts social science by way of participating in public debates. His major works interrogate big socio-political issues of the age (Wacquant, 2014, p.447).

2. Discussion

As it was mentioned in the Literature Review, Euro-Centrism was replaced by American hegemony after World War II. Collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 resulted in the collapse of the bipolar world. The antecedent era has been characterised by worldwide chaos, uncertainty, imbalances and cracks in international relations, political and economic instability and disproportionateness. The world has become uni-polar or multi-polar with no certain fixed equilibrium. American sovereignty has been shadowed by mass terrorism of any origin, religious, ethnic, racial or uncertain. For the first time after World War II, soldiers worthy protect civilians in streets of European capitals against massive terrorists who were hanging over humankind like the sword of Damocles. Bi-polarity was unity in one certain sense, too: political identity of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation versus political identity of Warsaw Pact and the rest Third World. However the puzzle fell on the ground and many pieces have been missing. The puzzle has been cracked, fractured and disintegrated. This is like something undoing. Traditional good old days were over and there has not yet been any integrative key or handling device for chaotic world affairs. The crack

in the world has been so deep that totality has been lost totally. As epistemologically science and knowledge were presupposed to be mirrors of actual life or there were presupposed to be complimentary of missing pieces the world and nature puzzle, science and knowledge have also been fragmented, disintegrated. This opposes to modern positivistic paradigm which has allured science and intelligentsia. High ideals of Enlightenment, elaborate masterpieces of high culture have been replaced by other forms of knowledge, popular culture and what we could call peripheral civilizations. Modernist paradigm defended and proved the existence of just one human civilization; however, that has been replaced by one centre and nine peripheral civilizations argument by Samuel Huntington. Unity in logic and dialectics in methodology have been threatened by post-positivist paradigm, because dichotomies have been disintegrated or perplexed by spell-casting post-positivism.

Modernist unity was discarded by postmodern end of history in international relations. Albeit one unified Germany, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and even the Soviet Empire fell into pieces. Nation states have been threatened by many uncertain, impure and disintegrative forces like terrorism, ethnic or micro nationalism, and international circulation of destructive weapons; drug trafficking, disinformation and manipulation of local regional and international public vote by a variety of sources and elements, et cetera.

Henceforth, social science paradigms, as were presupposed to mirror actual world in the Introduction, have been partial, particular and disintegrated.

The following table (Table 1) is the brief account of post-positivist international relations theories some of which are the derivatives of relevant social science theories. They are accepted post-positivist according to a variety of parameters, videlicet they are partial, they are disintegrative and they are non-integral. Another parameter is the age of the theorist when s/he developed her theory. The table also includes

major theorists of individual theories. Furthermore, the table also shows each post-positivist theory's interconnection and interrelation with modernism. How the theory takes its position in international relations is also be inquired and studied.

In international relations discipline there have been five major theoretical standpoints, videlicet critical theory, constructivism, normativism, post-modernism and feminism. These perspectives have highly been associated with social sciences and relevant interdisciplinary studies.

Table 1: Post-Positivist International Relations Theories

	Critical Theory	Constructivism	Normativism	Post- Modernism	Feminism
Parameter 1: Chronology	Influential in international relations in 1990's	Major works in international relations literature in 1990's	Normativism interrogates late 1990's and re-constructs 21. century international system	Started to appear in international relations literature in 1980's	Became a school of thinking in international relations in 1980's
Parameter 2: Coverage of post-positivist theories	Based on critique of modernism, non-integral, partial	International relations as a human construct	Prioritizes ethics and partial	Critique of modernism but not as integral and comprehensive as modernism	Focuses on critique of man-made, patriarchal, masculine, androgenic nature international relations, partial, non-integral
Parameter 3: Focus in international relations	Constructing a universal legal order	Nation state as a social network	Construction of universal ethics, individual as major actor	Supra- and super-national constructs	"Manly" war and military service as legitimizing violence
Parameter 4: Interrelation and interconnection with modernity	Critique of positivism	A new dimension in classical subject-object distinction, profundity in social reality	One of the three sources of the knowledge with positivism and rationalism	Critique and collapse of modernism	Critique of modern system and epistemology
Major theorists in international relations	Robert W. Cox, Andrew Linklater	Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, John Ruggie, Alexandere Wendt	Richard Falk	Richard Ashley, James Der Derian, Rob. B. J. Walker, William Candy ve David Campbell	Sandra Harding, J. Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Christine Sylvestre

Briefly and one by one post-positivist international relations theories could be summarised in the light of Table 1 as follows: Critical theory has been influential in international relations since 1990's. It is based on critique of modernism; it is non-integral, partial in terms of international relations approach. Its main focus is constructing a universal legal order. It critiques positivism (Bilgier, 2011, pp.154-160). As for constructivism, its major works in international relations literature appeared in 1990's. It conceptualises international relations as a human construct. It conceptualises nation state as a social network. It brings about a new dimension in classical subject-object distinction with its profundity in social reality (comp. Bilgier, 2011, pp.160-165). Normativism interrogates international relations in late 1990's and re-constructs 21. century international system. It prioritizes ethics and it is partial to explain international relations system. Post-modernism started to appear in international relations literature in 1980's. It is critique of modernism but it is not as integral and comprehensive as modernism. It prioritises supra- and super- national constructs. It critiques modernism and defends that modernism has collapsed (comp. Bilgier, 2011, pp.169-172). Feminism became a school of thinking in international relations in 1980's. It focuses on critique of man-made, patriarchal, masculine, androgenic nature of international relations. It is partial, non-integral in terms of explaining international relations. It critiques "manly" war and military service as a source for legitimizing violence. It critiques modernist system and epistemology (Bilgier, 2011, pp.172-176).

3. Conclusion

There is a liaison between actual life and epistemology. As in the age of post-modernity, social life and international relations are fragmented, cracked and fractured. Therefore and thereby, social sciences epistemology in general and international relations epistemology in particular have likewise outlook and they are inherently like this. Positivism was able to make sense in the age when there was modern

age, polarity and when social life and international relations were as regularly explainable as Newtonian universe. Moreover, as it could be inferred from was cited from Wacquant about Bourdieu sociology in the Literature Review, the mind of post-modern subjects has had likewise structures and codes.

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CHAPTER 3

MEDIUM POWERS AND REGIONAL COMPETITION: CASES OF FRANCE AND SPAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH AFRICA

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Introduction

Foreign policy can be defined as "the attitude of a country towards other countries on specific issues" (Sönmezoğlu, 2014: 11), as "aims, strategies and behaviour of states within the international system and vis-à-vis the other states" (Arı, 2001: 21) or simply as the implications of the decisions made by policy actors in the area of international politics. Foreign policy outputs are an outcome of a complex policy making process where various political actors at different policy levels interact and compete with each other. Foreign policy outputs are a result of interaction between domestic political setting and international setting and it is a multi-level process that requires a multi-dimensional analysis.

This study analyses the French and Spanish foreign policies in the Mediterranean and North Africa from a comparative perspective within the context of historical background of policies, the international status and power of the states and foreign policy actors. The reason for choosing French and Spanish cases stems from the fact that both states have a similar geographical proximity to the region.

Moreover, both countries are medium powers with similar potential in the international arena and their interests may clash leading to regional competition. In the first part of the study, the factors affecting the regional policies of France and Spain and their perceptions about the Mediterranean and North Africa are compared. This comparison is followed by analyses of tools and aims of regional policy. In the last part of the study, the regional policies of these two medium powers are analysed within the European Union framework, which added a new level to foreign policy making process in both states.

Factors Affecting the French and Spanish Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean and North Africa

Both France and Spain are two major states of Southern Europe, which have borders and common interests in Mediterranean and North Africa. The foreign policies of the two states towards region are shaped by factors such as historical ties with the region, their position in the international system as medium powers, their approach to changing international system dynamics and the actors of foreign policy making. Economic conditions, military and security interests are also important factors shaping a state's foreign policy, however, for the purpose of this study, they can be considered within the context of power and international position of the given states.

The historical dimension of French and Spanish foreign policy in the Mediterranean and North African regions can be traced back to their imperial past in the region. While both states were major colonial powers once, they gradually lost their colonies. However, the loss of

colonial status did not mean that the influence of these countries erodes from the region. On the contrary, both France and Spain gave a great deal of importance to their historical, cultural, economic, political and military ties with their former colonies. After the Second World War, both states focused on intensifying their relations with the Mediterranean and African countries in order to compensate the loss of territory and power due to the dissolution of their colonial empires (Gillespie, 2001). In other words, for France and Spain, Africa and the Mediterranean were perceived as an alternative foreign policy domain to the foreign policy failures in other regions (Daguzan, 2009: 388) and colonial ties were utilized as means of retaining power status in the region.

Despite this common point of origin, it is possible to argue that their colonial past led to different foreign policy approaches and strategies for Spain and France. The first difference in this context is the way in which these states managed the independence and nation-state building processes of their former colonies. France opted for retreating from the region physically and transferring political sovereignty to its colonies and tried to continue its political power and presence in the region by means of bilateral agreements on a variety of issues. On the other hand, the geographical proximity of Spain to its former colonies made actual retreat a problematic option for Spanish policy makers and independence of colonies created border issues between Spain and the newly-independent states. The Sub-Saharan land conflict with Morocco and Algeria has been a major factor in shaping Spanish

foreign policy in the region in the post-independence period and its political presence as the former colonial power (Powell, 2009: 531). Spain is the only European country that has territory in North Africa and this created problems in the relations with the states of the region and shaped the regional interests of Spain (Lopez-Garcia and Larramendi, 2002: 170). Thus, it can be argued that the territories shaped by the independence of colonies were more challenging for Spanish foreign policy in comparison to that of France.

The colonial past of the two states in the region also created cultural ties with the newly-independent former colonies. However, there are various differences in terms of establishment of these cultural ties and cultural policies for Spain and France as well. The fact that Spanish territory has been a home for Arab-Islamic civilization created the suitable conditions for cultural exchange between Spain and its former colonies (Harbron, 1956 135). In addition to the Arab influnces, Spain was also under the Jewish impact as a result of the sizeable Jewish population in the empire and this dual impact enabled Spain to establish better relations with the countries in the region (Echeverria, 1999: 98). As a result of these influences, Spanish foreign policy was in line with a pro-Arab position until the end of Cold War and emergence of new understandings of threat and security. A pro-Palestine and pro-Arab foreign policy together with an anti-colonial rhetoric increased the credibility of Spain in Arab and African worlds (Gillespie, 2000: 23). The positive image of Spain in its former

colonies was to a great extent, shaped by cultural similarities and the perception of equality of the newly-independent states.

While Spain chose to retain its colonial ties through cultural similarity and equality, in the French case, the main means of retaining these ties was cultural hegemony and legitimizing its regional presence through a civilizing mission (Medard, 2005: 28). France tried to protect its colonial power in Africa and the Mediterranean through linguistic and cultural aspects with the pretext of creating a Francophone region tied by a common language and culture (Renau, 2002: 3). France saw Africa as its backyard and natural policy domain because of its imperial past (Martin, 1995: 5). This perception of the region led to establishment of hegemonic and unequal relations with the newly-independent states instead of relations based on equality and partnership leading to mistrust towards France in the former colonies.

In addition to the historical and cultural ties, the international status of France and Spain and changes in the international system also affected their African and Mediterranean policies. The common characteristic of France and Spain is the fact that they are defined as medium powers in the international system. Medium powers are the states, which have marginal effect over international system but which also have a potential to become regional powers (Oran, 2001). Medium powers are in constant competition in terms of their regional policies. This competition is a dual one as they are both in competition among themselves in order to retain and increase their area of influence and in competition with the global powers in order to protect their regional

political, economic and security interests. However, the medium powers have limited military, economic and political resources, thus, in order to protect their status in the international system, they choose to focus on the regions, where they have a traditional domain of influence. Africa and the Mediterranean are such regions for Spain and France, which they utilize to increase their international power (Delgado, 2011: 41). While they compete with each other in terms of regional influence, Spain and France also need to cooperate against the intrusion of global powers, such as the United States, China and Russia, in the region (Tavati, 2007: 9).

The medium powers use the international organizations as a means to increase and retain their regional influence. In addition to bilateral agreements and unilateral initiatives, using multilateral frameworks for their regional interests constitutes a rational foreign policy tool that decreases the costs of regional policies. Especially after the end of Cold War, both for Spain and France, initiatives of international organizations, mostly the European Union, have been a major resource of regional policy (Powell, 2009: 553). The end of Cold War created a great challenge for medium powers of the international system as in the absence of a bipolar world order, they had to redefine their foreign policy priorities and strategies and had to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the new balance of power. While it was possible for the medium powers to establish regional hegemony by using the power struggle among the great powers during the Cold War (Kolodziej, 1971: 503), the new world order established in 1990s

according to a single great power made it difficult for the medium powers to carry out an independent and more effective foreign policy (Oran, 2001).

African-Mediterranean policy of France and Spain was affected by their regional competition in addition to their relations with great powers. The different and clashing geopolitical interests of the two states create a power struggle and regional competition (Gillespie, 2001: 22). After Spanish membership to the European Community, Africa and the Mediterranean ceased to be reserved domain for France and France lost its unique position of leadership in determining the European Community's policies and strategies towards the region (Marquina, 1998: 237). The competition between these two states was affected by the powers, resources and international positions of France and Spain and made Spain the "junior partner of France in determining European policy towards Africa and the Mediterranean" (Gillespie, 1997: 38). The Spanish presence in Africa was shadowed by French interests and their different approaches to imperial policies increased French impact in the region making Spanish impact and presence dependent on cooperation with France (Gillespie, 2000: 135).

The last factor that determines the regional policies of France and Spain is the nature of foreign policy institutions and actors. There are important differences between Spain and France in terms of the process and actors of foreign policy making leading to different policy outcomes in Africa and the Mediterranean. Spanish foreign policy is

the output of a parliamentary decision-making process, while French foreign policy is the reserved domain of the president. This difference creates two important outcomes. Firstly, as a result of change of government, Spanish foreign policy changes more easily and more drastically due to the different foreign policy perceptions of different political parties (Gillespie, 2000: 35), while French foreign policy is more institutionalized and more resistant to change due to its immunity to changes in the composition of the parliament (Medard, 2005: 30). The second output of differences in foreign policy making is related with the transparency of the policy making process. In Spain, foreign policy is one of the areas of political party competition, thus it is open to pressures from the public opinion and open to discussion, making it easy to adopt to changing political condition. On the other hand, as the reserved domain of the president, French foreign policy far from debate and transparency and instead of institutionalized processes, it is carried out through informal and personal channels. The institutional structure of foreign policy making is determining factor for regional strategies and capacities of both countries, however, in order to fully understand its impact, it is important to deal with the Mediterranean and African perceptions of Spain and France.

Mediterranean and African Perceptions of France and Spain

The Mediterranean and African perceptions of France and Spain experienced a major change after the end of Cold War and especially due to September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and March 11 2004 train

bombings in Madrid. In the Cold War period, Mediterranean and Africa were means of affecting international system and strengthening their international position (Baurmaud, 1995). In order to benefit from the power struggle between the United States and Soviet Russia, both France and Spain used their historical presence in the Mediterranean and Africa for emphasizing their geopolitical and strategic importance for the security of great powers. Within this context, while for Spain Morocco was of strategic importance, for France, it was Algeria that constituted the key to regional policies (Marquina, 1998: 245).

After the Cold War, when these two medium powers ceased to have a geopolitical importance in the new world order, Africa and the Mediterranean became a source of energy supply and export market for Spain and France (Echeverria, 1999: 98-99). The main motive for retaining political influence in the Mediterranean and North Africa was the economic concerns such as the region's very rich natural gas resources and its geographical proximity as a market for Spanish and French products. However, these economic perceptions about the region that emerged with the end of Cold War had to undergo a major change as a result of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to the United States and March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, also known as 9/11 of Spain. With the emergence of threat of global terrorism, Mediterranean and Africa became a source of potential threat to security for Spain and France and also for Europe in general. Security concerns started to be the major determinant of regional policies and both states built their strategies on the issue of regional

and global security. The new threats of 2000s and the new security understanding were seen as an opportunity by these two medium powers to increase their strategic importance and status in the international system after the Cold War.

The Aims of Mediterranean-African Policy

The common aim of French and Spanish Mediterranean-African policies is to protect their economic and security interests by creating regional stability. In the Spanish case, economic interests, diversification of energy resources, protection of medium power status in the international system and national security are major aims of regional policy (Gillespie, 2000). The major aims of French policy in the Mediterranean and Africa are "to protect the international status of the country after the loss of colonial empire, to secure access to strategic resources and to preserve its monopoly over access to the African ruling elite" (Renau, 2002: 6).

"The fear of regional instability" (Villaverde, 2000: 132) is a common concern for Spain and France in their Mediterranean and African policies. Spain defines itself as the "Southern gate of Europe" (Belen, 2002: 2) and aims to strengthen its international profile by emphasizing its strategic importance for Europe in terms of protecting the continent from threats such as terrorism and illegal migration that could come from the south (Barbe, 2000: 53). Spain aims to protects its territories and economic interests and in doing this, continuation of economic relations and protection of regional stability become much more important than promotion of democracy and protection of

human rights in the Mediterranean and African states (Lopez and Larramendi, 2002: 178).

Similarly, for France, prevention of the threat of terrorism and preservation of economic and political security are priorities of Mediterranean and African policies. For the French foreign policy, "economic prosperity, political stability and national security interests provide sufficient reasons to overlook the democracy and human rights violations in the region" (Wood, 2002: 93). Pro-Western authoritarian regimes are preferred to democratic plural regimes that could be a potential source of political instability and protection of friendly authoritarian regimes becomes a foreign policy priority in the Mediterranean and Africa (Emerson, 2008: 3). France tries to protect its international position and increase its strategic importance through becoming and remaining as a nuclear power and to this end, the mineral resources in Africa are of vital importance (Medard, 2005) and in order to continue its access to resources and its regional presence, preservation of privileged political relations with the regional leaders has been a key aim of French foreign policy in the Mediterranean and North Africa. While both France and Spain have similar aims in terms of focusing on economic and political stability in order to protect their interests, the instruments used to this end reveal differences.

The Instruments of African and Mediterranean Policy

The common feature of foreign policy instruments of France and Spain in the Mediterranean region is the increasing dominance of economic and political instruments over military instruments. For both countries, while using economic and political foreign policy instruments, the most important means are multilateral agreements and action taken within the framework of international organizations instead of unilateral actions. Development aid has been a major foreign policy tool in both cases and while the official discourse for development aid has been promotion of democratic norms, both Spain and France used this instrument to support friendly regimes in the Mediterranean and Africa.

Reduction of military presence and instruments of Spain in the region is a consequence of increasing public pressure over political parties in terms of foreign policy change after the Madrid bombings (Belen, 2002). As a result of the public opinion that rejects military interventions, Spain opted for economic instruments in foreign policy and tried to improve its economic relations with the region (Gillespie, 2000: 41; 56). Spain followed a policy of non-intervention to internal affairs of the Mediterranean and African states and channelled more economic resources to the region as a security measure (Echeverria, 1999: 103-104). In order to prevent potential security threats from the region, Spain used economic instruments such as debt relief, financial aid, increasing the number of diplomatic representatives and utilizing international aid agencies (Powell, 2009: 533). These instruments

were mostly used in countries of priority for Spanish security, such as Algeria and Morocco (Barbe and Lecha, 2005).

After the independence of its colonies, France retained its presence in the region primarily by military means. The former imperial power signed treaties with the newly independent states and established military bases by which it increased its international position (Marchal, 1998: 363). In addition to the defence agreements, France also provided technical and education assistance to the new armies established during the independence period and secured its continuous presence in its former colonies. France took an active role in state building and bureaucratization process in the new states as well (Medard, 2005: 36) and established a 'franc zone' with its former colonies in order to be able to shape their economic policies (Martin, 1995: 12).

The most important characteristic of France's foreign policy instruments is the fact that they were used through patronage networks and personal ties between the French president and political elite of the former colonies (Baurmaud, 1995: 88). Since the Mediterranean and African policy of France is a reserved domain for the president, all foreign policy instruments were utilized in the region through "secret networks" (Renau, 2002: 10). Most specifically, financial aid was used to protect pro-French leaders of the region and to support the authoritarian regimes as long as they served French economic and political interests, leading to discussions of corruption in French public (Tavati, 2007: 11).

Beginning with the 1990s, French foreign policy in the region proved to be a failure as a result of the genocide in Rwanda, economic crisis and increased US influence in the Mediterranean and Africa (Marchal, 1998: 356). Coupled with increased concerns about the transparency of financial aid, these developments created a need to revise French foreign policy in the region and France had to use new foreign policy tools in order to improve its image in the region, to establish regional stability and security, to manage its economic crisis and to compete with the increased US influence in its former colonies (Renau, 2002: 18).

The new foreign policy instruments of France in the Mediterranean and Africa were based on multilateral frameworks and international organizations in order to increase the legitimacy of country's presence in the region (Charbonneau, 2005: 280). France also changed its foreign policy discourse towards the region and shifted to a discourse of partnership from that of assistance (Tavati, 2007: 3) in order to emphasize equality over supremacy of the colonial legacy. The patronage networks of financial aid were also replaced by more institutionalized criteria based on international economic and political standards.

The European Union and US Dimension

In order to understand the regional policies of medium powers, it is necessary to analyse their relation to the superpowers of the system. In case of Mediterranean and Africa, Spanish and French foreign policies are shaped under the influence of the US and they compete with the

US for political impact in the region. In this competition, the EU becomes a strategic tool and while dealing with the US policies in the region, both states take initiative within the EU framework. In this context, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU becomes an important instrument for both France and Spain in protecting their regional interests (Barbe, 2000: 45). The southern dimension of this policy was determined by France and Spain and the threats from the South became a part of the EU's agenda as a result of these countries' efforts (Bicchi, 2002: 10). Both France and Spain tried to protect their interests in the region and guarantee their national security within the context of the EU's Southern policy (Olsen, 1998: 343).

Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). The formation of this official policy framework was due to the fact that with Germany's influence, the EU's priorities shifted to the Central and Eastern European countries and its eastern neighbours. EUROMED was a common reaction of France and Spain to the EU's German-led foreign policy that focused on east and both states wanted to counterbalance Germany's weight in the formation of the EU's foreign policy (Gillespie, 1997: 35).

Madrid terrorist attacks had a great deal of impact on the way in which Spain balanced its relations with the US and the EU in the Mediterranean and Africa. Before the attacks, Spain aimed to gain the upper hand vis-à-vis France by cooperating with the US both politically and militarily. However, after the attacks, as a result of

public pressure, Spain had to abandon this policy and opted for working with the EU in the region (Gillespie, 2007: 42). After 9/11, North Africa and the Middle East became strategically important for the US and turned into an area of military intervention in defence of national security. In addition to military interventions, political and economic tools were also used in the region and the US influence gradually increased (Barbe and Lecha, 2005: 88). As a medium power, Spain saw this as an opportunity in its competition with France and in order to increase its power, the country actively supported the US interventions. However, after becoming a target of terrorism itself, Spain returned to multilateral policies and partnered with the EU instead of the US (Rieker, 2006: 517).

France's basic strategy in the region has been to retain its political influence by keeping pro-French political elite in power. However, the economic and political costs of this strategy have increased over time and France had to abandon the unilateral policies. The EU has become an important instrument for France at this point and the country used the EU funds and policies in its regional strategy and shared the burden with the other EU member states (Wood, 2002: 97).

There is an extensive competition between France and Spain in terms of shaping the EU's southern agenda according to their national interests (Emerson, 2008: 1). This competition became evident in 2008, when France started the initiative to establish the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). UfM can be interpreted as a French effort to redefine the EU's foreign policy according to its national security

agenda. UfM aimed to "control the waves of immigration, protect the environment, provide economic development and fight with organized crime, corruption and terrorism" (Henry, 2012: 407). Until the French proposal for UfM, EUROMED, which was a joint Franco-Spanish effort, provided the general framework for the EU's policy towards the south. However, UfM was a solo initiative of France based on its national security priorities and it met with Spanish resistance from the beginning. With the support of Germany, Spain managed to prevent the realization of this initiative according to the expectations of France and the EUROMED remained as the official framework for the EU's southern policy (Gillespie, 2008: 278-279).

Conclusion

Spain and France have similar interests in the Mediterranean and Africa. For both countries, terrorism, waves of migration and limitations on access to energy resources are considered as major threats for national security. Prevention of these threats is the foundation of regional strategies of both countries.

The ability of both France and Spain to deal with the national security threats from the region are determined by their colonial legacy, their status in the international system as medium powers and their relations with the super powers. Two states supported friendly regimes and leaders in the region in order to establish a partnership of stability with the countries in the Mediterranean and Africa. As a result of this strategy, the authoritarian regimes in the region were

supported instead of promoting democracy in order to establish political stability.

After the Cold War, increased US influence in the region created a challenge for Spain and France and increased the political, economic and military costs of their regional policies. As a result, both states played the EU card and the southern threat was added to the EU agenda by France and Spain in order to decrease the costs of regional influence by using the EU framework for action. There exists a competition between Spain and France in terms of shaping the EU foreign policy agenda according to their national security priorities, however, as medium powers, France and Spain can profit from an alliance in the EU in terms of determining the EU's foreign and security policy instead of a competition as medium powers with limited economic, political and military resources.

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CHAPTER 4

USE OF SMART POWER OF TURKEY WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

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Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, bipolarity, which dominated for nearly half of the 20th century, diminished, and a new order, multipolarity, gained control of the international system. While the USA was the only power able at that time to affect international politics, regional powers were crucial for maintaining peace and security. After becoming the southern border of NATO, Turkey gained a new role as the regional actor entrusted with assisting in conflict areas such as the Middle East and the Balkans. This new role entailed fresh threats and risks in terms of national security. Nevertheless, Turkey played an important part in peacekeeping operations, resolving conflict by any means possible.

Creating a stable and healthy regional environment while keeping the peace among different regional actors depends not only on economic and military cooperation but also on cultural and moral ties to people living in the region. Improving living standards and fighting hunger and water shortages are central aspects of regional peace and security. Turkey is uniquely located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, giving it access to many other countries with which it

shares historical and cultural bonds. With its long history as an independent state, Turkey has always felt a responsibility to assist and raise the living standards of other recently independent countries. This study will describe Turkey's attempts to create prosperity, eliminate poverty, and water shortages as a means to ensuring stability and security within the Middle East, while strengthening its economic and political ties with other countries in the region.

In international relations, power can be separated into three distinct types: hard power, soft power and smart power (a combination of soft and hard power). These terms are defined in Chapter 1, prior to the analysis of Turkish smart power.

One aspect of Turkey's contribution to peace and security in the region involves peacekeeping operations and UN-based military activities. The next chapter provides some information about those operations and activities, which will then be analyzed in terms of how Turkey helps to maintain regional peace and security.

To understand the politics and application of Turkey's soft power approach, it is important to understand what soft power means, as well as the elements comprising Turkey's unique stance. Hence, the next chapter will contain an analysis of the creation and application of soft power in the Turkish context.

DEFINITION OF POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

"*Hard power*" is a frequently used term in international relations. From the Ancient Greeks to Machiavelli, from Morgenthau to Joseph Nye, the term is used to analyze how and why states adopt particular foreign policy and international relations behaviors. Joseph Nye defines hard power as "the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will."(Nye, 2004a, p.15). The preferred means of hard power is military intervention. Simply, this means that states use their military capacity in pursuit of their national interest and security. Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the USA's invasion of Iraq in 2003 are examples of the use of hard power via military intervention in international relations.

Military intervention is not the only way of implementing hard power. Economic pressure or embargos may also be effective, and give similar results. To regulate Iranian nuclear policy, for example, the USA and the EU applied heavy sanctions to Iran, which led to the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement. Even the threat of military intervention or economic sanctions could be counted as a use of hard power. As Alexander George stated, "coercive diplomacy" involves backing up one's demands of an adversary "with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand."(George, 2004, p. 70).

"*Soft power*" is a frequently used term in international relations and political science. It refers to any means of persuasion other than hard power. Joseph Nye defined it as the "ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye, 2004b, p. 5). To understand soft power, it is crucial to understand the different available resources, such as ideologies, cultures and international institutions, and the different conditions lending legitimacy and credibility, because "if a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes"(Nye, 2009, p. 119). The use of soft power may be viewed as underhanded; however, it is mostly used by countries seeking to achieve stability while avoiding military conflict. Soft power, in this context, is successful way both to keep peace in a region and to create a peaceful environment for regional states. A state exercising soft power becomes an example for other states, who that over time come to admire its prosperity and openness. To increase the exercise of soft power, the state's culture has to include some values that are shared with those of other states (Nye, 2009, p. 119).

When discussing soft power, it is impossible not to mention public diplomacy. Soft power and public diplomacy are two inseparable concepts. "Public diplomacy" is a strategic communication tool aimed at "informing and influencing the public" (Krause and Van Evera, 2009. p. 15). It is the visible, concrete aspect of soft power. Soft power is mainly the art of attracting other states, and public diplomacy is a means by which this is achieved. However, in Turkey's case, soft

power and public diplomacy can have other meanings and implementations.

"*Smart power*" simply refers to the combination of hard and soft power. According to Joseph Nye, "Smart power means learning better how to combine our hard and soft power" (Nye, 2004b, p. 32).

HARD POWER AND TURKEY'S APPROACH

Hard power is a negative approach, which only serves the state exercising it and which puts pressure on other states to cede to a superior force. In Turkey's case, however, hard power has a different meaning. With its role in the region, its cultural ties with other regional states, and its historical legacy, Turkey has always felt responsible for situations affecting the Middle East and its people. To fulfill this responsibility, Turkey cooperates with international organizations (IOs). It makes all the necessary attempts to participate in humanitarian operations linked to these IOs, as well as contributing to other activities such as training, protection or the provision of aid.

So-called Peace Keeping Operations began in 1948 under the United Nations Security Council. The goal was to secure peace in the Middle East, and its operations later became an important element of the maintenance and protection of international peace and security. Turkey's participation in these operations was based on its humanitarian, historical, and cultural responsibilities. International peace and security would become one of its main foreign policy

objectives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Due to its geographical uniqueness and its foreign policy vision, Turkey found itself at the center of many conflicts in the region. After the 9/11 terror attacks, the Middle East became a focal point for the whole world, and Turkey had to formulate a new foreign policy approach to cope with the resultant mass migrations (Bekar, 2017, p. 8). One way to do this was to send aid and troops as part of peacekeeping operations. Within this framework, Turkey has played an important part in certain operations. It participates still in some ongoing peacekeeping efforts and military activities in collaboration with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Table 1: Turkey's participation in peacekeeping and other activities in the region (Turkish Armed Forces, 2017)

Current peacekeeping operations supported by Turkish Armed Forces	Contribution to observation missions
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM)	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
UN Assistance Mission Somalia (UNSOM)	Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151)	NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)
	NATO Combined Protection Operation
	NATO Operation Ocean Shield

Table 1, Turkey has contributed to providing general security and international and regional peace in many ways, and plays still a central role in several current operations.

TURKEY'S APPROACH TO SOFT POWER

Turkey's approach to foreign relations changed when Ahmet Davutoglu was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a consultant, and later as Minister and Prime Minister. Even though some of his idealistic policies failed, foreign affairs received a boost during his time in office. One of the things Davutoglu succeeded in was making foreign policy more multidimensional, with civil organizations, firms and even individuals playing a part in the state's foreign relations. This new multidimensional, multi-layered foreign affairs environment made it easier to apply public diplomacy, strengthening Turkey's soft power in surrounding regions such as North Africa and the Middle East. At the time of the Arab Spring, Turkey became a role model for states making the long-awaited transition to democracy. (Altunışık, 2011, p. 2-3). This role model image was constructed around some basic pillars. One of these was its comparatively long and settled democratic status. After nearly one hundred years of democratic rule, Turkey is now a legitimate actor in both the regional and global international relations arena. States such as Tunisia and Egypt were inspired by Turkey's democratization and related economic success (Kalın, 2011, p. 9).

Another pillar of Turkey's soft power is its cultural and geographical ties with other states and nations. As İbrahim Kalın states, the American concept of power depends on the "carrot and stick" dialectic. However, this method is neither easy to accomplish nor desirable in the case of Turkey. Rather, Turkey's soft power is shaped by "a new geopolitical imagination and a notion of common memory, conscience and cultural depth" (Kalın, 2011, p. 9). These exclusive features have won the support of Middle Eastern nations and states, as politicians recognize that Turkey is working towards resolving problems in the region, increasing the country's prestige in the eyes of its neighbors (Aras, 2009, p. 2).

As mentioned above, the foreign policy transformation which started with Ahmet Davutoglu created a multidimensional, dynamic foreign policy, which boosted Turkey's soft power over a short period of time. However, this attempt to create an active and effective foreign policy based on soft power and public diplomacy has been misunderstood by certain groups and states. Some have accused Turkey of seeking imperial power under a type of "neo-Ottomanism." However, this is a mistake. Turkey's novel foreign policy approach was not an attempt to recreate an Ottoman legacy; rather, it was an effort to provide a peaceful environment to those nations with shared values, history and culture (Kalın, 2011, p. 10).

TURKEY'S EXERCISE OF SOFT POWER

Turkey's approach to soft power and public diplomacy are largely unique, with some exemptions. Generally, states use soft power and public diplomacy to realize their interest in another state or region. However, Turkey's main aim is to create a stable region. This is to their benefit, as any problems in the Middle East, in the Balkans and in parts of Africa will, either directly or indirectly, have a negative impact on the country. This chapter addresses Turkey's involvement in practices such as humanitarian aid, development aid, and the provision of education and health support.

Before examining Turkey's exercise of soft power and its recent figures relating to aid and other support, it is necessary to consider the actors Turkey uses in meeting its goals. While many actors take part in the process, some make a notably greater contribution. One of these is the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The Diyanet contributes to ensuring regional peace and stability by attempting to integrate split Muslim realms. Eurasian Islam Shura– a policy that unites 38 Islamic countries–is one of the Diyanet's achievements. The Diyanet provides religious education in certain countries to deter disreputable ideas and practices within the region. Another important institution is the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), which was founded by former President Turgut Özal. With its budget of more than 1 billion dollars, it has implemented many projects in the areas of education, health and infrastructure. As

well as helping those in need, TİKA supports long-term projects to increase the quality of life in specific areas. Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, which promote Turkish language and culture, are another actor in Turkey's soft power strategy (Koca, 2013, p. 3). In addition, the Turkish government has spent more than 10 billion dollars in providing public services for refugees since 2011 (Kirişçi, 2006, p.2).

The Figure 1 shows that Turkey was the world's most generous country in 2015 (TİKA, 2015, p. 1). Shown also are Turkey's ratio of development aid to its gross national product (0.37%). This figure is higher than that of many developed countries (Turkey is currently considered a developing country by many experts). These numbers and ratios indicate that Turkey is trying its best to fulfill its soft power aims, as well as accomplishing its humanitarian duties.

Figure 1: It shows Turkey's ratio of development aid to its gross national product.

The Figure 2 (the chart) shows also Turkey's contribution to humanity. Turkey comes 10th in the list of net expenditures on development and reconstruction (TİKA, 2015, p. 6).

Figure 2: Net expenditures on development and reconstruction

The Figure 3 indicates that most of Turkey's aid went to countries experiencing humanitarian issues such as water shortages, hunger, or poor health conditions (TİKA, 2015, p. 8).

Figure 3: Most of Turkey's aid went to countries experiencing humanitarian issues

Results

Through the exercise of both hard and soft power instruments, Turkey has created cordial, mutually beneficial relations with most other countries in the region. The Turkish government has signed many high-level strategic partnership agreements across the region in the spheres of economics, politics and culture, as well as strengthening its role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its relations with the Arab League. The Office of Public Diplomacy and TIKA were also made more active and effective (Özcan, Köse and Karakoç, 2015, p. 195-196). Recent studies show Turkey's efforts to engage with and attempt to solve the region's problems via smart power instruments (especially soft power instruments) have contributed to its positive image within the Middle East (Altunısık, 2008, p. 43). Another survey by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) shows Turkey's attractiveness within the region

as high, and that it is seen as a constructive actor (Akgün, Senyücel and Percinoglu, 2009, p. 26). This, Turkey's approach has had some success, and its soft power-oriented foreign policy and public diplomacy instruments have led to an increase in prestige. Turkey's successful and responsible efforts as part of peacekeeping operations and other military activities have also improved trust levels among other countries in the region.

Table 2 below shows the total amount of foreign trade (import-export) between Turkey and other regional countries (Turkey Statistic Institution, 2017). Turkey's soft power instruments and public diplomacy usage increased between 2005 and 2014, leading to a reciprocal increase in total trade due to increased regional prestige. Turkey's improving relations with regional states thus has a mutual economic benefit.

Table 2: Total amount of foreign trade between Turkey and other regional countries

	2005	2010	2013	2017
Morocco	514.055.895	1.020.755.339	1.765.105.782	2.086.442.023
Tunisia	412.157.650	994.351.720	1.181.425.009	884.293.217
Libya	578.703.300	2.358.022.375	3.057.052.804	884.275.074
Egypt	954.545.178	3.177.053.200	4.829.230.530	3.500.208.597
Lebanon	340.883.443	846.854.685	1.006.382.792	835.978.180
Syria	694.212.218	2.297.098.008	1.109.382.616	1.162.159.883
Iraq	2.816.514.489	6.189.837.917	12.094.589.490	9.150.144.811
Iran	4.382.645.813	10.689.185.019	14.575.728.059	9.201.514.158
Saudi Arabia	1.549.351.702	3.598.246.943	5.206.351.853	3.992.896.268
Qatar	132.770.215	339.595.390	618.000.456	679.672.113
United Arab Emirates	1.880.629.655	4.031.306.011	10.350.097.867	13.136.161.797

Conclusion

The exercise of either hard or soft power depends on the benefits that a state hopes to achieve. For some states, such as Turkey, with unique features and historical and cultural obligations, the use of power instruments can have different aims than is generally the case. Turkey feels responsible for the region's stability and security, both out of concern for its internal peace and security and consideration for the common good. Turkey's use of hard power mostly consists of providing support and aid to IO peacekeeping operations. Recently, Turkey has used mostly soft power instruments in its approach to regional development. Soft power is a tricky concept, frequently misunderstood as branding or an attempt by states to exert control by underhanded means. However, Turkey's case is very different in this context, and accusations of "neo-Ottomanism" are unfounded. Turkey has a responsibility to protect surrounding countries with which it shares cultural, religious and historical ties. As indicated by the above charts and figures, Turkey is succeeding in fulfilling its regional responsibilities. Its use of soft power has increased recently, and, with some difficulties, continues to increase at a fast pace. The implementation of these policies has had a positive impact on Turkey's influence within the Middle East.

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CHAPTER 5

KÜRESELLEŞME ve SAVAŞ:
YENİ BİR ANLAYIŞ BAĞLAMINDA YAKIN İLİŞKİ

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GİRİŞ

Küreselleşme olgusu yaşamın her yönünde olduğu gibi savaş üzerinde de doğrudan ve dolaylı etkiler yaratmaktadır. Bu etkiler insanlık tarihiyle özdeşleşmiş olan "mücadele" anlayışında da köklü değişimler oluşturmaktadır. Küreselleşmenin dalga dalga yayıldığı bir dönem içerisinde savaşların meydana gelmesi, yürütülmesi ve sona ermesi gibi süreçlerin de ciddi bir şekilde farklılaştığını ifade etmek gerekmektedir. Tanımlı ordular arasında sınırları belirli meydanlarında gerçekleşen savaşlar bağlamında gelişen geleneksel savaş anlayışı, günün şartlarında giderek yerini bambaşka boyutları olan yeni bir anlayışa bırakmaktadır. Yeni savaş anlayışı üzerinde küreselleşmenin olumlu ve olumsuz çıktılarının oluşturduğu etki önemli bir konuyu oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada küreselleşmenin savaş anlayışı üzerindeki oluşturucu, düzenleyici ve zorlayıcı yönünün ortaya konulması amaçlanmaktadır. Küreselleşme bağlamında ortaya çıkan gelişmelerin çatışma yaratıcı etkisi ve küreselleşmenin olumlu-olumsuz çıktılarının hâlihazırda var olan "savaş dünyası" üzerindeki etkisi bu kapsamda ele alınacaktır. Fakat öncelikle küreselleşme ve savaş anlayışının genel bir kavramsal analizinin yapılması gerekmektedir. Böylece hem küreselleşmenin boyutları ortaya konulabilecek hem de geleneksel ve yeni savaş anlayışlarının temel hatlarına değinilebilecektir.

KÜRESELLEŞME VE SAVAŞIN KAVRAMSAL ÇERÇEVE

1.1. Küreselleşme ve Etkileri

Sosyal bilimlerdeki pek çok terim için geçerli olduğu gibi küreselleşme de tanımı yapılması bir yandan kolay fakat içerdiği derinlik nedeniyle de diğer yandan da oldukça zor bir kavramdır. Küreselleşme kavramı ortaya çıktığı yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren bir süreci, durumu, sistemi, gücü veya çağı tanımlamak için hem akademik hem de popüler yazında kullanılmıştır (Steger, 2003:7). Andrew Heywood küreselleşmeyi, "bazen birbirini tamamlayan ve örtüşen, bazen de çelişen ve zıtlık oluşturan süreçler bileşkesi" olarak tanımlamaktadır (Heywood, 2011: 9). Peter Stearns ise kavramı yerel gelişmelerin küresel boyuta dönüşmesi ve dünyadaki insanların tek bir toplum halini alarak beraber hareket etmeleri süreci olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Stearns, 2010:1). Esasında ekonomik temelde tarihine vurgu yapılan ve ekonomik terimler üzerinden tanımlanan küreselleşme olgusu (Drainville, 2004, Glyn, 2006; Levitt, 1983) siyasi, toplumsal, kültürel, tejno-bilimsel, çevresel pek çok boyutu olan bir özelliktedir.

Küreselleşme dünya genelinde devletlerin ve insanların arasındaki her türden karşılıklı bağımlılık ağlarının gelişmesi, derinleşmesi ve hızlanması olarak ifade edilebilmektedir (Mcgrew, 2006: 20). Küreselleşme ile beraber toplumların çeşitli ilişki ağlarıyla iç içe geçtiği, iletişimin ve ulaşımın artmasıyla mesafelerin kısaldığı, sınırların şeffaflaşarak her türden dolaşımın serbestleştiği, ekonomik ve teknolojik karşılıklı bağımlılığın yoğunlaştığı bir döneme işaret edilmektedir. Küreselleşmenin tarihi üzerinde çeşitli tartışmalar mevcuttur (Bordo, Taylor ve Williamson, 2003; Grinin ve Korotayev, 2013; Germain, 2000; Shahzad; 2006). Genel kanı bu olgunun 20. yüzyılın ortalarında gelişen yoğun ekonomik ilişkiler bağlamında oluştuğu ve Levitt (1983) tarafından ilk kez bir ekonomi terimi olarak kullanıldığı yönünde olurken, küreselleşmenin tarihini çok eskilere dayandıran ve ismi konulmamış bir süreç olduğunu ifade edenler de bulunmaktadır. Dünya Bankası ise küreselleşmeyi 1870-1914, 1914-

1980 ve 1980'den günümüze olmak üzere üç dalga halinde gelişen bir küresel bağ sistemi olarak ifade etmektedir (DB, 2002: 23-31).

Küreselleşmenin var olup olmadığı yönünde kimi tartışmalar olsa da esas odak nokta sürecin kabulüyle birlikte olumlu ve olumsuz yönlerinin vurgulanmasıdır. Küreselleşme üzerine yapılan yorumlar çok boyutlu bu sürecin çıktılarının ilgili alanlarda avantajlara mı yoksa dezavantajlara mı yol açacağı üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır (Baylis ve Smith, 2006; Oslond, 2003; Marquart, 2005; Shopina, Oliinyk ve Finaheiev, 2017; Kellner, 2002). Örneğin Basu; küreselleşmenin olumlu ya da olumsuz tek bir yönüne odaklanmanın sonuçsuz kalacak bir girişim olduğunu söyleyerek bu sürecin iyiliği ya da kötülüğü ele alınan bakış açısıyla, dönemle, yerle, konuyla değiştiğini vurgulamaktadır (Basu, 2006: 1362-1367).

Küreselleşmeyle beraber anılan ya da küreselleşme tanımı yapılırken bolca atıf yapılan serbest ticaret, ekonomik bütünleşme, serbest dolaşım, teknolojik yayılma, yeni istihdam alanları gibi konular teorik bağlamda tüm insanlığın fayda sağladığı gelişmeler olarak ifade edilmektedir. Diğer taraftan ise hızla büyüyen çok uluslu şirketlerin yarattığı çevresel yıkım, kapitalist ekonomik sistemin getirdiği gelir eşitsizliği, aşırı tüketim ve kaynak kıtlığı, devlet yapılarının güçsüzleşmesi, yerel kültürel değerlerin giderek yok olması gibi olumsuzluklar da küreselleşmeyle bağlantılanmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda karşılıklı bağımlılık ağlarının gelişmesi üzerinden düşünülen küreselleşmeyi, köklü bir tarihi olan fakat günümüzdeki çoklu etkilerinin farklılığı nedeniyle de yeni ve sürekli yenilenen bir süreç olarak görmek mümkündür. Bu sürecin dünyanın her yerinde aynı şekilde ve şiddette yaşandığını ifade etmek doğru olmayacaktır; bu bağlamda küreselleşme için "göreceli" yakıştırmasını yapmak gerekmektedir. Bu süreçle birlikte tanımlanan çıktıların insanların yaşamları ve doğal hayatın akışı üzerinde beğenilen ve istenmeyen etkileri bulunmaktadır.

1.2. Savaş ve Savaş Anlayışı

Savaş, insanlık tarihindeki mücadelenin ve şiddet eğiliminin örgütlü ve düzenli halidir. Kekes savaşı savunma veya saldırı bağlamında düşmanı hedef alan ve çeşitli türde silahların kullanıldığı, bir ulusun ya da grubun liderleri tarafından planlanan ve silahlı kuvvetlerin sahaya koşulduğu organize şiddet olarak tanımlamaktadır (Kekes, 2010: 201). Destekleyici olarak Clausewitz'in "iradenin kabulüne zorlamak için düşmana karşı kuvvet kullanma eylemi" ifadesi de savaşın tanımının yapılması bağlamında oldukça önemlidir (Clausewitz, 2011:30). Savaşlar; kazanç, intikam, işgal, inanç güdüleri, meşru müdafaa gibi çeşitli amaçlarlar doğrultusunda ortaya konulan mücadelenin oluşturduğu geleneksel bir durumdur ve taraflardan birinin veya hepsinin rızasıyla sona ermektedir. Savaş ayrıca siyasi örgütlenmeler arasındaki devamlılığı olan ve düzenli şiddet eylemi olarak ifade edilmektedir (Levy ve Thompson, 2010:5). Savaşların başlaması taraflardan birinin resmi ilanı ya da doğrudan saldırısı ile gerçekleşmekte ve savaşlar çatışmalardan farklı olarak organize, kolektif, kurumsallaşmış bir durumu yansıtmaktadır. Carroll'a göre savaşlar bir tarafın mağlup olması, tam işgale uğrama, çekilme, saldırgan hükümetin ortadan kalkması, sözlü veya yazılı anlaşma gibi durumlarla sonlanmaktadır (Carroll, 1969: 298-299).

Savaş anlayışı, insanlığın kendisiyle, diğerleriyle ve çevresiyle olan sonsuz mücadelesi ve çatışması olarak kimlik bulan savaş durumuna yönelik oluşturulan algılar bütününü ve zihniyeti yansıtmaktadır. Savaş kavramı kullanıldığında akıllara gelen ilk sözcükler ve imgeler tam olarak savaşa yönelik anlayışı ortaya koyan ipuçlarıdır. Savaşın genel olarak çağrıştırdığı durum, karşı karşıya gelmiş iki grubun düşmanca bir tavırla hâkimiyet sağlaması rekabeti üzerinden okunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda oluşan düşünce geleneksel güvenlik anlayışını yansıtmaktadır. İlk/ilkel kabilelerinin kendi aralarındaki üstünlük mücadelelerinden günümüze gelen süreçte savaş alanında pek çok değişim yaşanmıştır (van der Dennen, 1995) ve bu değişimler ilgili alanda yeni bir anlayışı gerektirmektedir.

Bilinen savaş tanımları kapsamında en sık kullanılan düşman, silahlı çatışma, savaş meydanı, işgal, ordu, insan doğası, açık şiddet, savunma gibi sözcükler (Wright, 1942: 8-13) geleneksel savaşları anlatan belirgin ifadelerdir. Geleneksel savaşlar, savaşın ilk formlarından bugüne kadar uzanan süreç içerisinde gerçekleşen geleneksel silahların ve taktiklerin uygulandığı mücadeleleri ifade etmektedir (Aupers, 1988: 191-193; Kekes, 2010; Thompson; 1982). Geleneksel savaşlar; şiddetin ve yıkımın tüm korkutuculuğuna rağmen sis perdesinin yeni nesil savaşlar kadar yoğun olmadığı olaylardır. Geleneksel savaşların en önemli özelliği belirliliğin ve kestirilebilirliğin var olmasıdır: Tam olarak açık olmasa da savaşan taraflar, kullanılan silahlar ve askeri araçlar, uygulanan stratejiler, savaş sahası, gerçekleşebilecek yıkım ve kayıplar, savaşın başlama ve bitme süreçleri tahmin edilebilir ve bilinebilir seviyededir. Bu bağlamda savaş sahasının niteliği, süresi, savaşan tarafların sayısı, silahların nitelikleri tarih boyunca çeşitli değişimlere uğramış olsa da geleneksel savaşların devamlılığına ve muhafazakârlığına vurgu yapmak gerekmektedir. Mısır ve Hitit uygarlıkları arasındaki Kadeş Savaşı'nı da İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı da Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonlarındaki İran-Irak Savaşı'nı da 2008 yılındaki Rusya-Gürcistan Savaşı'nı da bu kategoride ele almak mümkündür.

Siyasi varlıklar arası çatışmalar zinciri bağlamında oluşan geleneksel savaş anlayışı anlaması kolay bir kavram olsa da çağın gerçeklerini yansıtmaktan uzaktır. Zira devletler arasında meydana gelen ve orduların karşı karşıya kaldığı mücadelelerin sayısı giderek azalmıştır. Örneğin Stockholm Uluslararası Barış Araştırmaları Enstitüsü (SIPRI) verilerine göre 2016 yılında gerçekleşen kırk dokuz silahlı çatışmadan iki tanesinin devletler arası savaş olmuştur (SIPRI, 2017:2). Her ne kadar güvenliğin hala en önemli konusunu "savaş" başlığı oluştursa da yine aynı Enstitü'nün 2018 Yıllığı'na göre yerinden edilen ve göç zorunda kalan insanların yarattığı durumundan iklim değişikliğe, terörizmden iç çatışmalara kadar pek çok sorunun olduğu (SIPRI, 2018: 182-23) ifade edilmektedir. Bu durum da güvenlik alanında kökten değişimler yaratırken, savaşı daha karmaşık bir yapıya sokmaktadır.

Yeni savaş anlayışı; geleneksel silahlar, ordular ve stratejiler üzerinden gerçekleşen savaşların ötesinde ilgili alanda var olan yeni

gelişmeler esasında oluşan düşünce yapısını içermektedir. Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları sırasında yaşanan büyük yıkım ve Soğuk Savaş sürecinde dünyayı geri dönülmez bir duruma götürebilecek nükleer tehdit, geleneksel savaşların sorguya açılmasına neden olmuştur. Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından hiç şüphesiz ki "mücadeleden vazgeçilmesi" gibi bir olumlu hava ortaya çıkmamıştır; fakat savaşların daha farklı şekilde yürütülebileceği yönünde görüşler oluşmuştur.

Yeni savaş anlayışı hem geleneksel savaşların karakterindeki değişim hem de yeni tür çatışma/mücadele tarzlarının ortaya çıkması üzerinden tanımlanmaktadır. Geleneksel savaşların maliyeti, askeri ve sivil alanda oluşturduğu büyük yıkım, süresi gibi durumlar yüzünden tercih öncülüğü olmaması ve mücadele sahnesinin uluslararası alandan devlet içine, ekonomik alana ya da siber sahaya kayması gibi gelişmeler savaşa bakışta önemli bir değişimin yolunu açmıştır. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte değişen güvenlik anlayışı (Buzan, 1991; Buzan ve Hansen, 2009) beraberinde savaşın yürütülmesinde farklı düşünceler de getirmiştir. Günümüze gelen süreçte iç, ekonomik, siber, psikolojik, vekalet, asimetrik, önleyici gibi isimler altında çeşitli savaş türleri tartışmaya açılmıştır.

Bu tür savaşların ilgili en önemli nokta geleneksel savaşların temel özelliği olan bilinirliliği ve kestirilebilirliği ortadan kaldırmaları olmuştur. Yeni savaş anlayışı içerisindeki söz konusu mücadelelerde savaş sahası, süresi, savaş ilanı, düşman algısı, yıkımın niteliği muğlak hale gelmiştir. Görünmez şiddet veya düşük yoğunluklu çatışmalar bu bağlamda oldukça ön plandadır. Savaşın yeni anlayışı; düşmanı yıpratma ve iradeyi kabule zorlama için çok boyutlu bir mücadelenin yürütülmesi üzerine kuruludur. Geleneksel savaşların teknolojik imkânların etkisiyle evrim geçirdiği ve mücadelenin farklı boyutlarının uygulandığı bir dönemin tecrübesi alandaki anlayışı da değiştirmektedir.

KÜRESELLEŞME VE SAVAŞ: YOĞUN BİR ETKİLEŞİM

İnsanlığın mücadelesi kadimdir ve aynı zamanda da ebedi bir özellik göstermektedir. Bu düşünceden hareketle savaşların yaşamın bir parçası olduğunu, her dönemde ve yerde gerçekleştiğini, sık sık başvurulan bir yöntem olduğunu söylemek gerekmektedir. Savaşlar gerçekleşmeye devam etmektedir; fakat yapılarında kimi değişimler olmakta ve bu durum da yeni bir savaş anlayışını doğurmaktadır. Savaş bağlamında yeni bir anlayışının gelişmesinde pek çok belirleyici faktör olsa da küreselleşme süreci merkezi bir konumda yer almaktadır. Küreselleşme-savaş ilişkisini iki boyutta incelemek mümkündür: Küreselleşme sürecinin yarattığı etkilerin çatışma oluşturucu durumu ve küreselleşmenin olumlu-olumsuz yönlerinin savaş alanı üzerindeki etkisi.

2.1. Küreselleşmenin Çatışma Yaratıcı Etkisi

Küreselleşmenin beraberinde pek çok sorun getiren bir olgu olduğu düşünce altyapısıyla sürece yönelik ciddi bir olumsuz bakış olduğunu belirtmek gerekmektedir. Bu sorunları; ekonomik eşitsizliğin ve gelir dağılım haksızlığının artması, sınırların şeffaflaşmasıyla güvenlik sıkıntıların ortaya çıkması, üretim-tüketim aşırılığı bağlamında çevresel problemlerin oluşması, bilgi ve teknoloji devrimleriyle etnik ve inançsal bağlamda pek çok konunun barışçıl yöntemlerin çok ötesinde tartışmaya açılması, insanların yaşadıkları yerlerin dışına yasadışı ve düzensiz bir şekilde göç etme eğilimlerinin artması gibi (Shevchenko v.d., 2016:20-21; Steger, 2003: 113-120; Freeman, 2004: 245-251; Hirst ve Thompson, 2002: 250-255; Shopina, Oliinyk ve Finaheiev, 2017: 459-460; Mittelman, 2000) ekonomik, toplumsal ve siyasi bağlamda ele almak mümkündür. Bütünleşmeyi, karşılıklı bağımlılığı ve her türden ilişki paylaşımını yoğunlaştıran küreselleşme sürecinin dolaylı ya da doğrudan bireylerin, toplumların, siyasi varlıkların ve çevrenin varlıklarını olumsuz yönde değiştirdiği durumlarda savaşlara neden olan çatışmalar patlak verebilmektedir.

Giderek daha büyük bir tartışma konusu olan kaynak kıtlığı, çevresel tehditler nedeniyle oluşan su ve gıda sorunları, kapitalizmin güçlenmesi ile ortaya çıkan kazanç eşitsizlikleri ve zengin-yoksul makasının

açılması gibi küreselleşme süreci ile ilişkisi kurulan olumsuzlukların (Ghosh, 2006:1-9) devletler arası gerginliklere ve ülke içi çatışmalara neden olduğunu belirtmek gerekmektedir. Özellikle yeni savaş anlayışı içerisinde geniş yer tutan iç savaşların büyük oranda ekonomik bunalımların, gelir dengesizliklerinin ve bu bağlamdaki toplumsal çöküşün bir sonucu olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Küreselleşmenin neoliberalizmin ya da kapitalizmin genişleme sürecine hizmet ettiği yönündeki görüşler (Hardin, 2004:180-191; Sklair, 2002: 97-99; Dollar, 2005: 145-175); gelir dağılımındaki adaletsizliği, gelişmiş devletlerin gelişmemiş olanlara ve zenginlerin yoksullara göre sağladığı (haksız) kazancı, işsizliği ya da iş gücünün ucuzlamasını, küresel krizlerin ekonomik yönden zayıf toplumları daha acı şekilde etkilediğini, sosyal yapı içerisindeki alt sınıfın giderek büyüdüğünü ve olumsuz koşullara maruz kaldığını savunmaktadır. Şüphesiz ki bu tür gelişmeler çatışma vaat edici bir özellik göstermektedir.

Özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde eski olarak ifade edilen geleneksel savaşların yerini giderek düşük yoğunluktaki çatışmalar ve iç savaşlar almaktadır. Büyük orduların karşı karşıya geldiği ve yıkımın gözlenebilir olduğu uzun tarihsel dönemin ardından asimetrik boyutta yaşanan mücadelelerin arkasında küreselleşme kapsamında hızla yayılan bilgi, teknoloji ve düşünce akımları da bulunmaktadır (Koldor, 2012: 2-9) Küreselleşmenin birleştirici, bütünleştirici ve şeffaflık sağlayıcı etkisinin yanı sıra sorguya açıcı, dağıtıcı ve parçalayıcı bir yönünün olduğunu bu bağlamda belirtmek gerekmektedir. Marjinalleşme, hızla yayılan aşırı düşünceler ve kimlik farkındalığının artması gibi konular yeni savaşlar bağlamında oldukça önemlidir.

Küreselleşmenin devlet yapısı üzerinde oluşturduğu etkinin de savaşların niteliğinde değişim yaratığını belirtmek doğru olacaktır (Suter, 2003; Harris, 2003:125-159; Albekov, Polubotko ve Akapova, 2014: 180-182). Artan ticari ilişkilerle dışa açılma eğilimi, uluslararası şirketlerin etkisi, sınırötesi tehdit türlerinin artması, internet ve teknolojinin yayılması, serbest dolaşımın tetiklenmesi gibi durumlar devlet egemenliği üzerinde sarsıcı bir durum oluşturmaktadır. Devletin egemenlik kaybı; sınırların korunamaması, ülke içerisinde asayişin sağlanamaması, terör ve suç gruplarıyla etkin mücadele edilememesi,

ekonomik saldırılara karşı konulamaması, güvenlik sorunu oluşturabilecek durumların önceden tespit edilmesi gibi zaaflara yol açabilmektedir.

Oluşturduğu olumlu etkilerin yanı sıra küreselleşme daha tahmin edilemez, tehlikeli ve ayrıştırıcı bir dünyanın kapılarını da aralamaktadır. Kültürel kodların çoğunlukla düzensiz şekilde tartışıldığı, suç çeşitlerinin ve oranlarının arttığı, terör gruplarının serbest dolaşım nimetlerinden yararlandığı, güvenlik sağlayıcı en önemli aktör olan devletin egemenliğinin tartışma konusu olduğu, ulus-devlet yapısının sarsıldığı, ekonomik eşitsizlik üzerinden tanımlanan toplumsal çekişmelerin ayyuka çıktığı, pek çok devletin fonksiyonlarını kaybederek "başarısız" hale dönüştüğü bir dönemde savaşların oluş sıklığı ve karakter değişimi de göz önüne alınması gereken bir durumu yansıtmaktadır.

2.2. Küreselleşmenin Çıktılarının Savaş Alanı Üzerindeki Etkisi

Çalışmanın da çeşitli yerlerinde bahsedildiği üzere küreselleşme bakış açısına göre değişmekle birlikte olumsuz ve olumlu çıktıları olan ve giderek genişleyen bir süreçtir. Küreselleşmenin özellikle uluslararası ticaret, teknoloji, bilgi gibi alanlarda yarattığı etki ile savaş anlayışı üzerinde ciddi bir tesir oluşturmaktadır (Hawkin, 2004; Rasmussen, 2006: 43-90; Wright ve Paszek; 1970). Öncelikle belirtmek gerekmektedir ki savaş alanında düşmandan bile daha korkutucu olan şey bilinmezliktir. Küreselleşme bilginin daha hızlı şekilde yayılmasını sağlarken savaşan taraflara düşmanın yeterliliği, stratejileri, kullanılan silahlar ve savaş sahası gibi konularda bilgiye ulaşma imkanı tanımaktadır. Her ne kadar yeni nesil savaşlar geleneksel savaşlara oranla daha kalın "sis perdesine" sahip olsalar da bilgiye ulaşmanın kolaylaştığı ve istihbarat yapılarının daha etkin şekilde çalışabildiği bir dönem tecrübe edilmektedir.

Ekonomik küreselleşme ile beraber yoğunlaşan uluslararası ticaretin konu alanlarından bir tanesini silah ve askeri araç satışı oluşturmaktadır. Tarihin her döneminde var olan bu ticaret mevcut imkânlar doğrultusunda giderek artmaktadır. Örneğin; SIPRI raporlarına göre 2018 yılında dünya genelindeki söz konusu ticaret

önceki yıllara göre düzenli bir yükseliş göstererek 1.8 trilyon dolar seviyesine ulaşmıştır (SIPRI, 2019: 1-3). Bu ticaretin yönü sadece devlet-devlet ya da şirket-devlet olmamakta devlet-altı gruplar, terörist yapılar ya da suç örgütleri de ihtiyaç duydukları askeri teçhizata ve sistemlere sahip olabilmektedir. Bu bağlamda içerisinde kitle imha silahlarının da olduğu büyük bir küresel pazar resmi ve gayri resmi alıcılarını beklemektedir. Böylesi bir durumda geleneksel ve yeni nesil savaşların yürütülebilmesi için gerek duyulan silahlar hem devlet eliyle hem de devlet dışı grupların imkanlarıyla dolaşıma sokulmakta ve çatışma bağlamında kullanılmaktadır. Böylece özellikle asimetrik savaşlarda devletin ayrıcalıklarından bir tanesi ortadan kaybolmaktadır.

Küreselleşmenin tetiklediği bilimsel-teknolojik keşifler ve icatlar ve bunları hızlı yayılması savaş alanında da önemli etkiler yaratmaktadır. Kimi zaman bilimsel-teknolojik gelişmeler doğrudan savunma sanayi olarak isimlendirilen alana aktarılırken kimi zaman da doğrudan askeri ihtiyaçlar doğrultusunda geniş ar-ge çalışmaları yapılmaktadır. Bu sürecin sonucu olarak da savaş sahası daha önce görülmemiş yeniliklere sahne olmaktadır. Geleneksel silah ve araçların yerini son teknoloji ürünleri alırken bu durumdan savaş süresi, yıkım ve üstünlük ölçütü gibi unsurlar da etkilenmektedir. Dahası hâlihazırda emareleri gözlemlenen savaş teknolojileri ile savaşların yakın gelecekte insansız araçlar, robot askerler, dijital birlikler tarafından yürütüleceğini tahmin etmek zor değildir.

Yine eklemek gerekir ki bilgisayar ve ağ teknolojilerinin gelişmesiyle birlikte savaşın geleneksel sahası siber alana kaymış durumdadır. Siber alan bireylerin ve devletlerin giderek daha çok içerisinde yer aldıkları ve aynı zamanda tehlikelere maruz kaldıkları bir mecra olarak kendini göstermektedir. Teknolojinin savaş sahası üzerinde pek çok farklı boyutuyla etkili olurken aynı zamanda yeni savaş sahası oluşturması dikkate değer bir durumdur.

SONUÇ

Küreselleşmenin masum bir olgu olduğunu düşünen büyük bir kitleden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Küreselleşmenin "avantajı dezavantajla harmanlayan" bir süreç olduğuna yönelik görüş genel kabul görmektedir. Şeytan-melek tartışması üzerinden gitmek yerine küreselleşmeyi tecrübe edinilen dönemin temel belirleyicilerinden biri olarak algılamak daha doğru olacaktır. Her ne kadar ekonomik ilişkiler temelli kimlik kazanmış olsa da küreselleşme özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından hayatın hemen her alanında tesir sağlayan bir faktör haline gelmiştir.

Çalışmanın çeşitli bölümlerinde vurgu yapıldığı üzere savaşın doğası aynı kalsa da özelliklerinin değiştiği, geleneksel savaşların çeşitli nedenlerle nadir hale geldiği, organize şiddet içeren mücadelenin boyut değiştirdiği bir dönemin şahidi olunmaktadır. Küreselleşme ise hem çatışmalara neden olan etkileriyle hem de sürecin olumlu-olumsuz çıktılarıyla yeni bir savaş anlayışının ortaya çıkmasında pay sahibidir.

Savaş dünyasındaki değişimin gelecekte de hızla devam edeceğini öngörmek zor değildir. Zira artık büyük ve hantal orduların yerini küçük ve etkili birlikler, büyük yıkımlara neden olan harplerin yerini siber savaşlar, geleneksel silahların ve askerlerin yerini insansız hava araçları ve robot askerlerin ikame edeceği dönemin ayak sesleri şimdiden duyulmaktadır. Geleneksel savunma-saldırı-strateji bağlamının etkisiz kaldığı/kalacağı bu mücadele içerisinde pek çok devletin yetersiz kalacağını tahmin etmek gerekmektedir. Diğer yandan ise gelecekte işsizliğin, gelir düzensizliğinin, kentli-köylü ve zengin-yoksul ayrımının daha da yükseleceğini, gelişmiş kapitalist devletlerin ve çok uluslu şirketlerin etki alanlarının diğerleri pahasına genişleyeceğini, doğal kaynak kıtlıklarının daha geniş coğrafyalarda yaşanacağını, kimlik ve inançsal sorgulamalarla ulus yapılarının hızlı bir çözülmeye gireceğini, devletlerin egemenliklerini korumada zorlanacaklarını, çevreye yönelik tehditlerin üst seviyeye ulaşarak artık çevrenin bir tehdit haline geleceğini belirtmek yanlış olmayacaktır. Ayrıca terör örgütlerinin ve yasa dışı faaliyet gösteren gerçek ya da sanal grupların etkilerini artıracakları da bolca tekrarlanan

öngörülerdendir. Son olarak da eklemek gerekir ki savunma sanayi teknolojisi simetrik ya da asimetrik boyutlardaki çarpışmalarda kullanmak üzere daha kısa sürede daha yıkıcı silahları ilgili pazara süreceği bir gelecek yaşanacaktır. Küreselleşmenin de tüm bu gelişmelerin her noktasında dolaylı veya dolaysız şekilde parmağının olduğunu ve olacağını söylemek gerekmektedir.

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CHAPTER 6

KÜRESELLEŞME SÜRECİNDE ULUSLARARASI MALİYE ALANINDA YAŞANAN SORUNLAR

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GİRİŞ

Günümüzde hemen hemen her alanda etkisini ve izlerini sürdüren küreselleşme süreci, teknolojinin de her geçen gün hızlı artması ile birlikte varlığını tüm dünya genelinde hissettirmektedir. Bu kapsamda gerek mali ve ekonomik gerekse sosyal ve kültürel boyutları bünyesinde barındırması itibariyle ülkelerin adapte olması gereken en önemli olguların başında gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla, ülkeler ve uluslararası kuruluşlar bir taraftan söz konusu sürecin olumlu yöndeki etkilerinin artırılması diğer taraftan ise olumsuz yöndeki etkilerinin bertaraf edilmesi amacıyla hem ulusal hem de uluslararası düzeyde çalışmalar yapmaktadır. Böylelikle, küreselleşmenin uluslararası maliye diğer bir ifade ile uluslararası vergilendirme çerçevesinde yarattığı sorunlar çalışmanın konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çalışmanın ilk bölümünde öncelikle küreselleşme olgusu detaylı bir şekilde tanımlanmakta; sonrasında ise küreselleşme türleri açıklandıktan sonra küreselleşmenin genel olarak olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde öncelikle küreselleşmenin genel olarak kamu maliyesi ve vergilendirme politikaları ile olan ilişkisi ele alınmakta; sonrasında sırasıyla

küreselleşmenin neden olduğu uluslararası vergi rekabeti, vergi cennetleri, uluslararası çifte vergilendirme ve elektronik ticaretin vergilendirilmesi sorunları tartışılmaktadır.

1. KÜRESELLEŞME

Çalışmanın bu bölümü; küreselleşme kavramı ve önemi, küreselleşmenin türleri ve küreselleşmenin genel olarak olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri başlıklarından oluşmaktadır.

1.1. Küreselleşme Kavramı ve Önemi

Küreselleşme olgusu, aslında yeni bir süreç veya kavram olarak karşımıza çıkmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla küreselleşme temellerinin, farklı kültür ve coğrafyada yaşayan topluluklar arasındaki ilişkilerin oluşmaya başladığı dönemlerde atıldığı ifade edilebilmektedir (Bayar, 2008:26). Bu doğrultuda, 16. ve 17. yüzyıllarda ülkelerin ekonomik gelişmelerini sağlayan temel sektörler ticaret ve tarımdan oluşmaktayken; 18. yüzyıldan itibaren ülkeler arasındaki sınai etkileşim, sanayi devrimi ve bunun akabindeki sanayileşme ile birlikte hızla artmıştır. Günümüzde ise, bilişim ve iletişim teknolojilerinin gelişmesi ile birlikte, iki kutuplu dünya düzeninde sosyalist düşüncenin hakim olduğu ülkelerin serbest piyasa sistemini tercih etmeleri küreselleşme sürecine ivme kazandırmıştır (Bakkal ve Susam, 2011:24). Bu doğrultuda, özellikle son yıllarda ülkelerin birçoğunda görülen kapalı ekonomiden açık ekonomilere doğru geçiş süreci, ekonomik ilişkilerin uluslararasılık açısından işlem hacmini artırmakla birlikte, çok uluslu şirketlerin ulus ekonomilerinde daha

rahat hareket edebilme kabiliyetlerini artırmıştır (Devrim ve Altay, 2000:28).

Bununla birlikte, küreselleşme sürecine adapte olunabilmesi kapsamında ülkelerin artan entegrasyonu, bütün aktörler açısından yeni ekonomik ilişkilerin tesis edilmesini gündeme getirmektedir. Bu doğrultuda küreselleşme, üretim faktörlerinin hareketliliğini artırmakla kalmayıp; aynı zamanda yine çok uluslu şirketlerin ekonomik ve finansal piyasalarda ağırlıklı olarak söz sahibi olmalarına yol açmıştır (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:22). Bununla birlikte, ülkelerin sosyal, politik ve ekonomik entegrasyon kapasitelerini artıran küreselleşme sürecinden gelişmiş ülkeler pozitif yönde etkilenirlerken; gelişmekte olan ülkelerin söz konusu sürece adaptasyon sağlayabilme güçlerinin yeterli düzeyde olmaması nedeniyle birtakım olumsuzluklara maruz kalabilmişlerdir (Ener ve Demircan, 2006:197). Küreselleşme süreci neticesinde özellikle 1990'lı yıllarda ortaya çıkan yeni dünya düzeninde ekonomik aktör ve işlemlerdeki mobilitenin artmasıyla birlikte, ülkeler arasındaki politik, kültürel, sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkiler yoğunlaşarak ülkelerin politik ve ekonomik yapılarını söz konusu sürece göre yeniden şekillendirmesi kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir (Meriç ve Ay, 2004:295). Bununla birlikte, insan hakları, çevre kirliliği, terörizm, salgın hastalıklar, terörizm göç hareketleri gibi küresel meselelere çözüm bulma amacıyla ülkelerin birbirine entegre olduğu ve yakınlaştığı ve bu doğrultuda da küresel işbirliği çalışmalarının arttığı aşikardır (Yıldız, 2005:28-29).

Söz konusu gelişmeler neticesinde gündeme gelen küreselleşme, günümüzde bir anahtar kelime olarak son yılların en çok tartışılan ve gündemi işgal eden hususların başında gelmektedir. Bu doğrultuda küreselleşme kavramı, gerek günlük ilişkilerde gerekse ekonomik, politik, toplumsal ve sosyal ilişkilerin yönlendirilmesi ve belirlenmesinde hiçbir kuvvetin karşı koyamayacağı bir çekim merkezi olarak algılanabilmektedir (Meriç ve Ay, 2004:296).

Küreselleşme ile ilgili olarak yapılan farklı tanımlar, küreselleşmenin çok boyutlu bir kavram olması ve vurgulanan kriterlerin sübjektif nitelikte olması nedenleri ile literatürde net bir küreselleşme tanımının bulunmadığına işaret etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, söz konusu farklılıklara rağmen küreselleşme; teknolojik gelişmeler ile birlikte ulusal politik tercihlerden beslenen, ülkelerin politik, ekonomik ve sosyokültürel değerlerinde değişiklikler yaratan ve bunların karşılıklı iletişimi ve etkileşimi ekseninde ulusal sınırları aşarak dünya geneline yayılan bir süreç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Saraç, 2006:6-7).

Globalleşme, globalizasyon ya da uluslararasılaşma olarak de adlandırılabilen küreselleşme olgusu; ülkeler arasındaki siyasi ve ekonomik sınırların etkisini yitirdiği, politik, sosyal, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel alandaki bazı benzer nitelikteki değerlerin ulusal ve yerel sınırları aşarak bütün dünya genelinde yayıldığı, devlet ve toplumların giderek benzeştiği bir ortam olarak ifade edilebilmektedir (Canbay, 2009:64).

En genel anlamı ile küreselleşme; karşılıklı bağımlılık esasında dünyanın farklı kesimlerinde yaşayan devlet, toplum ve bireyler

arasındaki etkileşim ve iletişim derecelerinin yükselmesi olarak tanımlanabilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, yerel ve evrensel bakış açılarından değerlendirildiğinde, söz konusu iki tarafa da ilerleyebilen bir süreci ifade etmekte olup; statik bir yapı arz etmekten ziyade ileri derecede dinamiklik ve değişkenliği vurgulayan bir yapı olarak betimlenebilmektedir (Bayar, 2008:25). Bununla birlikte küreselleşme; yeni dünya düzeni veya bütünleştirme olarak isimlendirilen bir eğilimi de ifade etmektedir (Devrim ve Altay, 2000:38).

Ayrıca küreselleşme, yerel ekonomilerin dünya ekonomileri ile entegre olmasını, tüketim, üretim, teknolojik gelişme ve mali piyasaları kapsayan bir kavram olması nedeniyle; sermayenin, işgücünün, teknolojinin, mal ve hizmet piyasalarının uluslararası nitelik kazanması ve bu bağlamda ulusal piyasaların birbirlerine açılması olayı olarak tanımlanabilmektedir (Karluk, 2007:1). Bu bağlamda, ulusal piyasa dinamiklerinin, dünya genelinde hakim güç konumunda bulunan piyasa dinamikleri tarafından belirlenen küreselleşme süreci, birçok aktörün rol aldığı ve kompleks ilişkilerin ve etkileşimlerin yaşadığı bir yapı sergilemektedir (Saraç, 2006:7).

Küreselleşme, dünyanın tek bir mekan olarak algılanması ve bu doğrultuda ulusal sınırların ortadan kaldırılması olarak da ifade edilebilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, günümüzün kaçınılmaz ve de karşı çıkılamaz bir gerçeği olan küreselleşme olgusu ülkelerin hem siyasi hem ekonomik hem sosyokültürel hem de mali alanlarda birbirleri ile adapte ve entegre olabilme sürecini vurgulamaktadır (Bayramoğlu,

2017:390-391). Bu bağlamda, küreselleşme; üretim faktörlerinin, mal ve hizmetlerin, finansal kaynak ve teknolojik bilgi birikiminin serbest bir şekilde hareket edebildiği ve finans, mal, hizmet ve faktör piyasalarının artan bir seyirde bütünleşebildiği bir süreç olarak değerlendirilebilmektedir (Kargı ve Yağır, 2016:3). Dolayısıyla, küreselleşme olarak nitelendirilen söz konusu çok boyutlu süreçte, piyasadan teknolojik ilerlemeye, bilgi iletişim sistemlerinden hukuka, değer yargılarından farklı kültürlere kadar değişebilen birçok alanda küresel ilişkiler yaşanabilmektedir (Gökbunar vd., 2008:159).

Konuya farklı bir bakış açısı ile yaklaşan tanıma göre küreselleşme; kapitalizmin uluslararasılaşması olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bu doğrultudaki bir uluslararasılaşma süreci ise; siyasi, ekonomik, hukuki, sosyal ve kültürel alanlardaki dönüşümler ile birlikte ülkelerin ve toplumsal aktörlerin söz konusu sürece adapte olabilmelerini zorunlu kılmaktadır (Kargı ve Özuğurlu, 2007:275). Bununla birlikte, küreselleşmenin sadece bir piyasa olgusu olarak algılanması yanıltıcı olabilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, siyasi engellerin kaldırılması ve farklı siyasi kurumların çeşitlendirilmesi gibi politikalar da söz konusu süreçte etkin rol oynamaktadır. Böylelikle, söz konusu politikaların uygulanması küreselleşme sürecine daha hızlı uyum sağlanabilmesini gerçekleştirecektir (Günaydın ve Benk, 2004:381-382).

Bu bağlamda, yukarıda bahsedilen tanımlardan yola çıkılarak yapılabilecek en kapsamlı tanıma göre küreselleşme; fiziki açıdan uzaklık ne şekilde olursa olsun farklı coğrafyalar, kültürel şekillenme, sosyal, ekonomik ve politik yapılanma, devlet idaresi, sermaye

birikimi, mal ve hizmetler, yaşam tarzları ve teknolojik altyapıyı ortak ve tek bir yapıya dönüştürmeye amaçlayan, bu doğrultuda da boyutu ve yapısı ne şekilde olursa olsun aktörler arasındaki etkileşim, ilişki ve iletişim seviyelerini artıran, karşılıklı bağımlılık esasına dayalı yapısal bir döşüm süreci olarak ifade edilmektedir (Çaşkurlu, 2018:17).

1.2. Küreselleşmenin Türleri

Günümüzde birçok alanda varlığını önemli derecede hissettiren küreselleşme farklı tür ve boyutları bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda aşağıda küreselleşme türleri olarak; ticari küreselleşme, ekonomik küreselleşme, mali küreselleşme, siyasi küreselleşme, üretim küreselleşmesi ve kültürel küreselleşme açıklanmaktadır:

- *Ticari küreselleşme:* Ticari küreselleşme ile, uluslararası ticaretin önündeki temel engeller olan gümrük tarifeleri ve ticari kotaların kaldırılması yönündeki uygulamalar ile Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (WTO) gibi uluslararası kuruluşların oluşturulması vurgulanmaktadır (Bayramoğlu, 2017:391). Başka bir ifade ile ticari küreselleşme ile, serbest ticaretin benimsenerek farklı mal ve hizmet gruplarının uluslararası piyasalarda belirli kurallar çerçevesinde hareket edebilmesi anlaşılmaktadır (Doğan ve Kabayel, 2016:151). Bu bağlamda ticari faaliyetlerin küreselleşmesi ile birlikte, uluslararası ticaret hacminde artış meydana gelirken; uluslararası ticaret yapısında da dönüşüm süreçleri yaşanmaktadır (Saraç, 2006:37).

- ***Ekonomik küreselleşme:*** Ekonomik küreselleşme; uluslararası sermaye hareketliliği, uluslararası ticaret hacmi ve teknolojinin ivedi bir şekilde yayılma hızının artması neticesinde ulusal ekonomilerin birbirine olan bağlılığının artması şeklinde ifade edilebilmektedir (Doğan ve Kabayel, 2016:153). Bununla birlikte ekonomik küreselleşme daha kapsamlı bir şekilde tanımlandığında ise; ekonomik sistemler ile ideolojilerin uluslararasılaştığı süreç karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Karluk, 2007:2). Bu bağlamda ekonomik küreselleşme sürecinde serbest piyasa ekonomisinin geliştirilmesi ve bunun neticesinde de küresel bazlı ekonomik kurum ve kuruluşların oluşturulması önem arz etmektedir (Canbay, 2009:67).

- ***Mali küreselleşme:*** Finansal küreselleşme olarak da ifade edilebilen mali küreselleşme; ulusal piyasalardaki sermaye ve döviz hareketleri üzerindeki birtakım kısıtlamaların kaldırılarak, söz konusu ulusal mali piyasaların uluslararası mali piyasalar ile entegre olarak ekonomik faaliyetlerinin büyük bir çoğunluğunu uluslararası düzeyde gerçekleştirmeleri olarak tanımlanabilmektedir (Berke, 2006:1132; Bayramoğlu, 2017:391). Bununla birlikte mali küreselleşme ile, sermayenin ülkelere giriş çıkış işlemlerinin rahatça yapılabilmesi ve sermayenin daha hızlı bir şekilde dolaşabilmesi vurgulanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, sermaye hareketliliğinin artması, teknolojik uygulamaların yarattığı avantajların bir sonucu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Doğan ve Kabayel, 2016:152).

- *Siyasi küreselleşme:* Siyasi küreselleşme ana hatları itibariyle, siyasi otorite, güç ve yönetim şekillerindeki yapısal dönüşümü ifade etmektedir. Bu bağlamda küresel siyaset; uluslar üstü örgütler, ulus devlet, yerel yönetim birimleri ve sivil toplum kuruluşları olmak üzere dört temel aktörden oluşmaktadır (Bayar, 2008:28). Bu bağlamda siyasi küreselleşme, üst yapıyı simgeleyen küresel aktörler arasındaki ilişkilerin ve alt yapıyı temsil eden devlet, toplum ve vatandaş ilişkisinin yeniden belirlenme süreci şeklinde kendisini göstermektedir (Saraç, 2007:55). Bununla birlikte, politik küreselleşme olarak da adlandırılan siyasi küreselleşme; ulusal bazda geçerliliği olan siyasi yönetim modellerinin küresel düzeyde de geçerlilik kazanarak yaygınlaştırılması şeklinde de ifade edilebilmektedir (Karluk, 2007:2). Söz konusu küreselleşme türünün aynı zamanda diğer küreselleşme türlerini de etkilediği ifade edilebilmektedir (Çaşkurlu, 2018:18).

- *Üretim küreselleşmesi:* Üretim küreselleşmesi ile birlikte, sınır ötesi üretim yaygınlaşarak ivme kazanmakta ve mal ve hizmetlerin üretimi ana ülke haricinde coğrafi sınırlar açısından farklı ülkelerde de gerçekleştirilebilmektedir (Bayramoğlu, 2017:391). Bu kapsamda, çok uluslu şirketler dünyanın farklı ülkelerinde avantajlı ve karlı bir şekilde üretim yaparak uluslararası mal ve hizmet piyasalarında önemli rol üstlenmektedirler (Doğan ve Kabayel, 2016:153).

- *Kültürel küreselleşme:* Kültürel küreselleşme, yerel kültürlerin farklı ulusların kültürlerinden etkilenmesi veya söz

konusu kültürleri etkilemesi vasıtasıyla belirli ulusal kültürlerin yaygınlaşma süreci olarak tanımlanabilmektedir (Karluk, 2007:2). Bu bağlamda politik ve ekonomik açıdan hakim güç olan ülkeler yadsınamaz bir şekilde kültürel küreselleşmeyi de yaygınlaştırabilmektedirler (Devrim ve Altay, 2000:43). Aynı zamanda kültürel küreselleşme ile de, belirli siyasi özelliklere sahip bir bölgedeki tüketim kalıpları ve üretim modelleri diğer bölgelere doğru kayabilmektedir (Saraç, 2006: 57).

1.3. Küreselleşmenin Genel Olarak Olumlu ve Olumsuz Etkileri

Küreselleşme süreci ile birlikte ülkelerin ve toplumların ekonomik, sosyal, politik ve kültürel yapıları başta olmak üzere, birçok alandaki yapılarında etkileşim mekanizmaları vasıtasıyla gerek olumlu gerekse olumsuz yönde etkiler meydana gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda küreselleşmenin olumlu etkileri şu şekilde sıralanabilmektedir (Ener ve Demircan, 2006:206-210; Yıldız, 2005:32-33; Çaşkurlu, 2018:38-40; Canbay, 2009:68-74; Meriç ve Ay, 2004:301-302; Günaydın ve Benk, 2004:381-385):

- Küreselleşmeye adapte olunabilmesi adına ülkeler, farklı ülkelerin uyguladıkları ekonomik, sosyal ve mali politikalara daha fazla ölçüde duyarlı olabilmektedirler.
- Küreselleşme süreci ile birlikte, özgürlükçü demokrasinin uluslararası arenada yayılmasının oluşturduğu yeni siyasi ve ekonomik örgütlenmeyle küresel medeniyet olgusu ortaya çıkmaktadır.

- Küreselleşme süreci ideolojik ayrımlara dayanılarak ortaya çıkan kutuplaşmayı kaldırmakla birlikte; aynı zamanda farklı toplumsal inanç ve kültürlerin daha fazla yakından tanınmasını sağlamaktadır.

- Küreselleşme vasıtasıyla bilgi ve iletişim teknolojilerinin hızlı bir şekilde ilerlemesi ve değişmesi, fiziksel sınırlardan bağımsız bir yeni dünya düzeni oluşturulmaktadır.

- Aynı zamanda küreselleşme ile birlikte, bireyler ve toplumlar geçmiştekine nazaran daha kapsamlı ve çeşitli ürün yelpazelerini daha düşük seviyelerdeki makul fiyatlardan satın alabilme imkanına kavuşabilmektedir. Ayrıca ulaşılabilecek bilgi çeşidi ve miktarının artması suretiyle, bilgiye ulaşabilme maliyetlerinde önemli miktarda düşüşler gözlemlenebilmektedir.

Küreselleşeme sürecinin ülkelerin ekonomik, sosyal, politik ve kültürel yapıları üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri ise aşağıdaki gibi sıralanabilmektedir (Aktan ve Vural, 2004a:64; Sönmezler, 2006:9; Ener ve Demircan, 2006:206-210; Yıldız, 2005:32-33; Çaşkurlu, 2018:38-40; Canbay, 2009:68-74; Meriç ve Ay, 2004:301-302; Günaydın ve Benk, 2004:381-385):

- Küreselleşme ve bunun siyasi yansıması olarak ifade edilen serbestleşme politikaları ülkeleri ekonomik anlamda yok eden bir yapı ve süreç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Mali sıkıştırma olarak da ifade edilebilen bu etki ise ülkelerin gelirlerini

azaltmakla kalmayıp; aynı zamanda harcama faaliyetlerini artırabilmektedir.

- Küreselleşme süreci bünyesinde eşitsizlik ve adaletsizlik barındırması itibariyle, işsizlik, sömürü, yabancı düşmanlığı, çatışma gibi olumsuzluklara yol açabilmektedir.

- Küreselleşme ile birlikte, rekabet gücü yüksek olan sektör ve ülkelerde işgücünde kıtlığa rastlanılırken; düşük rekabet gücüne sahip olan sektör ve ülkelerde ise işsizlik rakamları yüksek seviyelerde seyretmektedir.

- Küreselleşme gelişmiş ülkelerde çalışan niteliksiz işçilerin ücretlerinde ciddi düşüşlere yol açarak, söz konusu ülkelerde daha adaletsiz gelir dağılımına sebebiyet vermektedir.

- Küreselleşmenin gelişmesi ve ekonomik büyümenin hızlanması ile birlikte, doğal kaynaklar şiddetli saldırıya uğrayarak denizler ve kara parçalı zararlı ve zehirli maddelerin tahribatına uğramaktadır. Bu bağlamda ekonomik gelişme ile birlikte, birtakım ülkeler ve çok uluslu şirketler daha da zenginleşirken; söz konusu zenginliğin getirdiği avantajlardan çok az sayıda insan ve toplum faydalanabilmektedir.

- Küreselleşmenin sağlık alanında neden olduğu bir diğer olumsuz etki ise; birey, mal ve hizmetlerin serbest bir şekilde dünyayı dolaşabilmesi kapsamında dünyayı tehdit edebilecek bakteri veya virüslerin yayılmasına imkan tanıyabilmesidir.

- Küreselleşmenin yarattığı merkez çevre ülke ayrımı neticesinde sömüren ile sömürülen ilişkisi ortaya

çıkabilmektedir. Ekonomik bağlamda oluşan ayrılık giderek sosyal şiddete de dönüşebilmektedir.

- Küreselleşme sürecinin döngüsel bir yapı ihtiva etmesi hegemonik ilişkileri de değiştirebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda hegemonik yapı ise, kültürel dayatılmışlık ile birlikte toplumlar ve ülkeler arasındaki uçurumu daha da fazla artırabilmektedir.

- Küreselleşme neticesinde spekülatif amaçlı sermaye hareketlerinin kontrolsüz ve denetimsiz bir şekilde ülkeler arasında hareket etmesi ise, birçok ülkenin ekonomilerinde krizlere sebebiyet vererek ağır tahribatlara yol açabilmektedir.

2. KÜRESELLEŞMENİN ULUSLARARASI VERGİLENDİRME KAPSAMINDA YOL AÇTIĞI SORUNLARIN DEĞEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Çalışmanın bu bölümü; küreselleşmenin genel olarak kamu maliyesi ve vergilendirme politikaları ile ilişkisi, küreselleşmenin neden olduğu uluslararası vergi rekabeti ve vergi cenneti sorunu, küreselleşmenin neden olduğu uluslararası çifte vergilendirme sorunu ve küreselleşmenin neden olduğu elektronik ticaretin vergilendirilmesi sorunu başlıklarından oluşmaktadır.

2.1. Küreselleşmenin Genel Olarak Kamu Maliyesi ve Vergilendirme Politikaları ile İlişkisi

Özellikli 1990'lı yılların sonlarına doğru gelişmekte olan ülkelerin küreselleşmenin yarattığı yeni ekonomik düzene uyum çabaları

sonucunda ortaya çıkan ekonomik krizler kamu kesiminin yapısını ve işleyişini derinden sarsmıştır. Bu doğrultuda da küreselleşme süreci kamu maliyesinin hareket alanını daraltarak; ülkeleri yeni kamu kesimi reformlarına yönlendirmiştir. Böylelikle, ulus devlet düşüncesi farklı boyut kazanarak devlete verilen yeni görevler ile birlikte fonksiyonel devlet anlayışını önemini yitirmiş; uluslararası bütünleşme çabalarının hızlandırılması bağlamında politika belirleyip uygulayan devlet anlayışına geçilmiştir (Bakkal ve Susam, 2011:24-30).

Söz konusu yeni devlet anlayışı çerçevesinde ise ülkelerin ekonomi ve kamu maliyesi alanında öncelikli olarak yapması gerekenler; kamu harcamalarının planlama esasına dayalı olarak gerçekleştirilmesi, kamu kesiminde mali disiplinin sağlanması, ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde vergisel reformların gerçekleştirilmesi, ticaretin serbestleştirilerek doğrudan yatırımların önünün açılması, özelleştirme yapılması, yeniden düzenleme faaliyetlerinin gerçekleştirilmesi ve mülkiyet haklarının teminat altına alınması olarak sıralanabilmektedir (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:22-23).

Ulus devletlerin kamu maliyesi ile ilgili temel politika araçları; kamu gelirleri, kamu harcamaları ve borçlanmadır. Bu doğrultuda küreselleşme sürecine girilmesiyle birlikte, ilk olarak kamu harcamalarının düşürülmesi vasıtasıyla kamu kesimi faaliyetleri kısıtlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, kamunun finansman yükünün artması ile bütçedeki faiz giderleri artarak ülkeler faiz-borç kısır döngüsü içerisine girerek mali sürdürülebilirliklerini sağlayamamışlardır

(Bakkal ve Susam, 2011:38-39). Bu bağlamda küreselleşme süreci, ülkelerin yatırım çekebilmesi için mali iklimi tesis edecek makul yer düzenlemesi amacıyla vergi sistemlerini ve kamu harcamalarını sürdürülebilirliğin sağlanması hususunda teşvik edici rol oynamaktadır (Giray, 2005:103). Bununla birlikte, küreselleşmenin mahiyeti itibariyle kamu gelirlerini azaltmasına karşın kamu harcamalarını artıran bir yapı arz etmesi, dünya ekonomileri üzerinde mali sıkıştırma etkisi yaratmaktadır. Söz konusu etkiden ülkelerin kaçınması mümkün olmamakla birlikte; gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde kamu ekonomisi ve kamu mali yapısının farklı düzeylerde olmaması itibariyle etkinin boyutu da söz konusu ülkelerde farklı olabilmektedir (Sönmezler, 2006:22).

Küreselleşme sürecinin beraberinde getirdiği teknolojik ve ekonomik ilerlemeler farklı ülkelerde farklı şekillerde uygulanan ulusal vergi rejimlerini etkilerken; ülkelerin bu etkileşimden bağımsız bir vergi sistemine sahip olabilmesi de imkansız hale gelmektedir. Aynı zamanda, neo-liberallerin ekonomi politikalarında sermayenin dünyanın farklı ülkeleri arasında serbestçe dolaşabilmesine kadarki süreçte ortaya çıkan farklılıklar vergi politikalarının da bu yönde belirlemesine neden olmuştur. (Güngör ve Aydın, 2011:70-77). Bu doğrultuda, küreselleşme neticesinde vergilendirme politikaları vasıtasıyla yeterli seviyede gelir temin edemeyen ülkelerin verimlilik ve etkinliklerini artıracak yani vergilendirme ihtiyaçlarını azaltacak bir yapıya sahip olabilmeleri önem arz etmektedir (Aktan ve Vural, 2004a:50).

Özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerin ekonomik gelişmelerinin tamamlanarak kalkınmalarının finanse edilebilmesi için tasarrufların artırılması kapsamında hareketli olan sermaye önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda söz konusu ülkelerin yabancı sermayeyi ülkelerine çekebilmesi adına vergi oranlarının indirilmesi veya vergisel engellerinin önlenmesi suretiyle ulusal vergi politikalarında değişime gidilmesi gerekmektedir. Vergi politikalarındaki bu değişim ile birlikte, ülkelerin ulusal vergi gelirlerinde düşüşler gerçekleşmekte ve vergi yükü nispeten daha az hareketli olan emek üzerinde yoğunlaşmakta dolayısıyla da verginin yeniden tahsis fonksiyonu zedelenmektedir. Bu durum ise genellikle küresel refah kaybı olarak algılanabilmektedir (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:22). Bu küresel refah kaybı ile birlikte özellikte gelişmekte olan ülkelerin vergi matrahları büyük ölçüde olumsuz yönde etkilenerek; kamu gelirleri yapısal olarak vergilerden borçlanmaya doğru yönelmekte ve finansal krizlere maruz kalabilmektedirler (Meriç ve Ay, 2004:303-304). Başka bir ifade ile, küreselleşme süreci gerek gelişmiş gerekse gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki vergi gelirleri miktarını azaltırken; artan kamusal mal ve hizmet taleplerini finanse edecek düzeyde kamu harcamalarının arttırılamaması söz konusu ülkeleri mali krizlere sürüklemektedir (Giray, 2009:76).

Bununla birlikte, maruz kalınan ekonomik ve mali krizler karşısında uluslararası kuruluşların tavsiyede bulunduğu ekonomik ve mali önlemlerin nispeten daraltıcı nitelikte olması nedeniyle, kamu açıklarının azaltılarak mali disiplinin tesis edilmesini kolaylaştırması

açısından kamu maliyesinde nispeten iyileşme gerçekleşmiştir. Nitekim daraltıcı tedbirler, reel piyasa yapısını daha da sınırlandırarak üretim kayıplarına, işsizlik artışına ve bu nedenle de durgunluk sürecine girilmesine neden olabilmektedir (Eker, 2009:21).

Bu doğrultuda, uluslararası vergi düzenlemeleri başta olmak üzere ülkelerin vergi sitem, yapı ve politikaları küreselleşme sürecinden en fazla etkilenen mali alanlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Söz konusu süreçte uygulanan vergi politika ve düzenlemelerinin alt yapısı, teknolojik ilerleme, kontrollü kambiyo işlemleri ve sınırlandırılan bir serbest sermaye dolaşımının mevcut olduğu dönemlerde oluşturulmuştur. Dolayısıyla söz konusu sürece adapte olunabilmesi adına, bu temellere dayanan ulusal vergi sistemlerinin uluslararası düzeyde yeniden düzenlenmesi gerekmektedir (Ferhatoğlu, 2006:79). Bu bağlamda söz konusu düzenlemelere yönelik olarak küreselleşme, ülkelerin ulusal vergi sistemlerinde yer alan vergi yükünün faktörler arasındaki dağılımını, alınması planlanan vergi türlerini, vergi oranlarını ve ülkelerin vergi idarelerinin yapılarını etkileyebilmektedir (Berke, 2006:1132).

Küreselleşmenin ulus devletlerin yetkilerini sınırlandırarak, yerini uluslararası platformlarda daha entegre olmuş devletlerin ortaya çıkmasının vergilendirme alanıyla ilgili olarak iki temel etkisi bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki; ulus devletlerin, rakipleri konumundaki ve ticari ilişki içinde bulundukları ülkelerin vergi politikalarını değiştirme süreçlerine daha duyarlı hale gelmektedir. İkinci etki ise; vergilendirme ile ilgili olarak devletlerin ulusal

politikalarının gücünü zayıflatarak; bağımsız vergi politikası üretme gücü ve bağımsızlığını zedelemektedir (Giray, 2005:102-103).

Uygulamaya giren ve yeniden düzenlenen vergi politikalarındaki dönüşüm en fazla dolaysız vergilerin yerine dolaylı vergilerin tercih edilmesi şeklinde gerçekleşmektedir. Bu doğrultuda küreselleşme sürecinin de etkisiyle birlikte, hareketli olan sermaye yüksek vergi alanlardan düşük vergi alanlara doğru yer değiştirmektedir (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:23). Başka bir ifade ile, özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerde artan finansman ihtiyacı dolaylı vergilere ağırlık verilerek karşılanma eğilimine girilmektedir. Aynı zamanda küreselleşme ile birlikte potansiyel vergi tabanlarının aşınması neticesinde gerçekleştirilen vergisel reformlarda, esnek vergi tabanları üzerindeki vergi oranları düşürülüp; esnek olmayan vergi tabanları üzerindeki vergi oranları ise artırılmaktadır (Kovancılar vd., 2007:49-53).

Farklı bir bakış açısıyla küreselleşmenin vergilendirme üzerindeki etkileri incelendiğinde; küreselleşmenin ulusal vergi politikaların gücünü sınırlandırdığı, ülkelerin üretim faktörlerini kendilerine çekebilecek vergi yapısı oluşturma çabalarına girdiği, mevcut vergi kaynaklarının ulusal düzeyde vergiye tabi tutulmasının zorlaştığı ve her ülkenin kendi ekonomik yapısına uygun olan bağımsız vergi politikası seçebilme özgürlüğünün kısıtlandığı gözlenmektedir (Canbay, 2009:91).

Ayrıca küreselleşmenin yarattığı olumsuzlukların giderilebilmesi adına ülkelerin vergi sistemlerini küresel sisteme uyum sağlayacak şekilde yeniden tesis etmesi gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası

vergisel boyutta mükellefin vergi planlamasına yönelik işlemlerinin vergi ödemekten kaçınmaya dönüşümünün önlenmesi adına ulusal vergi idarelerinin söz konusu alan ile ilgili olarak uluslararası işbirliğine giderek etkin mücadele ve politika araçlarının geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir (Erdem, 2017:16).

2.2. Küreselleşmenin Neden Olduğu Uluslararası Vergi Rekabeti ve Vergi Cenneti Sorunları

Küreselleşme sürecinin vergilendirme alanı üzerindeki etkileri kapsamda incelenmesi gereken en önemli uluslararası vergisel sorunların başında uluslararası vergi rekabeti ve söz konusu rekabet neticesinde ortaya çıkan vergi cennetleri gelmektedir. Bu doğrultuda da vergilendirme kapsamında birtakım uluslararası düzenlemeler yapılmakta ve söz konusu süreç içerisinde yabancı sermayenin ülkeye çekilebilmesi için bu tip düzenlemeler birer politika tarzına dönüştürülmektedir. Küreselleşme ile birlikte farklı ülkeler arasında sermaye ve yatırımların yön değiştirmesi bağlamında vergi muafiyetleri gibi vergi oranlarının indirilmesi şeklinde bir rekabet ortamı yaratılmıştır.

Başka bir ifade ile, küreselleşme süreci neticesinde sermaye en hızlı ve en kolay serbestleşebilen yani mobilitesi en yüksek faktör olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda ülkeler ve firmalar maliyetlerini minimize ederek karlılıklarını artırmak amacıyla vergi oranlarında indirime gidebilmektedirler. Yüksek hareket serbestisine sahip olan sermeye aynı zamanda vergiye olan duyarlılığı artırabilmektedir. Bu durumda özellikle yabancı sermaye ile büyüme modelini tercih eden

gelişmekte olan ülkeler için vergilerin indirilme politikası kaçınılmaz hale gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla da, uluslararası yatırımların ülkeye çekilmesinde vergiler en önemli araç olarak vurgulanmaktadır (Eminer, 2017:113). Ülkeler arasındaki rekabet ortamını yaratan diğer bir husus ise küreselleşme sürecinde ülkelerin vergi politikası araçları kontrolü altında bulunan kamu alt yatırımları politikası olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu kapsamda harcama rekabeti dikkate alınmadan vergi rekabeti tek başına belirleyici olmayabilmektedir (Göker, 2008:122).

Bunnula birlikte, bilgi, teknoloji ve iletişim kavramları ile eşanlı bir şekilde değişen küreselleşme sürecinin temel odak noktası olan serbestleşme faaliyetleri ve bunun neticesinde üretim faktörü hareketliliğinin artması vergi politikalarında rekabetin artırılması açısından dönüşüm yapılması gerektiğini belirtmektedir. Bu kapsamda küreselleşme, geniş bir alana yayılan vergi matrahı ve düşük seviyelerde seyreden vergi oranlarını temel alan vergisel düzenlemelerin temelini oluşturmaktadır (Giray, 2005:102). Dolayısıyla ülkeler, mobilitesi nispeten daha yüksek olan yatırım ve mali sermaye gibi faktörleri kendilerine kazandırmak amacıyla düşük oranlı vergi tarifelerini ayrıcalıklı vergi politikası aracı olarak kullanabilmektedir (Berke, 2006:1133). Bununla birlikte küreselleşmenin yarattığı imkanlarla ülkeler bir taraftan uluslararası vergi rekabetinin avantajını kullanarak kazançlarını arttırabilirlerken; diğer taraftan da ülke içindeki kaynakların farlı bir ülkenin vergi

ayrıcalığını tercih etmesi nedeni ile zarar görebilmektedir (Armağan ve İçmen, 2012:145-146).

Üretimim şekilleri ve süreçlerinin uluslararasılaşarak sermaye başta olmak üzere bazı üretim faktörlerinin hareketliliğinin artması ile birlikte ülkelerin küresel vergi tabanından daha fazla yararlanmak istemesi neticesinde vergi yüklerinin diğer ülkelere ihraç edilmesi uluslararası vergi rekabeti olarak adlandırılmaktadır (Aktan ve Vural, 2004b:1). Aynı zamanda uluslararası vergi rekabeti kısaca; küreselleşmenin ve ekonomik bütünleşmelerin artması ile birlikte vergi oranlarının indirilmesi olarak da tanımlanabilmektedir. Genel kabul gören uluslararası vergi rekabeti tanımı ile sadece vergisel düzenleme ve yenilenme anlamı vurgulanmamakta; aynı zamanda küresel yarışın avantajlı bir aşaması olduğu da belirtilmektedir (Yakar Önal ve Temelli, 2011:350).

Ülkelerin vergi rekabeti uygulamalarına başvurmalarının temel nedenleri ise aşağıdaki şekilde belirtilebilmektedir (Giray, 2005:94-99; Armağan ve İçmen, 2012:148; Yurdadoğ ve Albayrak, 2017:28; Canbay, 2009:136-137; Yıldız, 2005:65-67; Saraç, 2006:144-145).

- Vergi rekabeti, kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının etkin bir şekilde organize edilmesi, kamusal mal ve hizmet sunumunun azaltılması ve farklı vergi türleri arasında uygun bir dengenin sağlanması açılarından mali disiplini sağlamaktadır.
- Vergi rekabeti düşük vergi ve yüksek kaliteli mal ve hizmet sunumunu beraberinde getirmektedir.

- Ülkelerin uluslararası vergi rekabeti uygulamalarını tercih etmelerinin arkasındaki temel düşünce verginin tarafsızlığı ilkesidir. Söz konusu ilkeye sadık kalınarak sosyal ve ekonomik amaçlara uyum çerçevesinde kaynak dağılımında etkinlik sağlanabilmektedir.
- Devletleri yönetimde etkin olmaya teşvik ederek seçmenlerin taleplerine uygun yönde davranmalarını sağlayabilmektedir.
- Adil bir şekilde uygulanacak olan vergi rekabetinin fiyatlar genel düzeyi üzerindeki olumlu etkisi ve ekonomik etkinliğin tesis edilmesi açılarından faydalı olabileceği vurgulanmaktadır.
- Ülkeler durgunluk yaşadıkları dönemlerde vergi rekabeti ile ilave sermaye sağlayarak, söz konusu sermaye geliri ile yaratılacak olan istihdam artışlarından olumlu yönde etkilenebileceklerdir.
- Vergi rekabeti ile birlikte vergilerin, yükümlüler üzerindeki vergi yükleri ve kamusal mal ile hizmetlerin arasında dengeli bir ilişkiyi ifade eden makul bir seviyeye ulaşması sağlanabilmektedir.

Günümüzde ülkelerin hareketli sermayeyi ülkeye çekebilmeleri amacıyla birey ve firmaların yatırım kararlarını belirleme ve etkileme gayretleri uluslararası vergi rekabetini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Söz konusu rekabet makul bir sınıra kadar kabul edilebilir uygulamalardan ibaretken; bu sınırdan sonra yatırımcının mukim olduğu veya vatandaşı olduğu ülkenin vergi idaresine zarar vermeye başlamaktadır

Bunwith birlikte uluslararası düzeydeki bir vergi rekabeti ile hareketli sermayeyi ülkesine çekmek isteyen rekabetçi ülkelerin vergi yüklerini hafifletmekte; bu bağlamda da üretim faktörleri yüksek vergili alanlardan düşük vergileri alanlara kaçarak yön değiştirmektedir (Kargı ve Yaygır, 2016:2-6). Devletlerin mali egemenliğinin ve ulusal vergi sistemlerinin sağlıklı ve etkin bir şekilde yürütülmesi işlemlerinin büyük ölçüde teknolojik gelişme ve küreselleşmeden neden olduğu imkanlar vergiden kaçınılması amacıyla kullanılabilmektedir. Başka bir ifade ile geleneksel vergi sistemleri bu yenilik sürecine adapte olurken zorlanabilmekteyken; servet ve varlık vergileri ile ilave gelir sağlayan ülkelerin küreselleşme sonucu ortaya çıkan zararlı vergi rekabeti ile mükellefiyete maruz kalmaksızın varlıklarını daha da fazla artırabilmektedirler (Erdem, 2017:15). Bu doğrultuda uluslararası zararlı vergi rekabetinin belirlenmesinde kullanılabilecek ölçekler şu şekilde sıralanabilmektedir (Öncel ve Öncel, 2003:10-13; Yıldız, 2005:46-48, Pehlivan ve Öz, 2017:125; Öz, 2005:96):

- Sıfır veya çok düşük oranlı tercihli vergi rejimlerinin oluşturulması,
- Dış sermaye veya yatırımlara ayrımcı vergi rejimi uygulanması,
- Kapalı veya çevrili alan rejimi uygulanması,
- Uluslararası bilgi değişimi konusunda boşluk oluşturulması,
- Uluslararası vergi sistemlerinde saydamlığın bulunmaması,
- Rejim çerisinde serbest vergi kantonlarının yaratılmış olması,

- Vergi matrahının belirlenmesinde yapay önlemlere başvurulması,

- Uluslararası transfer fiyatlandırmasına olanak verecek yasal boşluklar oluşturulması,

- Yabancı kaynaklı gelirlerin yerleşik ülke vergisinden muaf tutulması ve

- Vergi kaybını telafi edecek şekilde yabancı yatırımcıların mükellefiyete ilişkin vergi oranını veya matrahını yerleşik yatırımcıya doğru aktarıcı önlemler alınması ve mevzuatın bunun uygulanmasına olanak veren hükümler oluşturulmasıdır.

Dolayısıyla, uluslararası vergi rekabeti ülkelerin ulusal ekonomi ve vergi sistemleri üzerinde yarattıkları olumsuz etkiler nedeniyle özellikle AB ve OECD tarafından zararlı olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda özellikle OECD zararlı vergi rekabetinin önlenmesine yönelik olarak uluslararası işbirliği gerektiren ve söz konusu meselenin çok taraflı bir şekilde çözümlenmesini amaçlayan projeler üretip uygulamakta ve aynı zamanda zararlı vergi rekabetini uygulayan ülkeleri vergi cenneti olarak damgalamaktadır (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:24-25). Bu doğrultuda OECD zararlı vergi rekabeti ile ilgili olarak 1998 tarihinde "Zararlı Vergi Rekabeti: Acil Bir Küresel Sorun" adlı rapor hazırlayıp yayınlamıştır. Söz konusu raporda vergi rekabetin ulusal ve uluslararası arenalarda yarattığı bütün etkiler ve alınacak tedbirler detaylı bir şekilde açıklanmıştır (Kargı ve Yayğır, 2016:7). Bu bağlamda küreselleşme süreci kapsamında ortaya çıkan uluslararası vergi rekabetinin olumsuz

etkileri ise şu şekilde sıralanabilmektedir (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:24-25; Kargı ve Yaygır, 2016:7-8; Ferhatoğlu, 2006:84; Aktan ve Vural, 2004a:55; Armağan ve İçmen, 2017:149-150; Eminer, 2017:114-120; Yurdadoğ ve Albayrak, 2017:128; Canbay, 2009:140; Yıldız, 2005:61-65; Saraç, 2006:141-42):

- Ülkeler mali ve ekonomik kaynakları etkin bir şekilde vergilendirememek suretiyle vergi matrahlarında aşınmalar meydana gelmekte ve bunun neticesinde de mali bozulma gerçekleşmektedir.

- Vergi ve kamu harcamalarının miktar ve bileşim düzeylerinin belirlenmesi ihtiyacı doğurmaktadır.

- Reel ve finansal yatırımların yönünü değiştirmek suretiyle etkinsizlik yaratabilmektedir.

- Kamu hizmetlerinin sunumunda etkinsizliğe yol açabilmekte ve sosyal devletin bunun neticesinde zarar görmesine neden olabilmektedir.

- Vergi yönetimi ve uygulama maliyetlerini büyük ölçüde artırabilmektedir.

- Vergi yükümlülerin vergi ödeme istekliliğini ve vergiye uyumunu zorlaştırarak vergi kaçırmalarına neden olabilmektedir.

- Özellikle gelişmiş ülkelerin temel gelir kaynağı niteliğini taşıyan kurumlar vergisi ve kişisel gelir vergisi gelirlerinin toplam vergi gelirleri payı içerisindeki payının düşmesine neden olabilmektedir.

- Vergileme alanında adaleti zedeleyebilmekte ve dolayısıyla da gelir dağılımında adaletsizliğe neden olabilmektedir.

- Vergi yükünü tüketim ve emek gibi nispeten hareket serbestisi daha düşük olan faktörlere doğru yönlendirebilmektedir.

- Gelirin hareketli ve sabit kaynakları arasında başka bir ifade ile bir taraftan işgücü diğer taraftan da parasal ve reel sermaye arasında fırsat eşitsizliğine neden olabilmektedir.

Bununla birlikte, uluslararası vergi rekabeti kapsamında oluşan vergi cenneti; belli bir ülkenin sınırlarında bulunmakla birlikte yabancı yatırımcılardan gelecek sermayeye yönelik olarak her türlü denetim ve vergi muafiyeti imkanı sunan mali ve ekonomik adacıklardan oluşan bölge olarak tanımlanabilmektedir (Öztürk ve Ülger, 2016:238). Aynı zamanda vergi cenneti en basit şekilde; vergi sistemlerinde sıfır veya düşük oranlı vergi uygulayan ülkeler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ancak ülkelerin kendi ekonomik yapıları çerçevesinde sadece belirli sektörlere yönelik olarak vergisel kolaylıkları sunması söz konusu ülkeyi vergi cenneti olarak nitelendirmeye yeterli değildir. Bu bağlamda OECD'nin 1998 yılındaki hazırladığı raporda bir ülkenin vergi cenneti olarak nitelendirilebilmesi için taşıması gereken nitelikler şu şekilde sıralanmaktadır (Kargı ve Yayğır, 2016:9-10; Aktan ve Vural, 2004b:10-11, Öncel ve Öncel, 2003:15-16, Çaşkurlu, 2018:158; Pehlivan ve Öz, 2017:133):

- Özellikle yerleşik olmayanların işlemlerinden hiç vergi alınmaması veya çok düşük oranlı nominal vergi uygulanması,
- Bilgi değişiminden kaçınılması,

- Vergi anlaşması yapmaktan kaçınılması,
- Gelişmiş bir bankacılık sistemine sahip olunması,
- İkili bir döviz kontrol sisteminin bulunması veya kambiyo denetiminin bulunmaması,
- Kanuni, idari ve mali işlemlerde saydamlığın olmaması ve
- Belirli bir düzeyde reel faaliyette bulunma zorunluluğunun olmamasıdır.

Özellikle son yıllarda çoğunluğunu nüfus, yüzölçümü ve milli gelirleri açısından nispeten daha küçük ülkelerin oluşturduğu vergi cennetleri kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda faaliyetlerinden olumlu yönde etkilenirlerken; küresel ekonomi bütünü itibariyle değerlendirildiğinde söz konusu ülkelerin vergisel faaliyetlerinden zarar görebilmektedir (Şahin ve Yılmaz, 2018:112). Dolayısıyla, çok uluslu firmalar kolaylıkla vergi cenneti olarak nitelendirilen ülkelerde bağlı şube açıp kağıt üzerinde işlemler yaparak karlarını vergilerin yüksek olduğu ülkelerden nispeten daha düşük efektif vergi oranı uygulayan veya hiç vergi almayan ülkelere doğru kaydırarak vergiden kaçınabilmektedirler (Ferhatoğlu, 2006:86). Bu doğrultuda, vergi cennetleri küreselleşmenin karanlık tehlikeli boyutları ile ilgili olarak: kara paranın aklanması, vergiden kaçınma, vergi kaçakçılığı, terörizmin finansmanı ve mali krizler yaşanması gibi önemli küresel meselelerde olumsuz yönde rol oynayabilmektedirler (Öztürk ve Ülger, 2016:246).

2.3. Küreselleşmenin Neden Olduğu Uluslararası Çifte Vergilendirme Sorunu

Ülkeler egemenlik haklarının gereği olarak ve kendi ulusal vergi sistemlerini diledikleri şekilde kullanma yetkisine sahip olmaları nedeniyle farklı ilkeler temelinde vergileme sistemlerini kullanabilmektedirler. Söz konusu farklı ilkelere başvurulması neticesinde birden fazla ülke ile hukuki ve ekonomik ilişki içinde bulunması durumunda ülkelerin vergilendirme yetkileri çakışabilmekte ve çatışabilmektedir. Aynı zamanda, aynı ilkeyi benimseyen ülkelerin vergi ile ilgili kavramları farklı yorumlayabilmeleri nedeniyle aynı yükümlü veya aynı yükümlü farklı vergilendirme yetkileri ile karşı karşıya kalabilmektedirler (Dağlıoğlu ve Çiçek; 2014:28). Bununla birlikte uluslararası çifte vergilendirme konusu, ülkelerin ulusal vergilendirme yetkisini sınırlandırması vasıtasıyla uluslararası ilişkileri olumsuz yönde etkileme özelliğine sahip olması nedeniyle küreselleşme sürecini sekteye uğratabilecek bir uluslararası mali bir sorun olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Saraç, 2006:86).

Bu bağlamda uluslararası çifte vergilendirme en genel anlamı itibariyle; herhangi bir vergi yükümlüsünden, belirli bir vergi konusundan ötürü aynı vergilendirme döneminde, aynı türden verginin birden fazla ülke tarafından alınması olarak tanımlanabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla söz konusu tanımdan hareketle uluslararası çifte vergilendirmenin temel unsurları şu şekilde sıralanabilmektedir (Pehlivan ve Öz, 2017:76-77):

- Yükümlü kişinin aynı olması,
- Vergilendirme döneminin aynı olması,

- Vergi konusunun aynı olması,
- Vergi türünün aynı olması ve
- Vergilendirme yetkisine haiz olan ülkelerin çok olmasıdır.

Konu hukuki açıdan değerlendirildiğinde; çok uluslu firmalarda ana firmanın bir devlet, bağlı firmanın ise farklı bir devlet tarafından vergilendirilmesi bağlı firmanın ayrı bir tüzel kişiliğinin bulunmaması nedeniyle uluslararası çifte vergilendirmeye neden olmamaktadır. Bu kapsamda uluslararası çifte vergilendirme aşağıdaki durumlarda ortaya çıkabilmektedir (Öz, 2005:30-31):

- İki devletin aynı kişiyi dünya genelinde elde ettiği bütün gelirler kapsamında vergilendirmesi durumunda,
- Bir devlette ikametgahı bulunan kişinin diğer devlette elde ettiği geliri her iki devletin birden vergilendirmesi durumunda veya
- Her iki devlette de ikametgahı bulunmayan kişinin, bir devlette sahip olduğu sabit bir işyeri vasıtasıyla diğer bir devlette gelir elde etmesi durumunda her iki devletin birden bu geliri vergilendirmesi durumunda.

Bununla birlikte, uluslararası vergileme ile ilgili olarak benimsenen ilkelerin farklı olmalarına göre uluslararası çifte vergilendirmeye neden olan durumlar ise şu şekilde sıralanabilmektedir (Çaşkurlu, 2018:139-140):

- Vergilendirme yetkisinin tespit edilmesinde her ülkenin kaynak ilkesini tercih etmesi,

- Vergilendirme yetkisinin tespit edilmesinde her ülkenin ikametgah ilkesini tercih etmesi,

- Vergilendirme yetkisinin tespit edilmesinde ülkelerin ikametgah ve kaynak ilkelerini karşılıklı olarak kullanmaları,

- Ülkelerin, vergilendirilebilir gelirin özelliklerini farklı yorumlaması,

- Ülkelerin, vergilendirilecek kişileri farklı yorumlaması ve

- Vergilendirme işlemini gerçekleştirecek ülkelerdeki vergi sistemlerinin uyumsuz olmasıdır.

Bu kapsamda uluslararası çifte vergilendirmenin giderilmesine yönelik olarak uluslararası çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme anlaşmaları yapılmaktadır. Söz konusu anlaşmalarda vergileme yetkileri ya yatırımcının mukimi olduğu ülkede veya anlaşmaların içeriğine bağlı olarak istenilen tarafa bırakılabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla yatırımcılar, kendi ülkeleri dışında yapmayı planladıkları yatırımlar için hem yatırım yaptığı ülkede hem de kendi ülkesinde mükerrer bir şekilde vergi ödememek adına hükümetlerinin söz konusu anlaşmaları yapmalarını arzu etmektedirler. Nitekim bu tip anlaşmalar, küreselleşme sürecinde yabancı sermayenin ülke içine çekilebilmesi adına önemli bir rekabet aracı olmakla birlikte; vergi kaçakçılığına da yol açarak sermaye ihracatçısı ülkeler açısından ulusal bir kayıp olarak görülebilmektedir (Meriç ve Ay, 2005:319-320).

2.4. Küreselleşmenin Neden Olduğu E-Ticaretin Vergilendirilmesi Sorunu

Küreselleşme süreci kapsamında elektronik ticaretin vergilendirilmesi meselesi uluslararası etkileri kapsamında tartışılan bir sorun olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda ödeme sistemlerinin elektronik ortamda geliştirilmesi elektronik ticaretin vergilendirilmesini daha da zorlaştırabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla elektronik ortamda yapılan ticari işlemlerin tespit edilip vergilendirilmesi sorunu gerek ulusal gerekse uluslararası alanlarda ciddi ölçüde tartışılmaktadır. Küreselleşme neticesinde hızla gelişen teknoloji aracılığı ile elektronik ticaretin coğrafi sınırları tanımaması nedeniyle, devletlerin mevcut vergi mevzuatları küresel ticaretin ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasında yetersiz kalabilmektedir (Ferhatoğlu, 2006:81). Bu bağlamda asıl sorun; küreselleşmenin neden olduğu artan gelir ve karlılığın mevcut vergisel düzenlemeler kapsamında sistem içine hangi yollarla dahil edileceği ve yeni sisteme geçiş sürecinde vergi matrahlarının aşınması nedeniyle ortaya çıkacak olan gelir kayıplarının nasıl önlenebileceği üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır (Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:28).

Küreselleşme sürecinde elektronik ticaretin vergilendirilmesi ile ilgili olarak karşılaşılabilecek sorunlar uluslararası arenada büyük önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda söz konusu sorunlar aşağıdaki şekilde belirtilebilmektedir (Organ ve Çavdar, 2012:67-72; Yıldız, 2005:94-99; Coşkun, 2005:154-155; Erdem, 2017:19-22; Ekeryılmaz ve Hatipoğlu; 2017:219; Kargı ve Karayılmazlar, 2009:28-29; Öksüz ve Türgay, 2018:144-148; Coşkun Karadağ, 2008:380; Çaşkurlu,

2018:180-186; Canbay, 2009:178-81; Pehlivan ve Öz, 2017: 178-186):

- Elektronik ticaret kapsamında fiziki ürün satışı ve üretiminden dijital üretime doğru geçişle birlikte sabit bir vergi objesinin tanımlanması zorlaşabilmektedir.

- Elektronik ticaret ile birlikte şekil değiştiren ödeme şekilleri ve ürün teslimi vergi idarelerinin vergiyi doğuran olayı tespit edebilmesini zorlaştırmakla birlikte; mükelleflerin vergiden kaçınma ve vergi kaçırma eğilimlerini artırabilmektedir.

- Vergi idarelerinin hesapları nispeten daha kolay izlemelerine imkan veren kaydi işlemlerin yerini izlenebilmesi daha sorunlu olan zımni işlemler alabilmektedir.

- Tüketim üzerinden alınan vergiler itibariyle, elektronik ticaretin tüketicinin taleplerine bağlı olarak yerli ve yabancı satıcılar arasındaki dağılımı incelendiğinde, toplam vergi gelirleri içerisinde tüketim vergilerinin önemli paya sahip olduğu ülkeler söz konusu durumdan olumsuz yönde etkilenebilecektir.

- Özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerde büyük öneme sahip olan ithalat ve gümrük işlemlerinden alınan vergilerde büyük kayıplar gerçekleşebilecektir ve dolayısıyla söz konusu ülkelerde bu kayıplar nedeniyle verilen bütçe açıklarının telafi edilebilmesi için dolaylı vergilerin alımı artırılarak vergi adaleti zedelenebilecektir.

- Elektronik ortamda yapılan anlaşmalar hukuken geçerli olmakla birlikte ortada düzenlenen bir kağıt bulunmaması nedeniyle damga vergisi alınamayarak gelir kayıpları yaşanabilecektir. Banka ve sigorta muameleleri vergisi açısından kıyı bankacılığını yayınlaşması kapsamında kayıplar ortaya çıkabilecektir.

- Vergi yükümlüsünün ülke içindeki hizmet ifası ve mal teslimi ve ithalata uygulanan katma değer vergisi açısından temel sorun ise; varış ülkesi prensibinin uygulanması kapsamında dijital ürünlerin nitelendirilmesi kapsamında ortaya çıkabilmektedir.

- İnternet ortamında gerçekleştirilen elektronik ticarette alıcı ve satıcıların kimlikleri gizlemeleri veya yanlış beyan etmeleri durumunda kendi arzuları dışında vergi idareleri söz konusu ticaretten haberdar olmayarak büyük ölçüde vergi gelirleri azalabilecektir.

- Kişi veya firmalar elektronik ticaret faaliyetlerini gerçekleştirdikleri internet sitelerinden hizmet verdikleri sunucuyu vergi cenneti olarak da nitelendirilebilen düşük veya sıfır vergi oranı uygulayan bir ülkede bulundurarak muhtemel bir kurumlar veya gelir vergisinden rahatça kaçınabilmektedirler.

- Elektronik ticaret vergilendirilirken mükellefiyetin türümü kapsamı yani söz konusu mükellefin dar mülkiyete mi yoksa tam mükellefiyete mi tabii tutulacağı belirlenememekte ve

dolayısıyla vergi gelirlerinde azalmalar meydana gelebilecektir.

SONUÇ

En basit haliyle karşılıklı bağımlılık esasında dünyanın farklı kesimlerinde yaşayan devlet, toplum ve bireyler arasındaki etkileşim ve iletişim derecelerinin yükselmesi olarak tanımlanabilen küreselleşme olgusu ülkelerin ekonomik ve mali yapıları üzerinde önemli rol oynayabilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, küreselleşmenin birçok alanda olumlu etkiye sahip olduğu ifade edilebilirken; gerek ulusal gerekse uluslararası düzeyde özellikle vergilendirme konusu ile ilgili olarak birçok olumsuz etkiye sahip olabilmektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada bahsedildiği gibi küreselleşme süreci neticesinde özellikle ülkelerin birbirleri ile olan ekonomik ve ticari ilişkilerinde ve yabancı sermayenin ülke içine çekilmeye çalışılmasında vergilendirme ile ilgili olarak uluslararası sorunlar yaşanabilmektedir. Söz konusu sorunların giderilebilmesine yönelik olarak da ülkelerin ulusal düzeyde tedbirler alması yeterli değildir. Dolayısıyla uluslararası kuruluş ve örgütlerin bütün ülkeler nezdinde ortaklaşa karar vererek tedbirler alması gerekmektedir.

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CHAPTER 7

THE ISSUE OF FOOD SECURITY AND ITS ROLE IN POLITICAL STABILITY OF MENA

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Introduction

The recent social unrest and political instability occurred in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 began in Tunisia by an individual protest in which a man[1] burned himself to be able to manifest his economic problems. It was not a coincidence that such a public annoyance was declared at the time of a peak in food prices in the world. It is sure that the people in North Africa and the Middle East had been suffering from lack of political rights, unjust distribution of economic wealth, and suppression by ruling elites. However, incompetence in providing peoples' basic needs can easily make people rebel against the authority and create instability in the regions where the people are vulnerable to the provision of their basic needs. As being the world's most food import dependent region that imports half of its wheat needs, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region in which the relation between food security and political stability should be studied exhaustively. Thus, this study is going to

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[1] Mohamed Bouazizi , a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire on December 17, 2010 in front of the governer's office in protesting the humiliation inflicted on him and confiscation of his fruit-cart by a municipal official.

investigate the issue of food security exclusively in MENA and its possible effects on future stability prospects of the region.

In this study, firstly a short definition of food security is going to be given. Then, the following part will consists of literature review. In this review, some previous studies that had investigated the relation between food security and social conflict in literature of politics are going to be dealt with, and some kinds of historical patterns of food riots starting from French Revolution to 1970s will be mentioned. In the following part, the issue of food security in North African countries will be discussed by paying special attention to these countries' dependency to the food imports. Before the conclusion, the last part of the article is going to be devoted firstly to the discussion of whether the global food prices have an impact on the recent social unrest in MENA or not; and secondly to the indication of food security levels of the countries in the region by the aid of some statistics.

What is Food Security?

The concept of food security was firstly come across as a policy concept at the 1974 World Food Conference. At that time, food security was only concerned of supply side issues of food and uncertain international conditions that have potential to hinder the access to the food, and defined as '*the availability at all times of*

adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs'.[2] In those days, the OECD countries had advantageous positions in supplying the food they need as of today, because most of them were producing large agricultural surpluses. On the other hand, if an OECD country had needed to import a substantial amount of its agricultural needs, for instance Japan, its economic power led it to purchase its nutritional deprivations from abroad. However, as of today, the problem was very much urgent for the Third World States. Most of the Third World was not able to cultivate the agricultural product they need and did not have power to buy it from the international markets owing to the rising prices of oil after 1973 which was also a commodity that they needed to import. That is why food was also a weapon which could be used against Third World Countries. Another food security related danger for the Third World was the fact that they were vulnerable to natural disasters that may damage their own food production and as a consequence reduce the amount of global supply and raise the prices in international markets whose disastrous effect would be felt firstly and dramatically by under developed Third World countries that has poor economies. Besides, rapidly growing population in these countries had potential to come up with negative consequences in producing sufficient amount of food that the people need.[3]

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[2] Colin Sage, "Food Security", Human Security and the Environment: International Comparisons, Edward A. Page and Michael Redclift, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002, p. 129.
[3] Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), p. 144-145.

Food security has an important effect on all dimensions of human security as economics, social relations, health, environment and so on. Food security is also a phenomenon that has changed over time. [4] As the time passes, social and cultural needs have evolved the notion of food security and made it more specific. In 1996 World Food Summit, it was stated that food security is achieved '*when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life*'[5]. This definition of food security is still the most commonly accepted one.

Everyday continuously increasing world population also rises people's nutrition needs, and consequently, this results in a rise in the demand for the food in the world. However, this does not mean that the global food supply is not sufficient to fulfill this demand. According to the 2013 statistics of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of UN, daily global food supply per capita is more than world people need. That means total agricultural production in the world is sufficient for the demand, but the reason behind the world food insecurity is based on regional differences in terms of the effects of climate change and economic issues.[6] Climate change causes floods and droughts that ruin or decrease agricultural terrains and the water resources reserved for agricultural production as well. As a result of climate change, the

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[4] Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", International Security, Vol 26, No.2 (Fall 2001), p. 89-90.

[5] Colin Sage, p. 132.

[6] FAO Statistical Yearbook 2013, http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3107e/i3107e03.pdf, (02.12.2014)

decrease in food supply increases the price, and consequently this brings out the problem of accessibility of food. Because even a small amount of increase in food prices makes it much more difficult for poor communities, who are obliged to live with low wages and feint economic conditions, to reach their nutrition needs. As a result, the issue of food security is not related to the amount of global food supply; because in expectable circumstances, food supply of the world is enough for the demand. So the issue of food security is directly associated with the phenomenon of accessibility to the food and the stability of food systems of each specific country. To sum up, the issue of food security concentrates on the economic level of societies that enables them to access their food needs, sustainability of food systems, reliability of food storage procedures, and the quality of accessed food in terms of nutritive value and hygiene.

Social Conflict and Food Security: A short literature review

In literature, there are quite a few research made on the effects of food security issues on the political stability of states. In most of these studies, food security issue was dealt with in the context of food prices in international markets. In one of those research, made by Arezki and Brückner[7], the level of global food prices in 120 country between 1970 and 2007 have been examined in annual basis; and their effects on democracy, intra-state conflict and political institutions have been

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[7] Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner, "Food Prices and Political Instability", IMF Working Paper, 11/62 (2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1162.pdf, (02/02/2014)

investigated. According to this study, the rise in food prices is felt much more strongly in low income countries than high or middle income countries, and this results as the deterioration of democratic institutions and appearance of anti-governmental demonstrations in low income countries. In another study made by Bellemare[8] that investigated the global food prices in monthly basis for the period between 1990 and 2011, the question of "do food prices cause political unrest?" has tried to be answered. In this study, not only the effects of the rise in food prices but also the effects of the volatility of food prices on social unrest are investigated. According to the study, an increase in food prices causes a rise in political unrest in public, while a volatility in food prices decrease the level of political unrest. So as a policy recommendation, this study argues that rather than food price volatility, policy makers should focus on the high level of food prices and try to take the necessary measure to decrease it. Another study[9], conducted by Ray Bush, focuses on the phenomenon of food riots in the context of the food price peak in 2007-2008. The study asserts that "*food riots were part of an important groundswell of mobilization that brought together a wide range of political coalition for change and the promotion of human dignity*"[10] which means the high level of food prices is not the only reason of seemingly food related political unrests, but it is among the disturbing facts inside the

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[8] Marc F. Bellemare, "Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Social Unrest", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 97, Issue 1, 2015, p. 1-21.
[9] Ray Bush, "Food Riots: Poverty, Power and Protest", Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2010, p. 119-129.
[10] Ibid., s. 119.

society such as injustice, inequality, political repression and so forth. The study, made by Alan Dupont and Mark Thirlwell, stresses on exploring the reasons behind 2008 food crisis by investigating it in a historical viewpoint. This study also tries to come up with some recommendations for policymakers and business.[11] There are numerous food-related social unrest in history.[12] It is believed that disturbances, aroused because of lack of food supply or high food prices, are among the causes of many political developments in history including even French and Russian Revolutions. Yet, it is said that there were some food riots before the French Revolution as well; however, they did not involve political demonstrations. Rather, in these demonstrations; farmers, merchants and traders were targeted; and they were being forced to cut their profits, as a result of which demonstrators were expecting a decrease in food prices. However, after the French Revolution, food based riots started to be political in nature; and to threaten the governments and such political units in charge.[13] Another pattern of food riots in historical sense is the fact that occurrence of food based disturbances has been much more likely in net food importing regions than in net exporting ones. For instance, in post-industrial revolution England, food based grievances were

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[11] Alan Dupont and Mark Thirlwell, "A New Era of Food Insecurity?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 2011, 51:3, p. 71-98.

[12] For more historical information about food-related social unrests see George Rude, The Crowd in History, New York: Wiley, 1964; David Arnold, "Dacoity and Rural Crime in Madras, 1860-1940", Journal of Peasant Studies 6(2): 140-167; Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution,1917, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Andrew F. Smith, Starving the South, New York: Martin's Press, 2011.

[13] Bellemare, op.cit., p. 7

breaking out in food importing north and west regions of England rather than in south and east parts. One another important thing that should be mentioned about food based riots in history is that the food riots that disappeared after 1850s started to reappear in 1970s, as the level of integration in world economy had been developing. The reason was that as the world economically integrated after 1970s, the food prices even in local level firstly started to be strongly influenced and finally determined by international indicators.[14]

Issue of Food Security and Import Dependency of North African Countries

Geographically the North Africa consists of -from the west to the east-Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. There are some common features among these states. For instance; Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya share many similiarities, like the ethnicities of people living –mostly Arabo-Berber-, using French linguistics and similar administrative practices coming from colonial times. On the other hand, in Egypt which is the leader state of Arab nationalism, 86 million people are living consists of Arabs, Hamites, and Nubians. Other than political security issues, these states in North Africa also face similar non-political security challenges originated from climate change, rising energy and food prices. These states have centralized economies where the state apparatus and a small group of elites have a determinant character and have a final say on the distribution of mostly state-owned resources. Besides, states are the main providers

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[14] Bellemare, op.cit., p. 8.

of jobs, social investments and services. Role of the military - especially in Algeria and Egypt- is to defend the status quo. However, such roles of the states have been come under a strict constraint in recent years by the aid of economic reforms undertaken after 1980s. These reforms have transformed regional economies into more liberal ones by increasing level of foreign direct investment in many sectors like energy, infrastructure, tourism, and telecommunication. Such developments have also stabilized the public finance and reduced the public debt.[15] However, these positive developments did not have any positive effect on the welfare of middle class in the region. Approximately half of the population is still living in poverty. For instance, in 2005, 40 percent of Egyptians were living in poverty and nearly 20 percent of Egyptians were living in absolute poverty who were unable to provide even their basic needs. This means that only 40 percent of Egyptians were living above poverty line. Yet, in 2008 when the price of wheat increased in 30 percent, the riots started in the region where half of total wheat need have to be imported. For instance in 2007, 15 percent of all global imported wheat was made by Algeria, Morocco and Egypt. Besides these figures, since the production of many basic foods like cereals, sugar and vegetable oil in these countries is much more costly than buying them from international markets, they have been imported for years as well.[16]

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[15] Claire Spencer, North Africa: New Challenges, Old Regimes, and Regional Security, International Peace Institute Africa Program Working Paper Series, November 2008, p. 1-2.
[16] Ibid., p. 3-4.

In terms of food security parameters; although the North African countries seem to be the most secure ones among the developing regions of the world, they are still facing food security related problems peculiar to the region. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia's relatively high level of per capita food consumption is the result of asymmetrically distributed high incomes and governmental subsidies. Although these subsidies spoil government budget, they are essential for low-income communities' survival in the circumstances of higher levels in international food prices. Because in this region distribution of income is highly unequal. While the richest 20% of people has 44% of all income, the poorest 20% of the population can only earn 7% of total income. Thus, the higher level of food prices severely jeopardizes food security of poors in the region. This does not mean that the region is deprived of positive developments in case of food security. For instance in 2009, by the aid of declining international grain prices and rising level of local production, the region observed development in food security indicators. In this year, besides 23% decrease in grain prices in international markets, total grain production was a record for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia which doubled its 2008 grain output in 2009. By increasing wheat production, Egypt has compensated for its declining rice production. As a result, increasing regional production eased the need for high amount of food imports. However; except Egypt, the level of agricultural production in the region is unpredictable because of erratic rainfalls. This leads to unsteady production of grain and wheat, and forces the already import dependent economies to make

increasing amount of imports to meet food needs. These countries provide approximately half of their grain needs from imports. In 2010, the most import dependent countries of the region, Algeria and Tunisia, imported 61% of their grain needs; while Morocco and Egypt were importing 46% and 36% of their grain needs respectively. In addition, since the amount of cultivable farmland and water is limited in the region, import dependency is projected to be much higher in the future. These import dependent economies finance their food imports by export earnings and capital inflows that makes them dependent to such kind of financial resources.[17]

Food Security in MENA[18] Geography

It is generally thought that social unrest occurs in case of lacking political rights, unjust distribution of economic wealth, and suppression by ruling elites. However, such political sufferings are permanent facts in most part of MENA geography. So, there should be some other triggering facts that determine the time of these social movements in MENA. It is not a coincidence that the social riots started in 2011 in some MENA countries occurred at the time of a peak in global food prices, as the same kind of riots occurred in 2008. It means that not only protracted political insufficiencies of

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[17] Shahla Shapouri, Stacey Rosen, May Peters, Felix Baquedano and Summer Allen, Food Security Assessment, 2010-20, United States Department of Agriculture, July 2010, p. 15-16.

[18] The study made by International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI) includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Yemen within MENA.

governments but immediate adverse changes in the provision of people's basic needs can cause political unrest in societies. Starting from 2000s, there have been two important global food crises. First one occured in 2008 when the food prices has increased by 51 percent between January 2007 and March 2008, and the second one occurred when the food prices increased by 40 percent between January 2010 and February 2011. For instance, the annual rise in the price of rice was more than tripled between April 2007 and April 2008.[19] According to some studies, it is argued that such crises have caused political dissonance in some countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and America.[20] Especially, the second food crises occurred in 2011 is associated with the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia by an individual protest in which a man[21] burned himself to be able to manifest his economic problems and that precipitated the collapse of Bin Ali in Tunisia, Husnu Mubarak in Egypt and Qaddafi in Libya .

In 2011, the world has seen the widespread social protests in MENA countries. These movements were also associated with the political system failures and undemocratic and illiberal regimes in these

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[19] Dupont et all, op.cit., p. 71.

[20] Mindi Schneider, ""We are Hungry!": A Summary Report of Food Riots, Government Responses, and States of Democracy in 2008", December 2008, http://www.businessethicsnetwork.com/downloads/Hungry_rpt2008.pdf, (05.10.2014); Bush, loc cit; Bellemare, loc.cit.

[21] Mohamed Bouazizi , a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire on December 17, 2010 in front of the governer's office in protesting the humiliation inflicted on him and confiscation of his fruit-cart by a municipal official.

countries.[22] However, there are also many studies show that such riots have also been economically affected and are related to the provision of basic needs of vulnerable people.[23] Today, there are many poor countries that import most of their basic needs (food) are vulnerable to global food prices, because they rely on global food supply system.[24] This unfortunately means that today's growing global interdependence not only determines many other things but also human survival.[25] Endurance of a political regime is subjected to its provision of security to its people, otherwise the reason of its existence will be in question. If a regime has difficulties in the provision of sufficient amount of food in reasonable prices for their people, food security no longer exists in that country. When such insecurity occurs, numerous other dissatisfactions reappear and replace the exact reason of the annoyance in public. Then nobody can remember the triggering fact[26] of the existent social riot.[27]

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[22] Fareed Zakaria, "How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East, TIME Magazine, February 3, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2046038,00.html, (March 7, 2012).

[23] Arezki and Brückner, loc cit.

[24] Benjamin Senauer and Luciano Venturini, "The Globalization of Food Systems: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Patterns", The Food Industry Center University of Minnesota, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/14304/1/tr05-01.pdf, (April 12, 2014)

[25] Debora Mackenzie, "Why the Financial System is like an ecosystem", Newscientist, 22 October 2008.

[26] It is believed that the high food prices is among the triggering factors of 2011 Arab Spring riots.

[27] Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam, "The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East", New England Complex System

Each member of a society wants to be governed by a regime in which his or her political representation is guaranteed. Existence of this political system is bounded to the acquiescence of the individual members who admire to practice a fair collective decision making system. In modern societies, it is impossible for individuals or families to address their security needs individually. That is why people admire to live in a political system that includes adequate decision making system that guarantees expected standards of survival fro each member. This is the case especially for the penniless ones who have to live at the margins of hunger threshold. The more dependent a population to the political system, the more this population supports it if only the political system provides security for them. It does not matter if the system is authoritarian, tyranny or any other undemocratic regime. People usually does not care type of the regime which they belong to, as long as they are satisfied with the conditions provided for their security. However, if the political system is not able to provide security for the population, the support they give disappears. As food security is defined as the accessibility to the food at fair prices, threat to food security exists when political system is not capable of providing populations' access to it. In this case, since such people, living at the margins of hunger, have nothing to lose; they do nothing but rebel against the system or the regime. [28]

Institute, September 28, 2011, p. 3-4, http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf, (October 20, 2012).
[28] Ibid.

Source: Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam, "The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East", September 28, 2011, p.3-6.

http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf, (October 20, 2012).

This figure shows the correlation between the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's Food Price Index and the number of food riots from January 2004 to May 2011 around Middle East and North Africa. The numbers in parenthesis reflect the number of deaths occurred in political riots in each specific country. It is seen that the number of deaths in riots is much bigger in the years when food price index is high, especially around 2008 and 2011. When food price index is smaller, the number of deaths in riots is very much lower. According to the analysis made by Lagi, Bertrand and Yam; the political rebels in MENA in 2011 were triggered by a food crisis

which threatened the security of people who live at the margin of hunger. In addition, they also state that when the food price index and the intensity of political riots are considered from January 1990 to May 2011, its highly improbable that the political riots occurred in 2011 in MENA at the time of a peak in global food prices by chance. They state that as the conditions of vulnerable people deteriorate; by the aid of this dissatisfaction, it becomes much more likely that revolts against the political system spread across the country or even the region. They also focus on the causes of increases in food prices and they stress that there are two dominating factors affecting food prices. One reason is the fact that speculators actions which may cause price bubbles can lead to a rise in food prices. The other reason is the high amount of corn to ethanol conversion which diminishes the stocks of total agricultural products that causes the rise in food prices.[29] Because of insufficient and unfair regulations of commodity market which create a vacuum for speculator's action, and unreasonable amount of ethanol conversion which is subsidized by governments causes the rise in food prices. In 2008, parallel to the rise in food price index, there was also unrest in some MENA countries. Having been experienced in 2008, states took some necessary precautions to control the food prices in 2011. If they did not take such measures, it is expected that the situation would be much worse in 2011. Thus, it is certain that the governments have to reconsider to review their biofuel

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[29] Marco Lagi, Yavni Bar-Yam, Karla Z. Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam, "The Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion", New England Complex System Institute, September 21, 2011, http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf, (October 20, 2012).

policy and commodity market regulations. These policy corrections should be made towards decrementing the volume of biofuel production and the ease of the actors in commodity market.[30]

MENA is one of the most food insecure regions in the world. First of all, it is the world's most food import dependent region. MENA countries are importing approximately 50 percent of their food consumptions. Despite the rising consumption, inertia in the supply side of the food causes a huge gap in food trade deficit of the countries in the region. Besides the high unemployment, poverty and malnutrition levels; the number of population is also rising in this region. It is expected that the population will double and exceed 650 million until 2050 in MENA geography where there are severe limitations to economic and agricultural growth as well, such as water scarcity, detrimental effects of climate change and conflicts that rupture development and displace people.[31]

The increasing food demand and limitations to agricultural growth like water scarcity, climate change and political conflicts increase region's food trade deficit. Before 2011 riots, the region has deeply felt the 2007/2008 global food crisis. Following this crisis, the global recession brought increased food prices, reduction in remittances and export earnings. This mostly affected the poor people in the region.

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[30] Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam,, op.cit., p.6-7.
[31] Middle East and North Africa Strategy, International Food Policy Research Institute, February 2010, p.1, http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/menastrategy.pdf, (March 28, 2012),

Thus, food price related political riots, due to rising cost of wheat and bread consequently, occurred in Morocco in September 2007, Yemen in March 2008 and Egypt in April 2008. It is sure that other countries in the region have been effected from such political unrests originated because of high global food prices and each one tried to take necessary precautions to alleviate the crisis. Considerably oil wealthy countries: The UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia were lucky and they used their earnings from energy export to finance the crisis by raising public sector salaries and increasing subsidies on basic food products. On the other hand; Iran, Syria and Jordan could not escaped from the detrimental effects of rising inflation.[32]

For sure the situation is not the same for all MENA countries. There are many differences between those countries in terms of amount of food trade, amount of agricultural products, consumption of calorie per capita and so on. As it is seen in the table below, it is possible to divide those countries in MENA into two groups as food secure countries and non-food secure countries. According to this division, food secure countries in the region are Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; and non-food secure countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine[33], and Yemen. The

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[32] Chris Abbott and Sophie Marsden, "From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and North Africa", Oxford Research Group, March 2009, p. 4-5, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/withinandwithout.pdf, (July 12, 2013).
[33] It is called West Bank and Gaza in the report.

classification made in International Food Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI) report, takes four criteria into consideration. These are food trade criteria calculated by total export/food imports, food production per capita criteria, calorie consumed per capita criteria and income per capita criteria. A country is accepted as food secure if it is above the world average in terms of the first three criteria –which are food trade criteria, food production per capita criteria and calorie consumed per capita criteria- and/or if it is a rich country in terms of income per capita. Iran is the only country in MENA that fulfills the first three criteria although it is not a high income country. The other food secure countries – which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates - are below the world average in food production per capita, however the numbers in food trade, calorie per capita and income per capita are above the average. According to the investigation, all countries in MENA including the nonfood secure ones, except Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti and Palestine are above the world average in terms of calorie consumed per capita, however the other nonfood secure countries are below the average in terms of other criterias and income per capita as well. Besides, in the report it is stated that half a dollar decrease in income per day almost double the number of poor people in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan which are among the nonfood secure countries and cannot fulfill any food security criteria except calorie per capita per day.[34] This also shows how severely the people in these countries are effected from even a small increase in international food prices. Although Sudan is below

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[34] Middle East and North Africa Strategy, p. 1-4.

the world average in all four criterias mentioned above, its territory has a great potential of irrigation where the land and water is sufficient for agriculture due to the existence of Nile River. However, if Sudan attempts to use more water from the Nile, it has to renegotiate the treaty it signed in 1959 with Egypt.[35] That means some kind of regulations for the provision of food security have a potential to create conflicts in the region as well.

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[35] Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security", International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer, 1993), p. 92.

Source: Middle East and North Africa Strategy, International Food Policy Research Institute, February 2010, (March 28, 2012).

MENA countries	Total export/ food	Food production per capita	Calorie per capita per day	GNI per capita
Food security challenge countries				
Mineral resource rich				
Algeria	8.7	111	3,070	2,720
Iraq	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	*800
Libya	11.1	133	3,380	5,860
Sudan	5.5	148	2,270	640
Syria	8.9	237	3,070	1,430
Yemen	4.9	44	2,010	650
Mineral resource poor				
Djibouti	2.1	54	2,270	1,000
Egypt	6.9	199	3,330	1,270
Jordan	4.7	120	2,730	2,490
Lebanon	2.4	258	3,190	5,520
Morocco	8.1	163	3,110	1,990
Tunisia	11.2	220	3,280	2,880
West Bank and Gaza	1.1	135	2,240	1,230
Food secure countries				
Iran	15.9	246	3,120	2,580
Bahrain	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	*24,733
Kuwait	25.4	55	3,110	30,630
Saudi Arabia	19.2	104	2,800	12,540
United Arab Emirates	17.2	114	3,250	22,583
Q	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	*76,000
a	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	*24,674
t				
World average	11.3	233	2,736	

http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/menastrategy.pdf,

By looking overall statistics, it can be said that MENA has achieved a good level of food security and a lower hunger rate compared to some other regions, with average per capita daily consumption is 3.029 calories that is higher than world's average of 2,798 calories and the undernourished population at 8.7 per cent, still good compared to 14 per cent in the world. However, food security still represents a challenge in the region, because of two indicators. First, the proportion of children under-5 who are underweight remains relatively high, at 14.1 per cent. Second and more important, significant differences exist among countries in calorie consumption. The undernourished population reaches 27 per cent in Sudan and 36 per cent in Yemen; the rate of undernourished children reaches 26 per cent in Somalia, 41 per cent in Sudan and 46 per cent in Yemen. Another problem is diet quality. While cereals and meat products are easily accessible in the region, fruits and vegetables are generally more scarce and expensive. Food insecurity affects vulnerable groups in the region such as nomadic pastoral communities, internally displaced persons, and the disadvantaged rural population as a whole. Vulnerable households have poor and unstable access to a sufficient quantity and quality of appropriate foods for a nutritious family diet.[36] The other issue is about the water supply in the region. Agriculture produces 12 percent of MENA economy but uses 89 percent of the water in this geography. Thus, because of climate change and

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[36] Ida Christensen, Benoist Veillerette and Sarantis Andricopulos, The Status of Rural Poverty in the Near East and North Africa, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2007, p. 26, http://www.ifad.org/pub/pn/nenapoverty.pdf, (18 March 2014).

variability, it is expected that agricultural products will reduce in coming years.[37]

Conclusion

It is understood that the food security issue especially in developing countries is among the causes of social unrest and high level of food prices that are determined in international markets is one of the very first causes of food insecurity. So the policy makers in developing countries as in MENA have to take some precautions in this respect. Firstly, policy makers should focus on the level of food prices and take necessary measures to keep them in a reasonable level. Although the food prices are determined in international markets in today's liberal world economy, local governments should also have some policy responses against rising food prices in international markets. In order to do that policy makers should secure the amount of food supply that people need, and they have to take necessary precautions to decrease their dependency to food imports. This can be managed in some different ways, for instance in order to increase agricultural yield, policy makers should investigate in agricultural research, support and subsidize urban people, and support the use of technology in agricultural production.

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[37] Middle East and North Africa Strategy, p.2.

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CHAPTER 8

OPENING A HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE ROOTS OF CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA

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Introduction

The civil war in Syria is an armed conflict between the Ba'ath regime under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad and his supporters, and those seeking to oust him. It began as a part of the uprisings in the Middle East, called as Arab Spring, which brought challenges to the region. Opposition groups drawing attention on human rights, democracy and development of economic conditions demanded toppling of the Assad regime. Nevertheless, when the Syrian army fired on demonstrators across the country, uprisings evolved to an armed conflict. Since the region was in a fragile situation, several actors were included into the agenda both from the region and out of the region. With the involvement of radical and fundamental groups, such as ISIL (the Islamic State) and Al-Nosra, into the picture, the issue crucially internationalized. With the affiliation of foreign fighters in the civil war and reciprocal violence with the regime has dramatized the issue. Unpredictable effects of a possible regime change have caused engagement of several actors like Hezbollah and Iran, which are mobilized with ideological and political motivations.

With the beginning of the civil war in Syria, all sectarian violence among Shii and Sunni groups increased, and sectarian oppositions in the region have begun to be defined on the basis of Syrian uprisings. Involvement of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran, and their support for the Assad regime, formation of opposition Sunni groups with logistical and financial assistances of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Turkey aiming topple of the regime, and involvement of the US and Russia have triggered violence in both international and regional fields.

The civil war is predominantly considered on preferential basis of sectarianism and sectarianism is noted as the cause of civil war, which is especially defined with fights among a blend of religious groups. For instance, Qatar-based news agency, Aljazeera, addresses the minority religious groups tend to support the Assad government, while pointing Sunni Muslims as the overwhelming majority of opposition fighters.[1] In addition to sectarian pamper within Syria, the sectarian split is reflected among regional actors' stances as well. Regardless of their regional strategies, the involved states of the civil war are treated as acting only through their sectarian potentials. Majority-Shia Iran and Iraq support Assad, as does Lebanon-based Hezbollah; while Sunni-majority states including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others staunchly support the Sunni groups.[2] In other words, there is a heavily emphasis on sects and sectarianism in terms of causes of the civil war and the involving actors in Syria.

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[1] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html Date Accessed: 23.01.2019.
[2] Ibid.

In this article, I will propose the history of Syria as an independent state, and its social-economic and political evaluation as the causes of the civil war. Without falling to 'the trap of sectarianism', which is usually preferred to explain recent developments not only in Syria but also in the Middle East in general, I will point state-society relations and social changes as the historical reasons behind the civil war in Syria. As it is noted, I will not take the easy way out by giving attention to sectarian divisions and religion much more than they are. On the other hand, I am not totally rejecting the significance, influence and existence of religious and sectarian differences. Sectarian, regional and tribal categories can overlap to a great extent with socio-economic categories, and that urban-rural contrasts can equally coincide with sectarian contrasts.[3] Furthermore, an overlap of sectarian, regional and tribal, and socio-economic loyalties can result in their elements becoming inseparably inter-connected, as well as in their complementing and reinforcing each other. Therefore, it may be incorrect to attribute the representation of specific religious communities in power institutions, at any level, to the existence of sectarian loyalties, or to explain it on that basis, without taking into account the socio-economic and politico-historical backgrounds of the people involved. In this regard, I will re-focus on formation process of the Syrian state. I will evaluate the rise of the Ba'ath Party in Syrian

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[3] Van Dam. Nikolaos, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba'th Party*, I.B. Tauris: London and New York, 1997, p. 75.

politics and, related to this, social changes within the Syrian society as the causes of the recent civil war.[4]

Social Change in Syrian Political History

Syria was conquered by the Ottomans in 1516 and it was ruled from İstanbul almost for four centuries until the early 1920s. The Ottomans gave autonomy to local governors and religious groups. After the Ottomans began to decline, Western economic, political and military penetration increased in Syria. With dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Syria began to be controlled by the French mandate until its independence in 1946. According to Khoury, the Syrian political structure did not change abruptly with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and imposition of European rule after the World War I.[5] There was a continuity of elite's political role during the Ottoman rule and after its collapse, and under the French mandate. Political power was monopolized by the traditional landholding or mercantile families and traditional Sunni leaders of the major interior cities including Aleppo, Hamah, Homs and particularly Damascus.[6] In other words, as Rabinovich claims, there was a continuation of Sunni predominance

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[4] Since I believe the roots of the Syrian civil war originate from the social changes that Syria society experienced with the Ba'ath Party's coming to the power, I will limit the scope of the article with the period between 1963 and 2000, and not approach the Bashar's rule. Many studies on the recent civil war in Syria tackle with sectarianism issue. Therefore, I want to draw attention to the historical context.

[5] Khoury. Philip, "Syrian Political Culture: A Historical Perspective" in Ed. Antoun Richard and Quataert Donald, *Syria: Society, Culture, and Polity*, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1991, p. 13.

[6] Bannerman. Graeme, "Syrian Arab Republic" in Long David and Reich Bernard, *The Governmental and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Westview Press: Boulder, 1995, p. 210.

and hegemony over non-Sunni and non-Muslim population.[7] Syria was controlled by the urban Sunni elites which had dominated the Syrian society and economy for hundreds of years.[8] As Hinnebusch points Syrian politics was an urban game of competition for the spoils of office between small groups of landlords-notables and their followers.[9] Majority of the population was out of political arena. It was after the World War II that changed the political structure of Syria. After the World War II, the elite lost their power and the Syrian political culture challenged with new forms with increasing influence of rural communities and minorities on political life. Thus, this article will heavily focus on the period from Syria's independence in 1946 to establishment of Ba'ath rule in 1963.

According to Rachel Bronson, without understanding the tumultuous and unpredictable nature of Syrian politics throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it is impossible to appreciate fully the achievement of Assad's 30 years of uninterrupted rule and the risks Bashar inherits with leadership.[10] Between 1946 and onwards, Syria was one of the most unstable states in the region. Experiencing regular coups, struggles for the leadership of Syria reflected deep divisions between the Sunni majority and the minority groups, land owners and dispossessed, those

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[7] Rabinovich. Itamar, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-45", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 14, 1979, p. 693.
[8] Cohen. Ronen, *Upheavals in the Middle East: The Theory and Practice of a Revolution*, Lexington Books: Plymouth, 2014, p. 159.
[9] Hinnebusch. Raymond, *Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural Development*, Westview Press: Boulder, 1989, p. 17.
[10] Bronson. Rachel, "Syria: Hanging Together or Hanging Seperately", *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, 23:4, p. 92.

from Damascus and those from Aleppo, urban and rural dwellers, pan-Arabists and other political groups.[11] In such a politicized environment and rife with factions, the Syrian society was open to fundamental changes. Causes originating from politico-historical and socio-economic reasons are important factors accelerated the social change in Syrian political and social life, and caused the strong representation of minorities in the state institutions and bureaucracy. Firstly, the French mandate directly affected the political structure in Syria. The hostility of the Syrian Sunni Muslim population to French rule led the mandatory authorities to adopt a policy that played upon the division within the society.[12] The French favored recruitment from the various religious groups and ethnic minorities, such as Alawis, Druzes and Christians. Sunnis were not encouraged to enlist in state institutions, especially the army. It was a divide and rule policy that the French chose personnel from remote areas and from minority groups with limited independence aspirations. In this regard, it aimed to prevent any of the communities from detaining a position so powerful as to be able to endanger the position of the central administration.[13] In addition, the French also aimed to enlist members of influential families into the army in order to secure allegiance of the minority communities from which they were primarily drawn. These groups were not the groups, which had rebelled against the French, but the groups which remained neutral or loyal to them.[14] The wealthy

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[11] Ibid, p. 92.
[12] Bannerman, 1995, p. 201.
[13] Van Dam, 1997, p. 26.
[14] Ibid, p. 27.

Sunni majority, who supported the Arab nationalist movements against the French occupation, indirectly reinforced the trend toward strong representation of minorities in the state institutions, especially in the army, by refusing to send their sons for military training or as officers, which were viewed as serving the French interests. Even, they defined the army as a place for the lazy, the rebellious, the backward, or the socially undistinguished.[15] A young man would join the military unless he had failed at school or expelled.[16]

As a socio economic factor, many people living in the poor rural areas saw the military as an opportunity to climb the social ladder and as a chance for a more comfortable life. These people were coming from economically less developed areas and therefore attracted by the opportunities provided by the army. For people living in the urban, it was easier to avoid military service by paying a redemption fee, when compared to their rural counterparts. With the independence of Syria in 1946, admissions to the army increased. Once having moved into command positions, these officers brought in relatives and others from their sectarian, regional or tribal communities, helping them to advance and tending to favor their applications to the army, navy and air academies. In addition to these, migration of rural to urban increased gradually. The takeover by lower middle-class and poorer rural minorities caused a social revolution. Traditional relationships were more or less completely turned upside down. Minorities began to dominate the predominantly Sunni people of the major cities and

[15] Ibid, p. 27.
[16] Seale Patrick, *The Struggle for Syria*, I.B. Tauris: London, 1987, p. 37.

bureaucracy. Van Dam calls it as 'national emancipation'. Sectarian division, on the other hand, mostly existed from these changing urban-rural relationships.[17] The rural-urban and minority-Sunni dichotomies have blurred and resulted in much more complexity among inter-communal and class relations.

Within this context, the Ba'ath Party became the main instrument, which new middle class and peasantry supported. Its nationalist and populist discourses and demands of new middle class and peasants were overlapping.

The Ba'ath Party

According to Hinnebusch, there are two developments that caused the rise of the Ba'ath ideology and fall of the 'old' regime: the conflicts between landlords and peasants, and the rise of a salaried new middle class. The rise of the Ba'ath cannot be understood apart from the class structure of traditional Syria, because the impact of social change on this structure generated the forces, new classes and new class alliances.[18] The first development was rooted in 19th century penetration of capitalism, which gave rise to landed estates at the expense of peasants. An urban based landed class was created. There was an economic and cultural gap between the urban and the rural. Moreover, the urban had the major political institutions.

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[17] Van Dam, 1997, p. 139.
[18] Hinnebusch. Raymond, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria", in Ed. Antoun Richard and Quataert Donald, *Syria: Society, Culture, and Polity*, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1991, p. 30.

The state was built up on this social contradiction. It was indeed little more than the executive committee of the landed commercial ruling classes.[19] It was controlling the land and markets in support of political elite and the urban, which was resulted in dependency and clientalism.

The creation of modern state institutions such as bureaucracy, army and educational system challenged the old order and a new class, salaried middle class recruited from the rural, emerged. This new class opposed to the old regime and the landed elite. The armed forces and rural intelligentsia became two of the bases, where anti-elite groups gathered. Minority groups played a central role in these bases. The new class demanded populist re-distribution of opportunity and a leading role of state on economy. Inspired by pan-Arab and anti-imperialist ideas, the new class criticized the elite because of being linked to the West. The Ba'ath Party, with its nationalist commitments, became the main organization that middle classes and peasants drew attention and came together.

Therefore, as Hinnebusch notes, the Ba'ath cadres were products of the village, officers and intellectuals of rural origin from the mountain peasants, minorities and, to a lesser extent, mainstream Sunni peasantry.[20]

The Ba'ath Party was defined as acting through sects and favoring the minorities. Although it was imputed as sectarian that

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[19] Ibid, p. 31.
[20] Ibid, pp. 32-33.

prioritized the minority groups especially the Alawis, sectarian ties were not exploited by the party that members of it strongly disliked the idea of exploiting sectarianism, which they saw as backward and barrier to the ideal of secular and egalitarian Arab nationalism.[21] When it came to the power in 1963, emphasizes in the Constitution of Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party pointed that the party was not in favor of any sect or religion and it did not exclude the religion from any spheres of the social life:

> "The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any difference existing among its sons are accidental and unimportant. They will disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness. The national bond will be the only bond existing in the Arab state. It ensures harmony among the citizens by melting them in the crucible of a single nation, and combats all other forms of factional solidarity such as religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional factionalism."[22]

According to the party, Islam constituted an essential and inseparable part of Arab national identity. There was a unique relationship between Islam and Arab identity that Islam was seen as an important component of the national identity. Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Ba'ath Party, structured his ideas upon the common memory of all

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[21] Van Dam, 1997, p. 138.
[22] Ibid, p. 15.

Arabs of the glory of the golden age of Islam.[23] Although Islam was seen as a component, according to the party, discrimination against other religions was unaccepted. This is why the party had tolerance against non-Muslims as a basic tenet.

On the other hand, after the party took over the power in 1963, it relied heavily on the party members' own communities because of practical purposes. They wanted to consolidate power and they needed support, which they derived from their communities. This was opposed by the Sunni and non-Alawi groups that they claimed it was sectarianism. It was only natural that the Sunni and other groups define sectarianism as a weapon to undermine the secularly inspired Alawi-dominated Ba'ath regime.[24] There is no doubt that the key positions, particularly in the security services, were held by the minorities, especially by men of Alawi origin. However, there is no reason to believe that positions on state-economy relations correlate with ethnicity and religious differences. Furthermore, when one looks at public policies of the Ba'ath, it is clear that critical policies are directed toward social classes rather than primordial groups.[25] Although representation of minorities in the state institutions are more than the majority of the population, Which is Sunnis, there are some writers claiming that there is a clear relationship between political stability and the degree of sectarian factionalism in the political elite.

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[23] Bannerman, 1995, p. 212.
[24] Van Dam, 1997, p. 139.
[25] Waldner. David, *State Building and Late Development*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 1999, p. 74.

For example, Van Dam notes that if there is a great diversity, the result is usually political instability.[26] In this regards, he claims that Syria under the Ba'ath rule, especially after Hafiz al-Assad came to the power, experienced more internal political stability and continuity than ever before since independence. Similarly, Hinnebusch and Drysdale argue that under Assad, Syria in effect metamorphosed from a plaything into a player.[27]

Even though the 'father Assad' period is considered as the period of sectarianism and his policies are thought as causes of today's civil war, his governance was more than sectarianism. His ability to balance factions in Syria and cooptation with opposing groups is important. In his early period, he supported economic liberalization and cooptation. He brought into power many Sunni leaders including Mustafa Tlas and Hikmat Shihabi.[28] Economic liberalization highlighted the private sector and rolled the state back in the economy. He downgraded the role of the party and enhanced access by the Sunni bourgeoisie to regime councils, and tried to broaden his base to the business class.[29] He encouraged marriage alliances between Alawi elite and business families and the Sunni ones. He made gestures of reconciliations to the Sunni urban business people and merchants.[30] In

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[26] Van Dam, 1997, pp. 136-137.
[27] Bronson, 2000, p. 94.
[28] Ibid, p. 94.
[29] Hinnebusch Raymond, "State and Islamism in Syria" in Ed. Sidahmad Abdel Salam and Ehteshami Anoushiravan, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Westview Press: Boulder, 1996, p. 210.
[30] Cleveland. Michael, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Westview Publishing: Boulder, 2000, p. 390.

another pragmatic gesture, he set up institutions of political participation that were more open and more broadly based than any Syria had known in over a decade.[31]

In order to remove the image of Alawi favoritism and clientalism, al-Assad built mosques, patronized the ulama and propagated Islam in mass media. As a part of this effort, he tried to re-Islamize the Alawis. Mosques were heavily built in mountainous places, where the Alawis were living, the media depicted Alawis as genuine Muslims, al-Assad's son, Basil, was shown making the hajj and when he died, his funeral was presided over by a Sunni cleric.[32] The Alawis were not allowed their own religious courts (despite being generally regarded as Shiite Muslims) and were brought under the same sharia rules as the Sunnis.[33] Islam presented in the schoolbooks was orthodox Sunni Islam, Islamic minorities living in Syria were not mentioned. According to the schoolbooks, there was no diversity between Alawis and Islam. Presenting a monolithic view of Islam became even more important for the regime after the Islamist uprising and subsequent massacre of thousands in Hama in 1982.[34] On numerous occasions al-Assad made an effort to build up an orthodox religious image for the sake of secular regime. He publicly performed prayers in mostly Sunni mosques including the famous Umayyad Mosque in

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[31] Ibid, p. 388.
[32] Hinnebusch, 1996, p. 211.
[33] http://muftah.org/assad-regimes-policies-nurtured-sectarianism-syria/#.WIpU8vmLTIU
[34] Ibid.

Damascus, and quoted from Quran in many of his speeches.[35] He tried to foster conservative 'al-Azhar-like' Islamic establishments to legitimate the regime. He even opened 'Asad Quranic schools'.[36]

Conclusion

After al-Assad's death in 2000, his son Bashar came to the power and inherited a monumental task. Studies concentrated on Bashar's term of office are based on the logical assumption that the structure and rules of the Syrian regime have basically remained the same, even though the faces have changed.[37] When compared to the party, Bashar gave primacy to his presidency and strengthened his rule. On the other hand, he maintained his father's collaborative policies towards the Sunni majority. He was increasingly receptive to the demands of the ulama allowing them to expand informal networks of religious education, while the number of charities and Islamic secondary schools skyrocketed.[38] However, Bashar's conciliatory strategy did not produce the desired outcome.

Bashar followed an "economo-centric" view of politics. He recognized the priority of modernizing Syria's economy and was aware that to do so he must gain the goodwill of the West.[39] This

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[35] Hinnebusch, 1991, p. 143.
[36] Hinnebusch, 1996, p. 211.
[37] Ziadeh. Radwan, *Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East*, I.B. Tauris: London, 2011, p. 48.
[38] https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB77.pdf
[39] Bar. Shmuel, *Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview*, Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2006, p. 379.

entails creating a functional bureaucracy to replace of the feudal system that thrived under his father. It is resulted in increasing economic gap between the 'circle' around the presidency including minorities and the periphery, who are mostly rural and lost its supremacy under the Ba'ath rule. Today, it is not surprising that when Syrian demonstrations began in 2011, economic demands were at the core of protests.[40] Protestors not only targeted repressive security apparatus of the state but also they complained about economic conditions that led to deteriorating standards of living, which were outcome of the economic and political policies of the Ba'ath Party since 1963.

In 1997, Van Dam argued that when Syria became independent in 1946, it was in many respects a state without being a nation-state, a political entity without being a political community.[41] Hafiz al-Assad, to some extent, consolidated the power and challenged Syria to a policymaker in the region. His son, Bashar, maintained the inherited system with few reforms. However, there is a vicious cycle, where the Syrian regime has repeatedly found itself: For the regime success, it is essential to have reliable power instruments including sectarian ties and loyalties. On the other hand, maintaining the power entailed dependence on these loyalties hinders their suppression and causes sectarianism criticisms.

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[40] Abboud. Samer, "Locating the 'Social' in the Social Market Economy" in Ed. Hinnebusch. Raymond, and Zintl. Tina, *Syria From Reform to Revolt: Political Economy and International Relations*, Syracuse University Press: New York, 2015, p. 64.
[41] Van Dam, 1997, p. 5.

Discussing the recent civil war in Syria through sectarian disputes is distorting the issue and it is not a constructive analysis. The fact that sectarianism is a major factor in the struggle for power does not imply that other elements, such as socio-economic and ideological factors, were not important, or could be ignored. The recent civil war in Syria is not a product of Sunni majority's opposition to the governing elite of minorities, as mostly emphasized, the Alawis. It is a struggle between transposed social classes. It is a struggle between the minorities, who located in the economy and bureaucracy of the state and, who do not want to lose these privileged positions to the 'periphery', and the majority, who suppressed by the regime and wants to capture the 'center'.

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
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